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Abstract 
The Allure of Affect: Rigor, Style, and Unintelligibility in Kristeva and Irigaray 
Abigail Suzanne Kluchin 
 
In this dissertation, I develop a theory of interpretation that attends to the often 
neglected affective dimensions of reading through a careful investigation of the writings 
of Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva. For much of the history of Western thought, a 
privileging of systematic and linear discourse as a crucial signifier of philosophical rigor 
has gone hand in hand with a certain disdain for the body and the emotions. The texts that 
I examine attempt to disrupt and discredit the equation of philosophy and systematicity. 
They refuse both in content and in style the steady march of analytic logic in favor of 
writing that is more intuitive, more experimental, and eminently more risky. I contend 
that even psychoanalytic and deconstructive interpretive approaches, which privilege the 
marginal, the de-centered, and the inaccessible, have not fully engaged with the question 
of affect in philosophical writing. The overarching question this dissertation seeks to 
examine is this: how can we find a way to take seriously the affective responses that 
philosophical texts provoke, and to incorporate their content, strength, and effect into the 
arsenal of strategies for reading and interpretation without relegating such reactions to the 
damning category of the ‘merely subjective’?   
I take as my primary focus texts that foreground and even force an affective 
response, and I read such works as possessed of their own distinctive rigor.  I maintain 
that one of the ways that affect is made evident to the reader is through what I term a 
“rigorous unintelligibility.”  I argue that attention to the protocols of such rigorously 
unintelligible texts produces a way to read that neither accentuates the individual reader 
at the expense of the text, nor banishes the reader’s visceral affective reactions to the 
realm of the subjective and inadmissible. Throughout, I refine the always slippery 
category of affect. In particular, affect is not simply interior; rather, it emerges and 
communicates itself through the ongoing interaction with the world. Affect is in rooms, 
in texts, in averted glances, in speeches, in dreams, in crying jags and in lecture notes, in 
philosophy and in poetry, in theories and in bodies. It has a deeply un-Cartesian lack of 
respect for or knowledge of the membrane of the skin, the boundary between the self and 
the world. 
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Introduction 
 
On Bad Reading 
 
 
"What does it mean to fall in love with a writer? What does it mean, for that matter—or maybe we should 
ask, what else could it mean—to cathect in a similar way a theoretical moment not one's own?" –Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling 
 
 
 
In her recent book The Transmission of Affect, Teresa Brennan opens with a 
disarming appeal to her reader to recall an everyday experience that usually passes 
without undue reflection.  “Is there anyone,” she asks, “who has not, at least once, walked 
into a room and ‘felt the atmosphere’?”1 She does not take herself to be describing a 
purely subjective experience. Rather, the atmosphere in this hypothetical room pre-exists 
the hypothetical reader’s entrance and as she enters, the atmosphere actually makes its 
way into her in a meaningful sense.  There is a certain initial impersonality to this 
experience. For an affect, in Brennan’s view, is not identical to a feeling; rather, it is “the 
physiological shift accompanying a judgment” and involves an “energetic dimension,” 
such that it can “enhance” or “deplete” the recipient.2  
Moreover, Brennan adheres to Freud’s fairly rigid distinction between thoughts 
and affects and the way that they attach to one another.3 While I may walk into that room 
and find the anxiety or rage of one of its occupants contagious and begin to experience it 
myself, the transmission of the affect does not carry along with it a concomitant “copy” 
                                                
1 Teresa Brennan, The Transmission of Affect, p. 1.  
 
2 Ibid., p. 5-6.  
 
3 See, for example, Freud’s discussion of affects in dreams in the Dream-Work section of The 
Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 460-487 in Volume V of the Standard Edition, and pp. 462-492 of Die 
Traumdeutung in the Gesammelte Werke, Volumes II/III. All citations from Freud refer to these editions. 
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of the thoughts attaching to the transmitter’s affect. In other words, to invoke another 
Freudian concept, this phenomenon should not be misread as a case of magical thinking, 
the infantile belief that a mere thought can materially influence the external world. “The 
point is that, even if I am picking up on your affect, the linguistic and visual content, 
meaning the thoughts I attach to that affect, remain my own: they remain the product of 
the particular historical conjunction of words and experiences I represent.”4 That is to 
say, two individuals walking into this affectively laden room, depending on their 
receptiveness, might experience a similar charge, as it were, but each would subsequently 
be referred to a wholly distinct set of thoughts, associations, and images. 
Although Brennan does not put it in precisely these terms, the consciousness of 
the atmosphere in the affectively charged room is in a sense a vestigial experience, the 
remnants of a phenomenon that would once have been taken for granted. In her view, a 
robust adherence to the distinction between subjects and objects, which requires a 
severing of affective ties to an object in order to stake a claim to objectivity, tends to 
obliterate the possibility of taking affects as a legitimate object of study.5  For in order to 
do so, it would be necessary to conceive the individual as porous and receptive rather 
than self-contained and autonomous, a view that runs wholly counter to the Cartesian 
subject and its many successors. I will return at length to Brennan’s and others’ analyses 
of the category of affect, its connotations, and its possibilities. But for the moment I 
                                                
4 Brennan, The Transmission of Affect, p. 7.  
 
5 I will return to this contention at length in the final section of Chapter One as I examine the ways in 
which the Western philosophical tradition has often proven itself to be “allergic” or at least wildly 
ambivalent with respect to emotion, feeling, and passion, and particularly the ways in which this has played 
out along the axis of writing style.  
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simply invoke her example in order to make my way into another affective relationship, 
to discuss texts rather than rooms.  
Just as we feel the energy of those rooms, likewise, we feel written words move 
us and more precisely move, in some visceral way, through us.  This is hardly a radical 
claim. It is taken for granted in certain circles within literary studies. More or less to the 
point, depending on one’s perspective, it is also taken as a given in book reviews, at book 
groups, and at library storytimes: it is an everyday event.6 And it is implicitly 
acknowledged within every classroom in which a teacher has ever found a point of entry 
into discussion by asking for students’ responses to a given text. As I will discuss, 
however, with certain exceptions, this assumption is construed as less valid in 
philosophical circles and with respect to Western philosophical texts.  It sounds perfectly 
natural to profess strong feelings for or about a novel and its characters: “I absolutely 
love Jane Eyre, but I can’t stand Mr. Rochester.” Or even to confess to a physical 
response: “I cried at the end, when she married him.”7  How strange, on the other hand, to 
observe someone weep at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit. (“I cried at the end, 
when we arrived at Absolute Knowing.”) And while any liberal might credibly profess a 
devotion to the writings of John Locke, such devotion would indicate a commitment to 
the ideals articulated therein rather than to the experience of reading his work. This is not, 
of course, a hard and fast distinction. No one would fault a reader visibly moved by the 
                                                
6 I might add erotica and pornographic writing to the list as well, in the context of everyday events of the 
consumption of texts that are explicitly designed to provoke a visceral response, although decorum, 
naturally, compels me to relegate them to a footnote.  
 
7 Wolfgang Iser cites a critic staunchly determined to resist the charms of Jane Eyre: “But as we read on 
we forgot both commendations and criticism, identified ourselves with Jane in all her troubles, and finally 
married Mr. Rochester about four in the morning.” (Iser, citing William George Clark’s 1849 review in 
Fraser’s,  in “The Reading Process: a Phenomenological Approach,” in Reader-Response Criticism, ed. 
Jane P. Tompkins, p. 65) 
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speeches of Plato’s Symposium, and one might look equally askance at a crying reader of 
JR or Finnegan’s Wake as of Hegel.  The question is when, or whether, the visceral 
response is understood as a legitimate site from which to generate a critical response or a 
judgment.  
At this point I expect the quite reasonable objection that this emphasis on the way 
that a book makes you feel is precisely what should be pedagogically eradicated.  And I 
would concur that part of the task of teaching reading, writing, and “critical thinking” 
involves disentangling the competing strands of what is being read from what is being 
read into, cultivating the capacity for realizing that, personal feelings aside, what you are 
reading was not addressed to you, was not written for you, that even the use of a “you” in 
the text or the poetic device of apostrophe—a “Reader, I married him”—does not 
constitute license to insert your particularities into the empty place of that “you” or that 
“Reader.”   Indeed, even the most amateur of cultural critics would not be altogether 
wrong in deriding this tendency (and perhaps identifying it as a product of a self-help 
culture or culture of narcissism that naturalizes the desire to see oneself in everything one 
reads). To see oneself in every text: after all, this is simply bad reading, is it not?  
 
 
 In answering this question, I would like to introduce two passages, the first from 
the philosopher Jacques Derrida, the second from the literary critic and novelist A.S. 
Byatt. The most compelling, and simultaneously condemning, sketch of this “bad reader” 
that I know of comes in Derrida’s The Post Card, an unsummarizable book that I will 
nonetheless provisionally summarize as follows: what is sent (or transmitted, in 
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Brennan’s language, more telegram than postcard) is not what is received. Derrida issues 
a warning about and to the bad reader: 
Because I still like him, I can foresee the impatience of the bad reader: this is the way I  
name or accuse the fearful reader, the reader in a hurry to be determined, decided upon  
deciding (in order to annul, in other words to bring back to oneself, one has to wish to  
know in advance what to expect, one wishes to expect what has happened, one wishes to  
expect (oneself)) [on veut ainsi savoir d’avance à quoi s’attendre, on veut s’attendre à ce 
qui s’est passé, on veut s’attendre]. Now, it is bad, and I know no other definition of the  
bad, it is bad to predestine one’s reading, it is always bad to foretell.  It is bad, reader, no  
longer to like retracing one’s steps.8 
 
Derrida’s bad reader, in his impatience, is always feverishly rushing on ahead. Instead of 
reading what he is reading, he wants to be reading ahead of what he is reading; indeed, he 
never wants to be reading what he is now reading. The time in which the bad reader reads 
is never the present. His experience of reading always involves a temporal distortion. 
While he is reading, he is in the future.  His present moment of reading is, precisely, not 
(or never) his present moment of reading. His reading is a projective experience; he 
projects himself into his future, which is of reading something that is not yet there, that is 
not what he is reading. He is not attentive in quite a literal sense; he does not attend to 
what is in front of him, precisely because he is “in a hurry to be determined.” He wishes 
not to be reading, but to have read.  
 Hence in rushing in order to be determined, to settle on a meaning, the bad reader 
avoids all real encounter with the text: he can only encounter himself. Derrida writes 
within the parentheses, “(one has to wish to know in advance what to expect, one wishes 
to expect what has happened, one wishes to expect (oneself)).” The parenthetical 
“(oneself)” does not appear in the French, but suggestively acknowledges the potential 
multiple connotations of the reflexive pronoun in the verb s’attendre, which ought to be 
(as in the previous iterations in the sentence, on veut ainsi savoir d’avance à quoi 
                                                
8 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card, p. 4; La Carte Postale, p. 9.  
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s’attendre, on veut s’attendre à ce qui s’est passé) accompanied by the preposition à and 
some sort of expression of what is to be expected. The final iteration, on veut s’attendre, 
deranges this grammatical convention, forcing the reader to search for the object of 
expectation and to settle on the only possibility, the contracted se of s’attendre.  
This third iteration—one wishes to expect (oneself))—suspends or bypasses the 
notion of event, which was thematized in the other iterations by “in advance” (as of some 
event, including an event of reading) and “what has happened.”  In this final iteration, 
one’s desire to know in advance, to avoid any surprises, conveys a desire to come face to 
face not with an event or occurrence but rather with oneself.  All that one wants to expect 
is what is already known. What is already known is oneself.  The bad reader wishes to 
confront himself so that he does not have to confront something other than himself, while 
reading.  He desires a lack of surprise, not to be surprised by what he is reading, by what 
is to come; he desires mastery over the contents of the text, to have it all be familiar. The 
bad reader, when he reads, is only reading himself: he is only reading what he brings to 
the text, foreclosing upon the possibility of being confronted with the unknown, the 
unfamiliar, the surprising.9  For fear of being confronted with what he cannot understand, 
he avoids the possibility of encountering the text in the present.  He transposes the 
present of reading into the future and thus resists being surprised.  He is always getting 
ahead of himself, and thus never encounters the text, but only himself.  Bad reading, then, 
consists in adopting this unhinged temporal relationship to what is being read such that 
one is never reading what one is reading. Hence the ability to read—to cease to read 
                                                
9 Nietzsche makes this point on a much more ambitious scale (and far more bitingly) in both The Gay 
Science and The Will to Power. While Derrida, at least, “still likes” and perhaps empathizes with his bad 
reader, Nietzsche does not confine his critique to the act of reading and suggests that all acquisition of 
knowledge is simply a domestication or making-familiar of that which is unknown or other, assimilating 
otherness to familiarity.  
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badly— involves a recognition that the text is not you, and that moreover it is not yours. 
It requires that one sunder oneself from the possibility that what one will encounter in the 
text is (no more than) oneself.  
Yet Derrida is not definitive on this point. The passage I cited arrives in the wake 
of an ambivalent reflection on the poetic device of apostrophe. Moreover, the paragraph’s 
final sentence, following directly on the heels of this rebuke to the reader who confuses 
himself with the text, tantalizingly reaches out to apostrophize the reader just as it 
chastises him once more: “It is bad, reader, no longer to like retracing one’s steps.”  In so 
doing, Derrida does not wholly undermine the lesson about reading that he has just 
imparted, but he certainly complicates it. For this passage, insofar as it is pedagogical, is 
implicitly prescriptive. While Derrida admits to a fondness for the bad reader, he still 
condemns his practices of bad reading. In identifying the habits of the bad reader, he 
necessarily evokes a good reader who would not adhere to such habits, who would like 
retracing his steps, who would not rush on ahead, who would not see himself in the text. 
Yet he delivers this prescription, hearing which is necessary for the transformation from 
the bad to the good reader, in part by way of apostrophe. Thus in order to be chastened, to 
reform, to eradicate one’s badness as a reader, one must hear that “It is bad, reader....” as 
addressed to oneself. The only way to resolve this seeming contradiction, it seems to me, 
is to deny that apostrophe implies or even invites the presupposition of a singular 
addressee. In order to read this passage well, you must realize that you are being 
addressed. And you must realize simultaneously that you, in your specificity, are not 
being addressed. But the intimacy of the unexpected apostrophe is no less intimate for its 
impersonality. And unless one understands that one is being addressed, Derrida’s lesson 
 8 
will have failed, for the line will have been read badly. And this is, indeed, a crucial part 
of the lesson of The Post Card. For while the overarching insistence that what is sent is 
not what is received is inescapable, nonetheless Derrida uses the “tu,” proffers the 
apostrophe; he makes the wager that something, somehow, will arrive.    
 
 
 In quite a different context, A.S. Byatt lists the variety of types of reading that one 
can derive from or experience with respect to the same text (it is, here, a poem). The 
types are not under evaluation; unlike Derrida, she has no “bad reader” in mind. But the 
litany culminates—and it is clear all the others have been enumerated in order to set off 
this final type as utterly distinctive—with what I would call an affective reading. This is 
not a simple case of being immersed in one’s own emotions and locating them in the site 
of the text one is reading, mistaking projection for mirroring. It is a case, indeed, of  
Brennan’s transmission, physical, visceral, its effects manifest in the body itself. I quote 
at some length: 
  There are readings—of the same text—that are dutiful, readings that map and  
dissect, readings that hear a rustling of unheard words, that count grey little pronouns for  
pleasure or instruction and for a time do not hear golden or apples. There are personal  
readings, that snatch for personal meanings, I am full of love, or disgust, or fear, I scan for  
love, or disgust, or fear.  There are—believe it—impersonal readings—where the mind’s eye  
sees the lines move onwards and the mind’s ear hears them sing and sing. 
 Now and then there are readings which make the hairs of the neck, the non-existent  
pelt, stand on end and tremble, when every word burns and shines hard and clear and infinite 
and exact, like points of stars in the dark—readings when the knowledge that we shall know 
the writing differently or better or satisfactorily, runs ahead of any capacity to say what we  
know, or how. In these readings, a sense that the text has appeared to be wholly new, never 
before seen, is followed, almost immediately, by the sense that it was always there, that we  
the readers, knew it was always there, and have always known it was, though we have 
now for the first time recognised, become fully cognisant of our knowledge.10 
 
  
                                                
10 A.S. Byatt, Possession, pp. 471-2, emphasis in original.  
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Where Derrida gave us the bad reader and left us to imagine his opposite, Byatt sets forth 
a veritable taxonomy of ways of reading. She is describing an act of reading that is in 
many ways academic: indeed, her reader is an academic, reading a poem by the object of 
his study. She is also, undeniably, describing reading as a revelation. For this is the 
emotional and perhaps also the narrative climax of the book, Possession, which I can best 
describe by saying that it is the type of novel in which a character reading a poem can not 
only plausibly but movingly serve as the climax.11 And indeed, one of the primary 
reasons that I choose Byatt to discuss here is that this act of reading (as described in the 
second of the two cited paragraphs) thoroughly fuses the analytical and the visceral: it 
argues, in fact, that the analytical reading that lacks the latter quality is in a real sense 
lacking. 
In order to flesh this out, let me turn to the implicit taxonomy that Byatt creates. 
There are at least four and possibly five types of reading here. First, what I take to be the 
“standard” academic reading, an activity that codes as everything dreary that could be 
imputed to reading for analytical purposes: not only pronouns, not only pronouns that 
must be counted (literary analysis transformed into calculation, mere accounting—one 
imagines veritable ledgers of pronouns), but “grey little pronouns”; more images of 
calculability, in the biological realm (“dissection”) and even in cartography (“mapping”). 
This is literary analysis as bean-counting, not only “papery and dry” but stultifying, 
deadening: it obliterates the possibility of hearing life (golden, apples) in words. And yet 
                                                
11 Byatt does warn in advance of the anomaly of this passage and nevertheless insists upon its necessity, 
admitting that she takes a certain risk in doing so: “Novels...do not habitually elaborate on the equally 
intense pleasure of reading.  There are obvious reasons for this, the most obvious being the regressive 
nature of the pleasure, a mise-en-abîme even, when words draw attention to the power and delight of 
words, and so ad infinitum, thus making the imagination experience something papery and dry, narcissistic 
and yet disagreeably distanced, without the immediacy of sexual moisture or the scented garnet glow of 
good burgundy. And yet natures such as Roland’s are at their most alert and heady when reading is 
violently yet steadily alive.” (p. 470) 
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the possibility of pleasure is not wholly excluded. There is still the potential, within the 
grey rows of pronouns waiting to be counted and sentences awaiting dissection, for the 
preservation of a poetic sensibility that hears what “rustles” (Byatt nods, appropriately, to 
Roland Barthes, after whom I imagine her character is named) just beneath the words. 
Even the driest reading, it seems, contains this possibility; it may simply arise, unbidden. 
Second, there is the “personal” reading, which bears a strong family resemblance to the 
approach of Derrida’s bad reader, who finds only himself in the text.  While Byatt does 
not explicitly condemn this reading, the strict parallel structure of her sentence—“ I am 
full of love, or disgust, or fear, I scan for love, or disgust, or fear”—clearly enacts the 
point that this reader, “snatching” only at what he already contains, finds in the text 
nothing more than a mirror to reinforce his own present preoccupations.  
The personal leads Byatt to the “impersonal,” at which point she immediately 
goes on the offensive, via apostrophe—“believe it”—anticipating those who will, 
inevitably, protest. Establishing the category of the impersonal reading is the condition of 
the possibility of the final type of reading to which she devotes the second paragraph, 
which is both affective and impersonal. And here her concerns dovetail once again with 
Derrida’s, for what is at issue in this final type of reading, in which the reader’s physical 
body is so viscerally, even animally affected, is the reader’s relationship to time. For 
Derrida’s bad reader, running on ahead was precisely the problem because it foreclosed 
upon the possibility of any real reading ever taking place. And it expressed, too, a desire 
not only to confront the familiar self rather than the unknown text, but also to close the 
book, to set reading aside, a desire to finish or—better—to have already finished reading. 
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Time in that instance is telescoped into the shortest possible period, asymptotically 
approaching zero.  
Byatt’s reader is also situated, at least in part, in the future tense, as his knowledge 
“runs on ahead.” But this is a running on ahead that is occurring as reading is taking 
place. More importantly, what is running on ahead is not the reading, because the reader 
is attending to every word to such an extent that the hairs on his neck are standing up. To 
the contrary, in these readings, “when the knowledge that we shall know the writing 
differently or better or satisfactorily, runs ahead of any capacity to say what we know, or 
how,” what runs ahead is, precisely, a knowledge that we shall know. That is to say, 
simultaneous with attentiveness to the text in the present is a knowledge of future 
knowledge that is presently inarticulable. For as of yet the reader knows neither the 
content for this yet-to-be-arrived-at-knowledge nor the method by which it will come to 
be known. The knowledge, then, is simply that the text will be known, in a potentially 
inexhaustible variety of ways. And indeed, there seems to be absolutely no rush to 
achieve the capacity of articulating this future knowledge. It is enough that while reading, 
it remains inchoate, at the level, perhaps, of intuition.  
Furthermore, in contrast to the bad reader always in a hurry for reading (which in 
his case is never really occurring) to be at an end, Byatt’s reader’s future tense conjures a 
period of time that is capacious, unbounded. Here is the opposite of avoidance or hurry; it 
is the opening up of the awareness of an unconstrained span of future that will be spent, 
precisely, in retracing one’s steps, backwards, forwards, differently. Again in contrast to 
the bad reader, whose reading of an unfamiliar text brought him face to face only with 
himself, Byatt’s reader is rereading a text that is, in fact, deeply familiar. He is reading it 
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“for the twelfth, or maybe even the twentieth time...he had already experienced all its 
words, in their order, and also out of order, in memory, in selective quotation or 
misquotation—in the sense that he could predict, at times even recite, those words which 
were next to come, or remotely approaching.” Yet in this twelfth or twentieth reading, he 
(re)reads “as though the words were living creatures or stones of fire.”12 The text, which 
is in fact familiar, seems foreign and unknown in the sense that it appears, upon this 
reading, to be entirely new. And yet, Byatt hastens to add, it is simultaneously as if it has 
always been there.  The familiar is made foreign just as it also is perceived to have 
always been there and to have always (have) been known to be there. And it is this sense 
that arrives with the coupling of the inevitable and the revelatory that translates into the 
body itself, raising the hairs on the neck.  
I set these passages next to one another, as object lessons in reading, for several 
reasons. Both are ambiguous as to genre, refusing tidy placement in either a literary or a 
philosophical register (as, indeed, do their authors). But more importantly, it seems to me 
that the layering of Byatt’s final type of reading over Derrida’s warnings about the 
practices of bad reading can gesture toward the lineaments of a type of reading that 
avoids certain pitfalls while reminding us of the necessity of analysis that is viscerally 
felt, not bloodless. There is a way to read, both concur, that is not simply about 
encountering oneself in the text at hand. Moreover, Derrida’s cautions about the perils of 
understanding oneself as the singular addressee of an apostrophe must be understood in 
conjunction with the manner in which he lingers with and repeatedly employs the device 
himself. For Derrida does not foreclose upon the possibility of being addressed. Indeed, 
                                                
12 Byatt, pp. 471-2.  
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the way he toys with apostrophe, interrupting his analysis of the bad reader to directly 
address him as his own reader—“Il est mauvais, lecteur”—demands that the reader, if 
reading well, take himself (in the subject-position of reader but not in his singularity as 
individual) to be addressed.13 In a more dramatic fashion, Byatt’s taxonomy culminates in 
an act of reading—the apex of this hierarchy—that is impersonal and visceral and 
analytical all at once, and indissolubly so.  Coupling these two meditations, there emerges 
a way to read that neither foregrounds the individual reader at the expense of the text nor 
banishes the reader’s affective, physical reactions to the realm of the merely subjective 
and inadmissible. And Byatt offers this up to be valorized: this will be a rare and precious 
reading that will be not only the most moving but also the most incisive and precise.  
This is the type of reading, which I hope to have evoked at least at the level of 
phenomenological description—I provisionally term it an affective hermeneutics— 
with which this dissertation is concerned. I will argue throughout, prompted by and 
through close readings of the work of Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, that there are 
certain types of philosophy that demand to be read affectively, particularly those that are 
involved in a polemic against the fetishization of rationality or systematicity. Stated in 
plain language, the overarching question that my dissertation seeks to examine is this: 
how can we find a way to take seriously the affective reactions that philosophical texts 
                                                
13 In my view, Derrida’s preoccupation with and insight regarding apostrophe is by no means limited to 
The Post Card, which in both form and subject demands engagement with the question of address. I think, 
for instance, of the equally experimental “Circumfession” which runs along the bottom of Geoffrey 
Bennington’s “Derridabase” in their collaborative book Jacques Derrida. Bennington’s text is an attempt at 
a systematic exposition of the basic tenets of Derrida’s thought, the impossibility of which the 
autobiographical “Circumfession” displays on each page through elliptical and impassioned prose that 
frequently departs from the first person to address, alternately, both God and the reader in the second 
person. See for instance p. 115 (p. 110 in the French edition): “...now if I do not invent a new language 
(through simplicity rediscovered) another fluid, a new SENTENCE, I will have failed in this book, which 
does not mean that that’s the place to start, on the contrary, you have to drag on in the old syntax, train 
oneself with you, dear reader [avec toi lecteur], toward an idiom which in the end would be untranslatable 
in return into the language of the beginnings....”  
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provoke, and to incorporate their content, strength, and effect into the arsenal of strategies 
for reading and interpreting them without relegating such reactions to the damning 
category of the ‘merely subjective’? 
 For this is above all a study of textual encounter. In one sense, it is about  
the encounter between a reading subject and a textual object, and in that sense it will 
partake, I suppose, of the underlying assumptions those categories presuppose. For those 
are eminently useful words and conventions and they describe an experience that readers 
find phenomenologically recognizable; and I have a great deal of respect for the use of 
such language no matter how much it can and should be interrogated. But I am not 
altogether content to remain with it.  For affect, once introduced into this encounter—into 
these encounters, I should rather say—will play fast and loose with such categories and 
point relentlessly to the notion that they are indeed simply useful heuristics, conventions 
rather than truths, whether or not they are experienced as such.  For one of the 
particularly challenging aspects of the various ideas of affect that I will review in Chapter 
One and work with myself throughout this dissertation is that affect is not simply 
interior. It is out there in the world, communicable. It is in rooms, in texts, in averted 
glances, in speeches, in dreams, in crying jags and in lecture notes, in philosophy and in 
poetry, in theories and in bodies. And it has a deeply un-Cartesian lack of respect for or 
knowledge of the membrane of the skin, the boundary between the self and the world. In 
an ostensibly “secular” context such as the contemporary university, the affectively 
charged textual encounter—although it is rarely identified in such terms—is still often set 
apart. This is one of the reasons there is a nearly apocalyptic tone attached to 
contemporary discussions of the death of the humanities. It marks the fear of the 
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vanishing of this irreducible encounter, the stakes of which are not simply a question of 
the transmission and reproduction of information. In the academic context, the textual 
encounter is the paradigmatic form of the experience of affective intensities in the world.   
 
Before I move to my readings of Julia Kristeva (Chapter Two) and Luce Irigaray 
(Chapters Three and Four), I will turn in Chapter One to several academic conversations, 
past and present, that directly bear upon my notion of affective hermeneutics. The first 
begins with the influential 1949 article “The Affective Fallacy,” and the many opposing 
theories of reading that it provoked, culminating in a body of literary criticism that came 
to be known as reader-response theory.  The second is the psychoanalytic strand, 
beginning with Freud’s work on affect, particularly in his early writings, and the more 
radical theories of the prominent post-Kleinian analyst Wilfred Bion. The third is the 
more recent work on affect from scholars in literary and cultural theory, philosophy, and 
anthropology, who put forth a number of conceptions of affect that mediate in various 
ways between traditional philosophical binaries such as subject and object, mind and 
body, being and becoming, self and other. Chapter Two examines Kristeva’s distinctive 
reading strategies as she analyzes the work of novelist Marguerite Duras and Duras’ 
effects on her “fragile readers.” Chapter Three considers Irigaray’s theorization of style 
in philosophy by way of her reading of Freud’s understanding of the relation between 
manifest and latent dream material in the Interpretation of Dreams and hazards the notion 
of a rigorous unintelligibility in the style of Irigaray’s own experimental writing, that 
submits her reader to the experience of the excluded position that she theorizes.  Chapter 
Four further develops this version of unintelligibility and its relationship to the cultivation 
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of affect in the reader and then turns to Irigaray’s more experimental work in order to 
determine precisely how she creates such effects. 
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Chapter One 
Beyond the Affective Fallacy:  
Expanding the Field of Analysis 
 
 
 
“Transmission is the only consistent explanation for a variety of phenomena, but it is no longer transparent 
to common sense.” –Teresa Brennan, The Transmission of Affect 
 
 
“It was when Freud began to seek a solution in the relationship between two people, the study of the 
transference, that he found what was the intelligible field of study for at least some of the problems that the 
neurotic patient poses, and problems that had hitherto defied all attempts at solution began to have a 
meaning.” –Wilfred Bion, Experiences in Groups 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 In the late 1940s, New Critic W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. collaborated with Monroe 
Beardsley to produce a pair of brief but important articles isolating two common 
“fallacies” against which readers and critics should guard themselves. In the first essay, 
“The Intentional Fallacy,” articulating a position that would later become a commonplace 
among the same critics that revolted against the second article, Wimsatt and Beardsley 
militate against the “romantic” notion that a reader can or should divine an author’s 
intentions. They refuse, however, to shift either the locus or the burden of meaning from 
the author to the reader, hovering, in classic New Critical fashion, over the text itself and 
insisting that the poem “is not the critic’s own and not the author’s (it is detached from 
the author at birth and goes about the world beyond his power to intend about it or 
control it). The poem belongs to the public. It is embodied in language....”14 In “The 
                                                
14
 W.K. Wimsatt Jr. and Monroe Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” in Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon: 
Studies in the Meaning of Poetry, pp. 5-6.  
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Affective Fallacy,” they spell out more precisely the limits of the ways in which the critic 
should properly engage with the text (again, taking the poem as their primary example). 
They take aim at so-called “affective criticism,” which they not only consider widespread 
among their contemporaries but also trace in various forms back to Plato and Aristotle as 
well as to Hume and Smith in their theories of “moral sentiments.” The Affective Fallacy 
itself, they write, consists of: 
a confusion between the poem and its results (what it is and what it does), a special case of 
epistemological skepticism, though usually advanced as if it had far stronger claims than the 
overall forms of skepticism.  It begins by trying to derive the standard of criticism from the 
psychological effects of the poem and ends in impressionism and relativism. The outcome.... 
is that the poem itself, as an object of specifically critical judgment, tends to disappear.15 
 
Wimsatt and Beardsley are not particularly interested in elaborating on or even 
developing a robust conception of what affect might be, even in service of avoiding its 
potential contagion into otherwise rigorous practices of critical reading. Affect, here, is 
largely synonymous with emotion and is distinguished by two primary features. First, it is 
unmistakably subjective. Second, they find emotion to be “vague” and “inchoate” 
(counting “grey” words “for instruction,” I find both adjectives recur throughout the 
article with a disquieting frequency). Both qualities, in their view, render affective 
response utterly unreliable as a site from which to form a judgment. The more visceral 
these responses become, the more unreliable they are deemed. Citing Emily Dickinson’s 
“goose-flesh” with disapproval, Wimsatt and Beardsley are particularly harsh on what 
they term the “physiological” variety of affective criticism, which would certainly 
                                                
 
15 Wimsatt and Beardsley, “The Affective Fallacy,” in Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning 
of Poetry, p. 21.  
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include the reading that Byatt describes as raising the “non-existent pelt” on the back of 
her character Roland’s neck.16  
The general claim of “The Affective Fallacy” is that emotional responses to a text 
are so varied, idiosyncratic, and relative to individual experience and impression that they 
simply cannot correspond in a meaningful way to the content of the text itself. Wimsatt 
and Beardsley do not deny the reality of affective response, but they are not shy about 
their desire for a genuinely “objective criticism.” By placing affect securely in the realm 
of the subjective and individual, they relegate it to a sort of no-man’s-land, “neither 
anything which can be refuted nor anything which it is possible for the objective critic to 
take into account.” Readers’ accounts of such responses are equally useless in their view, 
“either too physiological or...too vague.”17 While Wimsatt and Beardsley do not set out to 
pathologize emotion, their wariness of it appears excessive and quite unnecessary if the 
overarching purpose in sketching the Affective Fallacy is, indeed, merely to label it as 
subjective and thus rigidly to exclude it from the domain of legitimate sources of critical 
judgment. Wimsatt and Beardsley argue that the only emotions that are available to this 
objective critic are of the type that can be located in the poem itself. They term these 
“poetic objects of emotion” and suggest that they can be reliably identified, but not 
transmitted: “not communicated to the reader like an infection or disease, not inflicted 
mechanically like a bullet or a knife wound, not simply expressed as by expletives or 
grimaces or rhythms, but presented in their objects and contemplated as a pattern of 
                                                
16 Ibid., p. 30  
 
17 Ibid., p. 32.  
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knowledge.”18 In contrast to these emotional “objects” that may be rationally discerned 
and disinterestedly contemplated, the discourse that surrounds the reader’s emotional 
response is laden with judgment and suspicion. Within the first few lines of their 
discussion of a few “generalities” about emotion, they opt to skip some of the more 
obvious or mild states of emotion that tend to accompany reading, in my experience 
(pleasure, sadness, and so forth) and move directly to a hysterical litany: “mob-
psychology, psychosis and neurosis...’free-floating anxiety’ and all the vaguely 
understood and inchoate states of apprehension, depression, or elation....” Such states, 
they continue to drive home, “are indeed inchoate or vague and by that fact may even 
verge upon the unconscious.”19  
Wimsatt and Beardsley do not use this word, but it seems to me that their 
overarching problem with affect, conceived within a rigid and hierarchical structure of 
objective versus subjective criticism, is that it induces misdirection even in the most 
discerning reader. Affect, in their view, reorients the reader away from the text and leads 
him squarely into a category mistake, replacing the fixed object with the changeable 
subject: “What makes one angry is something painful, insulting, or unjust. One does not 
call it an angry thing.”20  
 
 
                                                
18 Ibid., p. 38.  
 
19 Ibid., p. 27.  
 
20 Wimsatt and Beardsley, “The Affective Fallacy.” Sewanee Review 57:1 (1949), pp. 38-9. Curiously, as 
this citation cuts to the heart of Wimsatt and Beardsley’s objection, the second of these sentences only 
appears in the first version of the essay and has been removed from the version reprinted in The Verbal 
Icon, where it is replaced by the line, “What makes one afraid is a cyclone, a mob, a holdup man.” (The 
Verbal Icon, p. 27)  
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II. Affect in New Criticism and reader-response theory  
“The Affective Fallacy” surely reads as a bit dated nowadays, and I could easily 
grumble further about its underlying assumptions. But I rehearse it here for two reasons. 
First, its thinly veiled anxiety about emotion (and emotional contagion) and its rigid 
preservation of the axes of subjectivity and objectivity, reader and author, emotion and 
reason, make plain what is at stake to be preserved in the insistence on segregating 
affective response from legitimate criticism. Second, I believe that its central argument 
still demands to be addressed by anyone who is interested in advocating for the necessity 
of an affective criticism, in the realm of philosophy quite as much as poetry. Of course, 
the most radical rejections of any argument proceeding along these lines come from 
theorists such as Roland Barthes, whose writing makes short work of the very terms in 
which Wimsatt and Beardsley frame their objection.  When Barthes, for instance, 
famously proclaims the birth of the reader at the cost of the death of “l’Auteur-Dieu” (the 
“Author-God”) and announces the category of the relentlessly plural text in contrast to 
the theological register of the work, he bypasses altogether Wimsatt and Beardsley’s 
worry that the poem will simply “disappear.”21  Of course, the idea of the poem that must 
not disappear may be transformed altogether in Barthes, but certainly the New Critical 
emphasis on an absolute attentiveness to the text, the privileging of its centrality, is 
honored.22 It would be more accurate, perhaps, to say that Barthes makes the text appear,  
as an object of study conceived more vibrantly and more inexhaustibly than before, and 
                                                
21 Roland Barthes, “La mort de l’auteur,” Le Bruissement de la Langue, p. 65; “The Death of the Author,” 
The Rustle of Language, pp. 52-3. See also “De l’oeuvre au texte” (“From Work to Text”) in the same 
collection.  
 
22 This is made abundantly clear, for instance, in Barthes’ painstaking structural analysis of Balzac’s 
“Sarrasine” in S/Z.  
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the condition of the possibility of this appearance must always include the work of 
reading.  Barthes demonstrates that there is no incompatibility between attending to the 
reader and a piercing attentiveness to the text. But to do so requires a wholesale 
reconceptualization of the framework and apparatus of criticism, of the nature of the very 
objects of criticism (a phrase that doesn’t quite work in the context of Barthes), the task 
of criticism, and the very elements that constitute a text (and again, here, the language is 
confusing, not only that I have chosen to refer to the poem as a text rather than a work, 
but since “elements” could refer to formal aspects of the poem, or to the multiplicity of 
voices crossing through a plural text, and so forth).    
I will return to Barthes in particular, but for the moment I want to examine a 
slightly more moderate position as elaborated in reader-response theory, by theorists such 
as Michael Riffaterre, Wolfgang Iser, and Stanley Fish. Reader-response theory does not 
represent a monolithic position, but as Jane Tompkins explains, at least in the Anglo-
American context, it can helpfully be conceived in opposition to Wimsatt and 
Beardsley’s designation and condemnation of the Affective Fallacy. Such theorists 
interest themselves in the phenomenological experience of reading, firmly rejecting the 
notion that meaning inheres solely in the text. They frequently invoke a hypothetical or 
ideal reader of some variety—the mock reader, the implied reader, the informed reader, 
the hyperreader or superreader (archilecteur)23—in order to evade the anticipated charge 
                                                
23 These terms are used by Walker Gibson, Wolfgang Iser, Stanley Fish, and Michael Riffaterre, 
respectively. Riffaterre’s notion of the archilecteur (which he earlier termed the lecteur moyen) is 
particularly intriguing, although problematic, and Riffaterre himself discarded it fairly rapidly. In a well-
known essay entitled “Describing Poetic Structures: Two Approaches to Baudelaire’s ‘Les Chats,’” 
Riffaterre critiques a purely structuralist analysis of poetry, claiming that it fails to account for something 
crucial. He insists on the objective reality of the reader’s response at certain specific points within a 
reading, moments when poetic devices inevitably affect the reader, regardless of distractions and other 
idiosyncrasies in the reading process. The archilecteur, meant to be a sort of neutral figure, reading line by 
line, shows up the poetic properties of a given text by way of his responses: "C'est un outil à relever les 
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of pure subjectivism, of simply developing a theory by means of universalizing their own 
potentially idiosyncratic reading experiences. But even as they militate against formalist 
analysis and attend to the lived experience of the reader, these theorists preserve a trace 
of the rigidity of the New Critics. With the exception of Stanley Fish’s second version of 
reader-response theory, focusing on interpretive communities (of which more below), 
reader-response theory does not veer exceptionally far away from the terms of the critics 
to whom they react. While they expand the horizons of the possibility of textual meaning 
to include the field of the reader’s experience, the text they theorize is not so radically 
plural as in Barthes, endlessly traversed and traversable, a “galaxy of signifiers” with 
innumerable points of entry.24 In particular, reader-response theory preserves a temporal 
sequence to the process of reading that is set and integral to its methods. The text is 
understood to be read line by line, word by word, “in order”—the figure of the Author 
still lurks—in contrast to Barthes, insisting the text “has no beginning; it is reversible; we 
gain access to it by several entrances, none of which can authoritatively declared to be the 
main one.”25 
In examining reader-response theory for my purposes, I will take Stanley Fish as 
my primary example for several reasons. First, he articulates his own theories of reader 
                                                
stimuli d'un texte, ni plus ni moins.” (“It is a tool to point out the stimuli of the text, no more and no less.”) 
Elizabeth Ladenson remarks that the archilecteur is “a sort of reading machine, the reader purged of all 
characteristics beyond the process of reading itself.” (Riffaterre in “Critères pour l’analyse du style” in 
Essais de Stylistique Structurale, cited in Ladenson, “The imperial superreader: or, the semiotics of 
indecency,” Romanic Review 93: 1/2 (2002)) 
 
24 Roland Barthes, S/Z, p. 5.  
 
25 Ibid. Barthes also challenges the notion that we should attribute any primacy or singularity to a first 
reading of the text, opposing “the claim which would have us believe that the first reading is a primary, 
naive, phenomenal reading which we will only, afterwards, have to ‘explicate’....” Rereading, in his view, 
is a necessary and radical practice, even a protest, against reading as consumption that uses up a text and 
demands a new one (he warns, in a line that resonates with Derrida’s counsel to the bad reader, that “those 
who fail to reread are obliged to read the same story everywhere”) (S/Z, pp. 15-16) 
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response directly in opposition to the Wimsatt/Beardsley position, terming it at one point 
the “Affective Fallacy Fallacy,” and occasionally uses the phrase “affective stylistics” to 
gesture toward the position he initially stakes out.26 I say initially stakes out because there 
are at least two discernible positions in Fish’s work on reader response. The second 
reason that I take him as my example is that in his collection Is There a Text in This 
Class?, one can see his vocabulary gradually shift as he moves away from a simple 
opposition to the Wimsatt/Beardsley position, getting deeper and deeper into the problem 
of creating a systematic (although not objective) method of using reader response as the 
primary locus of interpretation of textual meaning, realizing essay by essay that his 
original vocabulary and conceptual framework can no longer accommodate his evolving 
position.27 
The first position, which gives way to the theory of interpretive communities, is 
roughly as follows. Fish zeroes in on the Wimsatt/Beardsley assertion that the Affective 
Fallacy consists in mistaking what a poem is (its meaning) for what it does (its effect). 
Wimsatt and Beardsley, of course, intend this distinction as a corrective; once we know 
how to sever effect from meaning, we can henceforth discount the former and attend to 
the latter. Fish, on the other hand, indebted both to his own pedagogical observations and 
                                                
26 Stanley Fish, “Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics,” Is There a Text in This Class?: The 
Authority of Interpretive Communities, p. 42. 
 
27 This is particularly marked in later editions, in which each essay contains a lengthy prefatory note in 
which Fish comments on the way in which it relates to the views that he currently holds and suggests how 
he would write them differently according to those current views. In the very center of the book (physically 
and thematically),  in “Interpreting the Variorum,” he introduces the notion of interpretive communities in 
the final section of a three-part essay written over the course of three years in which the final section 
resolves certain difficulties of the first half of the book in such a way as to make the end of the essay not at 
all in accord with the rest (making the essay itself, he notes wryly, “something of a self-consuming 
artifact.” (p. 147) In this final section, the voice of the body text finally catches up to the stance of the 
annotating voice.   
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to the speech-act theory of Austin and Searle, attuned to the performative force of 
utterances, finds this distinction not only untenable but utterly wrongheaded. “What I am 
suggesting,” he writes, 
is that there is no direct relationship between the meaning of a sentence (paragraph, 
novel, poem) and what its words mean. Or, to put the matter less provocatively, the 
information an utterance gives, its message, is a constituent of, but certainly not to 
be identified with, its meaning. It is the experience of an utterance—all of it and not 
anything that could be said about it, including anything I could say—that is its 
meaning.28 
 
The meaning, in Fish’s view, inheres precisely in the effect. The crucial term here is 
experience.  My sense is that his attribution of the meaning to the category of experience 
is, at least in part, in order to strategically oppose the notion of meaning as content. 
Indeed, Fish bristles at the idea that two different passages, which could be glossed as 
conveying the same “information,” should be “translated” into that information and 
claimed to possess or convey the same meaning.29   
 But Fish’s relocation of textual meaning to the potentially nebulous category of 
the reader’s experience should not send us immediately running for the hills. First, Fish’s 
intervention is in service of greater textual fidelity. “The problem” that he is trying to 
address or correct, he explains, “is simply that most methods of analysis operate at so 
high a level of abstraction that the basic data of the meaning experience is slighted and/or 
obscured.”30 The critical attempt to extract meaning from a text, in his view, moves us 
further and further away from the singularity of any given text itself, a singularity 
conceived precisely in terms of what it does, how it acts upon the reader.  Like many of 
                                                
28 Fish, “Literature in the Reader,” p. 32.  
 
29 I return to this point at some length in Chapter Three in my discussion of Irigaray’s critique of Freud’s 
theory of the interpretation of dreams.  
 
30 Fish, “Literature in the Reader,” p. 30.  
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the other reader-response theorists, Fish conceives (in this first iteration of his theory) this 
reader in generalized and generalizable terms. He writes of an “informed reader” who 
reads in a temporally linear fashion, experiencing each word “in order,” line by line, and 
whose responses are gauged in terms of the push and pull of the text in that order.31  
Fish’s method requires that the reader “slow down the reading experience so that ‘events’ 
one does not notice in normal time, but which do occur, are brought before our analytical 
intentions.”32  
Possible reading experiences—which is to say, here, possible meanings for a 
text—might include a specific form of disorientation or frustration (as the text abruptly 
“turns on the reader”); a belief in transparency; the abandonment of premises built up 
throughout the argument of the text, at the end of which the reader can no longer assent to 
the original arguments (Is There a Text in This Class? itself provides an excellent 
example of this latter meaning/experience).33  Assigning meanings based on what they 
provoke in the reader not only, as Fish points out, allows for fruitful analysis of texts that 
seemingly fail to “mean”—to clearly communicate or transfer a message—in transparent 
ways (this will be particularly relevant for my purposes later on). For what Fish is after is 
not a naive impressionism, as the Wimsatt/Beardsley position would suggest.  Indeed, 
Fish suggests that his reader—and here he means students as well as literary critics, for 
all of his methodological concerns are informed by their potential and actual pedagogical 
                                                
31 Ibid., p. 48.  
 
32 Ibid., p. 28.  
 
33 Ibid., p. 31. All of these examples are taken from “Literature in the Reader”; the last is drawn from a 
particularly compelling reading that Fish gives of Plato’s Phaedrus as “self-consuming artifact,”  
concluding that “to read the Phaedrus...is to use it up.” (p. 40) 
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implications, as played out in his own classrooms—when trained in this method, will 
become more and more capable of recognizing and sloughing off what is “idiosyncratic” 
in his response. What Fish is after is a wholesale shift of the locus of analysis without 
abandoning rigor or systematicity: for now “it is the structure of the reader’s experience 
rather than any structures available on the page that should be the object of 
description.”34 
 Fish does not abandon this position entirely as Is There a Text in This Class? 
steadily consumes itself. He continues to take issue with the view that the text is a self-
sufficient object, a container of meaning, and that the reader’s activity is no more than 
“the disposable machinery of extraction.”35 The field of the reader’s activity, then, 
remains very much in play. But the generic informed reader has been banished. He is 
replaced with a reader who is always already a member of one or more of what Fish calls 
“interpretive communities,” which share underlying assumptions so deeply embedded as 
beliefs as to appear invisible to their possessors, who perceive them as factual elements 
of the external world. The crucial moment of transition for Fish arrives as he realizes, 
through what appears to be a mixture of contemplation and pedagogical experimentation, 
that interpretive strategies (which will always be brought to bear, whether in a formalist 
analysis or a reader-response analysis) will successfully produce a reading based on their 
principles each and every time. 36  Hence the arrangement of reader, interpretation, and 
                                                
34 Fish, “Interpreting the Variorum,” Is There a Text in This Class?, p. 152.  
 
35 Ibid., p. 158.  
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This is brought to its hilarious yet persuasive crescendo when Fish leaves a list of literary theorists from 
his morning seminar in literary criticism on the blackboard, informs his next class (on seventeenth-century 
English religious poetry) that it is a religious poem, and asks them to interpret it, which they do with 
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text, has to be once again reconfigured, re-worded. Interpretive strategies produce the 
text that the reader sees: “the form of the reader’s experience, formal units, and the 
structure of intention are one...they come into view simultaneously...therefore the 
questions of priority and independence do not arise.”37 Fish uses St. Augustine’s rule of 
faith to illustrate this point, a doctrine which asserts that everything in Scripture, properly 
understood, indicates God’s love and our reciprocal responsibility to love others. “This 
then is both a stipulation of what meaning there is and a set of directions for finding it, 
which is of course a set of directions—of interpretive strategies—for making it, that is, 
for the endless reproduction of the same text.”38 Kant makes an argument in his Religion 
Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason that bears a strong family resemblance to 
Augustine’s rule, albeit with very different theological implications, when he contends 
that anything in the Bible that does not easily accord with the moral law should be 
“forced” to conform to it.39  
These are extreme examples, neither of which is presently in vogue, which is 
precisely why they are so helpful. They make visible a set of presuppositions that to me, 
at least, appear not only specious but simply outrageous and irresponsible (placing some 
of my own presuppositions about fidelity to the letter of the text clearly on display) as 
interpretive strategies. I can see them, and dub them presuppositions, precisely because I 
am not invested in them in the way that I might plausibly be invested, for instance, in 
                                                
alacrity, producing quite a compelling religious poem in the process. See Fish, “How to Recognize a Poem 
When You See One,” Is There a Text in This Class?  
 
37 Fish, “Interpreting the Variorum,” p. 165. 
 
38 Ibid., p. 170.  
 
39 Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, p. 118.  
 29 
what the author intended; in the text as a discrete entity; in the necessity of reading 
everything in the original language rather than in translation; in the meaning and import 
of certain poetic or rhetorical devices; in the indispensability of historical context; in the 
total irrelevance of historical context; and so forth. Now, although I happen to find a few 
of these specious as well given my own philosophical commitments, I would still be 
unsurprised to hear one of my contemporaries profess a belief in one or several of them 
as inherent properties of any given piece of writing that obviously must be interrogated as 
a condition of the possibility of meaningful textual interpretation.  
The concept of interpretive communities thus leads Fish out of the necessity of 
using the vocabulary in which he justified his first reader-response position, in response 
to the question of how it could hold objectively, a question to which he finally conceded: 
“I suppose that what I am saying is that I would rather have an acknowledged and 
controlled subjectivity than an objectivity which is finally an illusion.”40 Once he can 
adequately account for the fact of both the similarity and the differences in readers’ 
responses in terms of their situatedness in interpretive communities with shared or 
differing presuppositions or commitments, the question of the objectivity of the response 
disappears while the field of the reader’s response remains a viable (and indeed, 
indispensable) site of analysis.  
I understand why Fish would want to move away from the notion of any kind of 
generic or implied reader, because any variation on that concept will be vulnerable to the 
accusation that the theorist is simply universalizing a reading experience that is, in fact, 
particular. And it is a logical extension of the attempt to make the reader’s response not 
                                                
40 Fish, “Literature in the Reader,” p. 49.  
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only a possible source of information for analysis but an essential field of investigation to 
claim that interpretation and the text arise/are produced simultaneously, that 
interpretation has neither beginning nor end and that none of us can have our own 
presuppositions fully in view, such that the text that we produce in our reading is always 
going to be the text we set out to look for, and our assumptions about what is ‘in’ the text 
will be reflected in our analyses ‘of’ that text. Fish ends up, one might say, in a position 
that—while set forth in a very different idiom—is closer to Barthes than his initial 
emphasis on the reader’s response as rigidly ordered, word by word and line by line, 
might have suggested.   
What I wish to draw from reader-response theory—both from the strand that 
posits some form of imagined reader, whether mock, hyper, or implied, and from Fish’s 
second version based on interpretive communities, is threefold. First, the push-back 
against the New Critical exclusion of the reader from the text, an exclusion that at first 
glance appears logically unassailable and, above all, appears responsible to the text. 
Second, the refutation of that exclusion through the insistence that the reader is integral to 
the text, that the labor of the reader is indispensable to its production, and far from 
making it disappear, the field of the reader’s experience, in constant motion, requires 
equally constant attention. Finally, reader-response theory is crucial in my view as a body 
of work that not only claims that the reader’s affective experience of poetic language is 
meaningful and constitutive of textual meaning, but that is simultaneously conservative 
enough to preserve, at least as heuristic categories, the infinitely useful language of 
reader, writer, and text, even if those terms no longer denote self-contained and 
impermeable entities.  
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What reader-response theory does not provide is any sort of theory or account of 
affect. Reacting against and refuting the Affective Fallacy, it comes out in favor of affect 
but does not specify just what this entity might be. Wimsatt and Beardsley treat affect as 
synonymous with subjective emotional response, and the reader-response theorists who 
oppose them seem uninterested in developing the concept further. Once they have 
successfully countered Wimsatt and Beardsley, the word “affect” seems simply to drop 
out, or to code merely as emotion or, even more broadly, as response.  It is significant 
that reader-response criticism adopted that name, rather than pursuing the avenue of 
“affective criticism.” For while the notion of affect may have set the initial terms of the 
conversation, it was not the category that was ultimately at stake for either the New 
Critics or the reader-response theorists. In search of more sophisticated accounts of 
affect, I will turn now to two realms in which affect and its transmission have been 
theorized. The first is psychoanalysis, particularly in Freud’s early work and in the 
provocative suggestions of Melanie Klein and the post-Kleinian Wilfred Bion. The 
second is the interdisciplinary field, still very much in its infancy, that is coming to be 
known as affect theory.41  In recapitulating these positions (neither of them monolithic), I 
hope to begin to stake out and clarify the conception of affect with which I will work 
throughout this dissertation, and which I find to be so crucial in reading continental 
philosophy.  
 
 
                                                
41 Quite recently, for instance (2010), Duke University Press published The Affect Theory Reader, which is 
replete with phrases such as “the turn to affect,” and clearly attempts to stake out affect (at the nexus of the 
fields of cultural studies, media studies, and literary theory) as one possible answer to the question of where 
“theory” is going in the wake of poststructuralism.  
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III. Affect in psychoanalytic theory: Freud and Bion 
In the background of and long before the recent work on affect, the concept 
received a complex treatment and definition at the hands of Sigmund Freud, particularly 
in the early texts Studies on Hysteria and The Interpretation of Dreams.  Freud did not 
consider himself a philosopher but a scientist. In his own philosophical leanings, no 
doubt deeply influenced by his medical and scientific background, he was a materialist. 
Yet his development and continual refinement of his theory of psychoanalysis arose from 
the treatment of seemingly somatic ailments—especially hysteria and obsessional 
neurosis—that turned out to be, precisely, psychosomatic.  Freud explicitly upholds a 
rigid distinction between intellect and affect. Yet his own work simultaneously and 
continually undermines the distinction between these categories.  
 A close reading of Freud’s early work, particularly the case studies of Studies on 
Hysteria and the section on affect in The Interpretation of Dreams, leads to an 
understanding of the category of affect in two distinct senses. One might say, crudely put, 
that there are affects, and then there is affect. In the first sense, affect is synonymous with 
feeling or emotion or, more broadly, an overarching mental state.  Depression, regret, 
hurt, shame, self-reproach, and general “psychical pain,” for instance, are all cited as 
affects. The second sense, however, is that of something that attaches to an idea or a 
mental representation, such as a recollection of a scene from the past, or a sense memory 
such as his hysterical patient Miss Lucy R.’s smell of burnt pudding.  In this sense, affect 
is explicitly set up in opposition to intellect.  Freud is at pains to distinguish affect from 
thought or from mental activity of any other kind.  It is the affect that attaches to a 
traumatic idea or memory that is abreacted in a successful treatment.  The affect, Freud 
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tells us, is the “operative force of the idea.” When the “strangulated affect” can “find a 
way out through speech,” the symptom disappears.42 The idea persists, but it has lost its 
power in reaching conscious awareness through its transformation into speech.  It has 
been discharged—as, then, can be the patient. Affect, in this framework, starts out as a 
“foreign body” lodged within the body itself and becomes progressively less material as 
the treatment progresses, until it dissipates altogether with the coming together of the 
material (in speech the affect comes out of the body, yet by way of the body) and the 
intellectual (in words, as abstract representations of the more original bodily affliction).  
The affect is lodged deep in the psyche, yet it manifests in physical forms:  Anna O.’s 
paralyses and linguistic mélanges, Miss Lucy’s inability to stop smelling burnt pudding, 
Frau Emmy’s clacking noises, Fräulein Elisabeth’s leg pains. The image is that of a 
foreign body lodged deep within the physical body. 
Yet the solid image of the foreign body (which Freud, interestingly, disavows as 
an imperfect metaphor after using it throughout the Studies) is coupled with the 
seemingly incompatible notion of the affect as malleable and plastic. An affect can jump, 
Freud tells us, from symptom to symptom, if it is not abreacted. As he remarks later in his 
Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, the sexual drives have an amazing plasticity 
and can easily shift their cathexis from object to object: “if the satisfaction of  one of 
them is frustrated by reality, the satisfaction of another can afford complete 
compensation. They are related to one another like a network of intercommunicating 
channels filled with a liquid...”43 Much the same idea is at work here with respect to 
                                                
42 Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud, “On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary 
Communication,” Studies on Hysteria, SE Volume II, p. 17, emphasis in original.  
 
43 Sigmund Freud, “Lecture XXI,” Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, SE Volume XV, p. 344.  
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affect. Moreover, it manifests itself both in the body and in language.  In this sense, it is 
best characterized at this point in Freud’s thinking as a measurable quantum of psychic 
energy whose most salient feature is not its type but rather its strength.  On this reading, 
the affect attached to the traumatic event or memory seems to have an undifferentiated 
quality to it; one could speak of it as a quantity of either psychical pain or excitement.  In 
a certain metaphorical sense, the affect in these case studies is the symptom beneath the 
symptom itself; it is the truth of the symptom.  
Hence the affect plays a strange and multivalent role in the analytic process in the 
sense that it is not only an obstacle, the foreign body whose dissipation the patient seeks, 
but also the goal itself, the crystallized truth of the patient’s psychic reality.  It is at once 
the node of psychic pain and deliverance from it. It is no coincidence that, as Peter Gay 
notes, Freud’s favorite philosopher was Ludwig Feuerbach, who rejected idealist 
tendencies in philosophical thought and claimed indeed that his thinking itself “requires 
the senses,” that it “generates thought....from Matter.”44  Jonathan Lear argues 
persuasively, and I would concur, that we should take most seriously only that in Freud’s 
theoretical work which emerges directly from his clinical practice.45 On this principle, I 
would contend that we should deny Freud’s explicit opposition of intellect and affect in 
favor of the view that his own work demonstrates that they are intimately intertwined. It 
is the conjunction, the knotting-together of body and psyche by way of the attached affect 
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45 Jonathan Lear, Freud, p. 9 and throughout.  
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that creates and constitutes the symptom, and they are “detached” only through the 
production of speech, itself an unmistakably physical act. 
The irreconcilably dual image of the affect from Studies On Hysteria only 
becomes further complicated in Freud’s discussion of affect in The Interpretation of 
Dreams.  While Freud is ostensibly in search of the latent thoughts that belong to a 
dream, in the sense that the resolution of the work of dream-interpretation consists in 
their discovery, he writes nonetheless that “dreams insist with greater energy upon their 
right to be included among our real mental experiences in respect to their affective than 
in respective to their ideational content.”46  The more elusive dream-thoughts, which are 
products of the intellect, formulated in words, are subjected in the dream-work to 
processes (such as condensation and displacement) so radically transformative as to 
render them utterly unrecognizable. Indeed, “there is often a passage in even the most 
thoroughly interpreted dream which has to be left obscure...This is the dream’s navel, the 
spot where it reaches down into the unknown.”47 The affect, on the other hand, is subject 
only to more readily decipherable distortions: it can be somewhat deadened, its level of 
intensity lowered, or it can be transformed into its opposite. The logic of both of these 
tricks of the dream-work is by its nature traceable, as the interpreter can, depending on 
the particular dream as its latent thoughts appear through the work of free-association, 
reverse or intensify the affect to restore it to its “truth.”   
Throughout the Studies on Hysteria and The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud’s 
ultimate goal is the uncovering of the thoughts that underlie the dream or the hysterical 
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symptom. The affect, for him, is simply the critical clue, the more-reliable pointer, the 
accompaniment, the attachment to that which is actually essential. Yet the trust that 
Freud places in the peculiarly truthful quality of affect belies this more explicit sense of 
its nature as secondary to the underlying thought.  For affect may be hidden, but once 
unearthed, it does not lie, in Freud’s view. He asserts that once he has reached a certain 
mastery of the therapeutic technique he is in the midst of developing, his patients’ bodies 
literally cannot lie to him.  “For it is well to recognize this clearly,” Freud writes, 
the patient only gets free from the hysterical symptom by reproducing the pathogenic  
impressions that caused it and by giving utterance to them with an expression of affect, 
and thus the therapeutic task consists solely in inducing him to do so; when once this  
task has been accomplished there is nothing left for the physician to correct or to remove... 
The situation may be compared with the unlocking of a locked door, after which opening  
it by turning the handle offers no further difficulty.”48  
 
Moreover, the successful discharge of the affect will be marked not only by the 
disappearance of the physical symptom, but the “complete calmness of the patient’s 
facial expression.”49  The patient’s face may also betray her true affect, as in Fräulein 
Elisabeth von R.’s inadvertent but unmistakable display of an expression of sexual 
pleasure when Freud manipulates the ostensibly painful places on her legs which are the 
primary site of her hysterical symptom. For Freud, as for Feuerbach, matter tells the truth 
about thought.  There is no analysis without affect.  
 What happens, then, if one translates this conclusion, born of clinical observation 
and dream interpretation, into a philosophical idiom?  Something along the lines, 
perhaps, of the idea that there is an affective dimension to rigorous thinking. Or, put more 
strongly, rigorous thinking is not simply infused with affect (for that would preserve the 
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49 Ibid., p. 301. See also p. 281.  
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distinction) but somehow constitutive of it.  Curiously, it is Freud at his most Kantian, so 
to speak, who pushes this conclusion.  For the importance of affect emerges, for Freud, in 
search of universal rules that would determine and regulate what might otherwise seem 
to be an utterly illogical morass of bodily symptoms (hysteria) or unconnected fragments 
of narrative and image (dreams).  It was Freud’s very systematicity in exploring dreams 
and neuroses that convinced him that they contained their own logic, idiosyncratic, yet 
not for all that wholly inaccessible or incapable of being deciphered, if not exhaustively.  
  
Affect surfaces again in Freud’s later work in the context of his work on group or 
mass psychology. Here he reinforces the affect/intellect dichotomy as he concurs with the 
prevailing logic of the time that given an individual in a group rather than alone, “his 
liability to affect becomes extraordinarily intensified, while his intellectual ability is 
markedly reduced....”50 He also notes that the phenomenon of affective contagion, which 
he treats as an empirically observable fact, is dramatically increased in a group setting, 
while it might be otherwise resisted.  Freud’s insights into affect in group psychology are 
not terribly helpful for my purposes, as he focuses primarily on analyzing the nature of 
the libidinal ties that bind groups together rather than on the mechanisms for the 
transmission of affect between individuals in groups. Wilfred Bion, however, the most 
influential of the post-Kleinian psychoanalytic theorists and author of the seminal 
Experiences in Groups, is very much worth investigating in this connection. I am 
interested in two particular moments in Bion’s work. First, he gives a critical reframing 
of Freud’s own work on individual neurosis in terms of group dynamics. Second, he 
                                                
50 Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, SE Volume XVIII, p. 87. 
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adapts and extends Melanie Klein’s concept of projective identification so as to suggest 
that one individual may project an affect such that another individual actually experiences 
himself as its recipient. As such, Bion outlines a clinical manner and method that insists 
on the necessity of the analyst’s taking his own affective response to the individual 
analysand or to the group as crucial to the work of analysis, well beyond the boundaries 
of other psychoanalytic conceptions of counter-transference and its uses.  
Bion’s Experiences in Groups constitutes a far more sophisticated approach to 
group psychology than Freud’s Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. Freud 
briefly notes at the outset of his text that “individual psychology” must in some sense 
always be “social psychology” insofar as individual psychic life cannot be tidily severed 
from its relations with objects, other individuals, and networks of family and friends. Yet 
he proceeds throughout to distinguish sharply between the individual qua individual and 
qua group member.51 Bion, on the other hand, takes issue with the seemingly inoffensive 
notion that, in his view, all previous theories of groups (including Freud’s) presuppose, 
which is that group psychology is in effect only when there are groups. On the contrary, 
Bion argues, the presence of the group simply makes existing group psychological 
phenomena visible: “The apparent difference between group psychology and individual 
psychology is an illusion produced by the fact that the group brings into prominence 
phenomena that appear alien to an observer unaccustomed to using the group.”52 What 
Bion is getting at here is, in fact, the same contention that he leverages in the following 
commentary on Freud: 
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Before Freud, the attempts to advance the study of neurosis were largely sterile because  
the individual was considered to be an intelligible field of study, but it was when Freud  
began to seek a solution in the relationship between two people, the study of the  
transference, that he found what was the intelligible field of study for at least some of the 
problems that the neurotic patient poses, and problems that had hitherto defied all attempts  
at solution began to have a meaning.53 
 
The claim that Freud’s primary innovation lies in the discovery of the transference 
relationship is not what is particularly noteworthy in this analysis; Freud himself might 
have agreed. Bion’s point is more subtle. Freud, he writes, in creating the analytic 
situation, brought into view a new “intelligible field of study” which produced the 
conditions for the possibility of psychoanalytic solutions. That field is the fundamentally 
dyadic analyst-analysand structure, not merely the psyche of the isolated individual. Bion 
suggests, moreover, that Freud himself may not have fully acknowledged or even known, 
at least in his psychology of groups, the implications of thus reconceptualizing the 
parameters of the field of study. “It appears to me,” he writes, “that Freud is in some 
ways failing to realize, in his discussion of groups, the nature of the revolution that he 
himself produced when he looked for an explanation of neurotic symptoms, not in the 
individual, but in the individual’s relationship with objects.”54  
Bion is not taking Freud to task for failing to sufficiently handle or theorize the 
transference or the counter-transference as so many others have done. He is pointing out 
that even as Freud grew more and more aware of these phenomena and came to 
understand the role of the transference as the motor energy of analysis, he did not extend 
to his study of groups the crucial insight that he brought to individual analysis. Thus, if 
the meaning of the individual’s neuroses and a method for their resolution could be made 
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54 Ibid., p. 134. Objects, taken here in the psychoanalytic sense, would include, and perhaps even 
predominantly indicate, people.  
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peculiarly visible only in the dyadic analytic encounter even though the neurotic also or 
even primarily experienced symptoms alone and outside that situation, likewise other 
psychic phenomena might be made manifest and visible to analysis only within the 
structure of the group, although they would be operative regardless of whether the group 
was physically present. Bion’s point here about the making visible of the “intelligible 
field of analysis” provocatively mirrors the argument of the reader-response theorists. 
Just as Fish and the others who objected to the Affective Fallacy expanded the domain of 
the fixed New Critical text to include the dynamic field of the reader’s reactions, 
claiming that a crucial aspect of interpretation was only then brought into view, Bion’s 
move here is to say that the patient only becomes intelligible once she is analyzed within 
the dyadic or group analytic situations. Just as seemingly individual psychoanalysis is 
really a “pair” activity, so the seemingly discrete text cannot come into view without a 
view of its analyst.  
As we will see, for Bion, the field in which this making-intelligible occurs 
includes, precisely, the affective responses of the analyst. For while many of the post-
Freudian psychoanalytic schools have theorized the twin phenomena of transference and 
counter-transference differently than Freud, Bion’s view is one of the most radical in this 
regard due to his use of Melanie Klein’s notion of projective identification in the clinical 
setting. Briefly, projective identification differs from projection in that the individual 
does not simply rid himself of troubling feelings or impulses by seeing them in others 
(who may or may not possess them). In projective identification, the individual projects 
(expels but remains connected to) part of the self, a “bad self,” into another individual or 
group of individuals.  Teresa Brennan, who argues that Bion’s work should be read as a 
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theory of transmission of affect, puts the distinction succinctly: “A projection is what I 
disown in myself and see in you; a projective identification is what I succeed in having 
you experience in yourself, although it comes from me in the first place.”55  
Bion came to think about the way this process operated in terms of “containers” 
and “contained,” and he also grew to believe it was a major component of the analytic 
process, going so far as to claim that the patient’s projective identifications actually make 
their way into the analyst. Psychoanalysts Stephen Mitchell and Juliet Black write:  
Klein describes the experience of the analyst in terms similar to Freud’s. But Bion, by 
interpersonalizing the concept of projective identification, regards the analyst’s affective 
experience as much more centrally involved in the patient’s struggles. The analyst finds  
himself resonating with and containing intense anxieties and disturbing states of mind.... 
For Freud, psychoanalysis was an arena in which one person observes and interprets the 
affective experience of another from a measured distance.  In the contemporary Kleinian 
perspective, psychoanalysis is an arena in which two persons struggle to organize and 
make meaningful the affective life of the patient into which the analyst is inevitably and 
usefully drawn.56 
 
In the clinical setting, the logical consequences of this theory entail that the analyst must 
pay very close attention to the affects that he experiences within the course of an analytic 
session. For the patient, or the group, may very well have caused him to experience them; 
he/they have given them to the analyst in a very real way, and they are crucial data. This 
is a significant departure from a theory of transference and counter-transference in which 
the former is a product of the patient’s psyche and the latter of the analyst’s, and the 
analyst is responsible for managing both, conscientiously attending to his own responses 
to the patient but never understanding them as the actual affect of the patient. In contrast, 
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here is Bion leading a typical group: “The pauses are getting longer, comments more and 
more futile, when it occurs to me that the feelings which I am experiencing myself—in 
particular, oppression by the apathy of the group and an urge to say something useful and 
enlightening—are precisely those which the others present seem to have.”57  
Toward the end of Experiences in Groups, he formalizes what seems here a 
passing observation into a theory and tentatively hazards a mechanism by which the 
analyst can distinguish between the affects that are his own and those that result from 
projective identification:  
I shall...state now a contention that I shall support throughout this paper.  It is that in  
group treatment many interpretations, and amongst them the most important, have to be  
made on the strength of the analyst’s own emotional reactions.  It is my belief that these  
reactions are dependent on the fact that the analyst in the group is on the receiving end of  
what Melanie Klein has called projective identification, and that this mechanism plays a  
very important role in groups.  Now the experience of counter-transference appears to me  
to have quite a distinct quality that should enable the analyst to differentiate the occasion  
when he is the object of a projective identification from the occasion when he is not. The  
analyst feels he is being manipulated so as to be playing a part, no matter how difficult to 
recognize, in someone else’s phantasy—or he would do if it were not for what in recollection  
I can only call a temporary loss of insight, a sense of experiencing strong feelings and at the  
same time a belief that their existence is quite adequately justified by the objective situation 
without recourse to recondite explanation of their causation.  From the analyst’s point of  
view, the experience consists of two closely related phases: in the first there is a feeling that  
whatever else one has done, one has certainly not given a correct interpretation; in the  
second there is a sense of being a particular kind of person in a particular emotional situation.   
I believe ability to shake oneself out of the numbing feeling of reality that is a concomitant of  
this state is the prime requisite of the analyst in the group: if he can do this he is in a position  
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In the groups in which I am psychiatrist I am the most obvious person, by virtue of my position, in whom to 
vest a right to establish rules of procedure. I take advantage of this position to establish no rules of 
procedure and to put forward no agenda.” (p. 77) The stated purpose of the group, then—the “work group” 
in Bion’s terminology—can be nothing other than to study the dynamics of the group itself as they unfold, 
revealing what he calls their “basic assumptions,” which operate on a different level than the work group 
and may often run at cross-purposes to it.  
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to give what I believe is the correct interpretation, and thereby to see its connection with the 
previous interpretation, the validity of which he has been caused to doubt.58  
 
In other words, the analyst must actually succumb not only to the experience of the affect 
but also to the earnest belief that it is his own. Only after he has thoroughly inhabited that 
position of identification can he begin to disentangle what is his own and what he has 
been given. The successful analysis will depend on the combination of being sufficiently 
receptive actually to receive the affect of the other(s), yet possessing sufficient 
boundaries to eventually identify it as not-self and to bring it to the attention of the 
patient or the group. The lines between self and other are distinct, then blur, then separate 
again. Affect, and analysis, both create and demand not only a certain degree of 
porousness, but also an ability to reconstruct and demarcate boundaries between subjects. 
With Freud we already have a conception of affect as something that is fluid, circulating, 
even jumping, from symptom to symptom. It can move and transform within dreams, 
become dampened or heightened. It is eminently mobile, in other words, and analysis of 
its movement(s) is essential to the process of interpretation, whether of dreams or of 
symptoms. With Bion’s insight into the functioning of projective identification in the 
clinical situation, affect becomes interpersonal and its range is likewise extended to a 
broader field of motion. Freud and Bion will be important for my understanding of affect 
and its relationship to interpretation. I would like to turn now to some of the recent 
scholarship that has moved out of the psychoanalytic sphere and, in certain respects, 
beyond Freud.  
 
 
                                                
58 Ibid., pp. 149-150.  
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IV.  Contemporary affect theory: Massumi, Sedgwick, Stewart 
Teresa Brennan, with whom I began this chapter, is not the only recent theorist to 
concern herself with affect. Scholars in a variety of disciplines, including Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick, Kathleen Stewart, Brian Massumi, and Sara Ahmed have lately invoked the 
category of affect in a bewildering variety of contexts, to the extent that in their 
introduction to the recently-published Affect Theory Reader, editors Melissa Gregg and 
Gregory J. Seigworth remark that there is “no single, generalizable theory of affect: not 
yet, and (thankfully) there never will be.”59 They are certainly correct, at least as to the 
first part of that formulation, but there are noteworthy family resemblances and shared 
goals. The recent scholarship on affect often draws as much or more on Deleuze as it 
does upon Freud and his successors, but across the board it shares at least one identifiable 
concern: the desire to create or theorize a concept that would trouble or call into question 
philosophical dichotomies such as those between subject and object, mind and body, and 
to do so in a way that is rigorously attuned to visceral, bodily processes as a necessary 
element of writing theory. Ben Anderson neatly summarizes this position when he writes, 
“Affects are understood as impersonal intensities that do not belong to a subject or an 
object, nor do they reside in the mediating space between a subject and an object.”60 
In addition to Teresa Brennan’s The Transmission of Affect, there are three texts 
from contemporary affect theory that I find particularly incisive and helpful in crafting 
my own working definition of affect: Brian Massumi’s “The Autonomy of Affect,” Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick’s Touching Feeling and Kathleen Stewart’s Ordinary Affects.  
                                                
59
 Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, “An Inventory of Shimmers,” The Affect Theory Reader, p. 3.  
 
60 Ben Anderson, “Modulating the Excess of Affect: Morale in a State of ‘Total War,’” in The Affect 
Theory Reader, p. 162.  
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Massumi is in certain ways the figure here I will take up the least, but his essay is a 
touchstone in the recent thinking on affect. It is especially noteworthy for the way in 
which he distinguishes affect from emotion, for his equation of affect with what he calls 
“intensity” and for his use of the category of affect to distance theory from language. 61  
Massumi (like Stewart, as we will see below) works often from within stories, and here 
he begins with the puzzling tale of a group of children in a scientific experiment who 
bewildered researchers by their reactions to three versions of a video, one silent and two 
with various cues on vocal tracks. Surprisingly, when they were cued as to the unfolding 
of the story, the children reacted less and found the experience less pleasurable; they 
found the version in which the vocal cues stressed the emotional tenor of the story in 
between, in terms of pleasure. The lesson that Massumi wishes to derive from the study is 
about what he calls “the primacy of the affective in image reception,” which is significant 
for the way in which it opens up (or more precisely allows us to view) a “gap between 
content and effect” and highlights the manner in which “the strength or duration of an 
image’s effect is not logically connected to the content in any straightforward way.”62 He 
seems to use this initial distinction between content and effect only briefly, and then 
proposes two new categories that map onto them: “qualities” and “intensity.” Again, he 
                                                
61 Massumi is the English translator of Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus and 
his work is thoroughly informed by Deleuzian themes and aesthetics. While Massumi’s is an important 
contribution, he is less useful for my purposes insofar as his work understands affect as functioning in a 
way that points, if not entirely away from the linguistic, at a fundamentally different angle. Furthermore, 
much of the work in this vein (most of it in cultural studies), if not Massumi’s, tends to use affect as a sort 
of blanket category that vaguely indicates that it’s important to pay attention to things that aren’t words. 
Lawrence Grossberg articulates my own frustration with this tendency much better than I can when he says, 
“I do think that affect can let you off the hook. Because it has come to serve, now, too often as a ‘magical’ 
term. So, if something has effects that are, let’s say, non-representational then we can just describe it as 
‘affect.’....It’s like people who say the world is ‘rhizomatic.’ The world isn’t rhizomatic!” (“Affect’s 
Future: Rediscovering the Virtual in the Actual,” interview with Lawrence Grossberg, in The Affect Theory 
Reader, p. 315)  
 
62 Brian Massumi, “The Autonomy of Affect,” Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation, p. 
24.  
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insists that there is no clear relation between the two, as in the example of the children’s 
film, in which the viewing experience judged to be most pleasant was also the saddest 
(that is to say the most intense). Both of these categories are always embodied, for 
Massumi, but only one is narrative (content or qualities) and it is intensity that he is at 
pains to elucidate.  
Another of the binaries that Massumi is working with here is surface and depth, 
and he associates intensity with surfaces and specifically that of skin, not only 
metaphorically but also in a genuinely physiological sense, as associated with the 
autonomic nervous system and the systems that it controls that are primarily regulated 
without conscious thought (respiration, heartbeat, etc). Depth seems to function for him 
primarily as a metaphor; he uses it to refer to content or qualities, which for him require 
expectation and thus consciousness, self-positioning in narrative structure. Intensity, on 
the other hand, exists or occurs outside of such structures: “Intensity,” he writes, “is the 
unassimilable.”63  Interestingly, after raising and largely discarding the language of 
content and effect in favor of qualities and intensity, he now proposes to equate this 
unassimilable intensity with affect. While “effect” and even “intensity” did not 
necessarily conjure the notion of emotion, when Massumi introduces the term “affect,” he 
finds it necessary to disambiguate. He writes, 
Affect is most often used loosely as a synonym for emotion.  But one of the clearest lessons  
of this first story is that emotion and affect—if affect is intensity—follow different logics  
and pertain to different orders. 
An emotion is a subjective content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an 
experience which is from that point onward defined as personal.  Emotion is qualified  
intensity, the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and 
semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function  
and meaning. It is intensity owned and recognized. It is crucial to theorize the difference  
between affect and emotion. If some have the impression that affect has waned, it is because  
                                                
63 Ibid., p. 27.  
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affect is unqualified. As such, it is not ownable or recognizable and is thus resistant to  
critique.64 
 
A crude way to put this distinction would be to say that affects are things that we feel but 
for which we have no words. Emotions, on the contrary, are nameable and as such 
containable. They are subjective and personal, but not for all that incommunicable. 
“Emotion is qualified intensity”: this relation calls to mind (in family resemblance, at 
least) the Kierkegaardian/Heideggerian distinction between fear and anxiety, in which 
fear has an object, anxiety none. Affect escapes language in a way that emotion can be 
described and bound by it. And it transpires that this idea of escape is crucial to 
Massumi’s conception of affect.  
Affect is felt but not grasped because it is always involved with what he calls “the 
virtual,” something “that happens too quickly to have happened, actually,” but 
nonetheless does happen—and to the body—but before and without conscious 
understanding or consent (again, the idea of the autonomic presents itself). For Massumi, 
this virtual and the actual are always intertwined. Thus “affect is this two-sidedness [of 
the intertwining of the virtual and the actual] as seen from the side of the actual thing, as 
couched in its perceptions and cognitions.”65 This last is crucial, for while affect is often 
deployed by Massumi and others in service of a radically dispersed notion of the subject, 
distinct from the narrativizing subject involved in expectation and “ordinary” temporal 
structure who can name her emotions and understand them as part of her own story, 
affect here still can and even must be analyzed from a particular (not singular) 
perspective, albeit not with any connotations of interiority. It is wholly accurate to 
                                                
64 Ibid., pp. 26-7. 
 
65 Ibid., p. 35.  
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describe affect by saying that intensities traverse the body, but the specificity of the body 
and its perspective may be preserved and spoken about, if perhaps necessarily with 
difficulty. I quote at length from what I find the most crucial passage for understanding 
Massumi:  
Affect is the virtual as point of view, provided the visual metaphor is used guardedly. For  
affect is synesthetic, implying a participation of the senses in each other: the measure of a  
living thing’s potential interactions is its ability to transform the effects of one sensory mode  
into those of another....Affects are virtual synesthetic perspectives anchored in (functionally 
limited by) the actually existing, particular things that embody them.  The autonomy of affect is  
its participation in the virtual.  Its autonomy is its openness.  Affect is autonomous to the  
degree to which it escapes confinement in the particular body whose vitality, or potential  
for interaction, it is. Formed, qualified, situated perceptions and cognitions fulfilling 
functions of actual connection or blockage. Emotion is the most intense (most contracted) 
expression of that capture—and of the fact that something has always and again escaped.  
Something remains unactualized, inseparable from but unassimilable to any particular, 
functionally anchored perspective....Actually existing, structured things live in and through  
that which escapes them. Their autonomy is the autonomy of affect. 
The escape of affect cannot but be perceived, alongside the perceptions that are its 
capture... When the continuity of affective escape is put into words, it tends to take on positive 
connotations.  For it is nothing less than the perception of one’s own vitality, one’s sense of 
aliveness, of changeability (often signified as ‘freedom’). One’s ‘sense of aliveness’ is a 
continuous, nonconscious self-perception (unconscious self-reflection or lived self-referentiality).  
It is the perception of this self-perception, its naming and making conscious, that allows affect  
to be effectively analyzed—as long as a vocabulary can be found for that which is imperceptible 
but whose escape from perception cannot but be perceived, as long as one is alive.66 
 
We notice affect, in other words, only insofar as it escapes: escapes language, escapes 
capture, escapes assimilation. And its escape is not only from a particular body but also to 
other bodies, other sites. This is why I return again and again to the formulation of affect 
as intensities traversing the body. Teresa Brennan’s insistence on affect’s transmission 
resonates here, as does her image of the affectively laden room whose contents make 
their way into one through the membrane of the skin. Massumi also helpfully draws 
attention to the dynamism of affect: it need not be positive, but it is always in motion of 
one kind or another; and it is intimately related to a dramatic awareness of being 
                                                
66 Ibid., p. 35-6, emphasis in italics in original, bold mine.  
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intensely, physically alive, in a fashion that is instantaneously recognizable but nearly 
impossible to articulate.  
It is possible and perhaps even necessary to read Massumi as introducing the 
notion of affect as a category toward or from which one can theorize in the wake of 
poststructuralism. He is deeply fatigued, one senses, by the way in which an 
overwhelming emphasis on language and structure can write out the body, a concern that 
I will return to below in the context of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick. Massumi’s thematization 
and use of affect constitutes a rebuke to any emphasis on structural analysis insofar as it 
serves to obscure the notion of event, which for him is singular and unassimilable to any 
concept of structure.  For him, affect’s vexed relationship or irreducibility to language is 
part of its appeal. He does not forbid the possibility of the transmission of affect through 
linguistic means, but it is not part of his own trajectory.  
In her essay collection Touching Feeling, Sedgwick echoes and amplifies some of 
Massumi’s concerns about the limitations of poststructuralist and deconstructive thought 
in theorizing the body. But rather than using affect to move away from the linguistic like 
Massumi, from structure to event, she wants to complicate the relationship between the 
linguistic and the non-linguistic. Although she aligns herself with the work of thinkers 
like Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler in the sense that she “wants to address aspects of 
experience and reality that do not present themselves in propositional or even in verbal 
form alongside others that do,” she announces her departure from such work insofar as 
she professes a “disinclination...to subsuming nonverbal aspects of reality firmly under 
the aegis of the linguistic. I assume that the line between words and things or between 
linguistic and nonlinguistic phenomena is endlessly changing, permeable, and entirely 
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unsusceptible to any definitive articulation.”67 Sedgwick’s turn to affect, feeling, touch, 
and so forth constitutes a refusal of what she views as the priority of the linguistic in 
theory.68  
Moreover, where Massumi wishes to distinguish between affect and emotion, 
Sedgwick—reading the work of psychologist Sylvan Tomkins—is rather more interested 
in distinguishing it from the drives. She is particularly attentive to Tomkins’ idea that 
unlike drives, which have specific objects and which require satisfaction, affects can have 
or attach to any object whatsoever, and do not require satisfaction in the sense that hunger 
or sexual desire do; they can be “autotelic,” self-satisfying.69 Glossing Tomkins, 
Sedgwick writes: “Affects can be, and are, attached to things, people, ideas, sensations, 
relations, activities, ambitions, institutions, and an number of other things, including 
other affects.  Thus one can be excited by anger, disgusted by shame, or surprised by 
joy.”70 Sedgwick also finds Tomkins particularly provocative insofar as he forces his 
reader to think in terms of the category of affects, plural, not Affect. Tomkins laid out a 
bullet point list of eight (or occasionally nine) hardwired affects regarding which 
Sedgwick herself notes that one would not have to be “long out of theory kindergarten” 
                                                
67 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity, p. 6. 
 
68 Her essay on Tomkins begins, tellingly, with a list of “a few things theory knows today.” High up on the 
list is “2. Human language is assumed to offer the most productive, if not the only possible, model for 
understanding representation.” See p. 93 and following. 
 
69 A helpful sample of Tomkins on this subject: “It is enjoyable to enjoy. It is exciting to be excited. It is 
terrorizing to be terrorized and angering to be angered.  Affect is self-validating without any further 
referent.” From Affect Imagery Consciousness, vol. 3, p. 404, cited in “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: 
Reading Silvan Tompkins,” Touching Feeling, pp. 99-100. 
 
70 Ibid., p. 19.  
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to discredit.71  But she chooses to read and think with the currently unfashionable 
Tomkins in part to show up the limitations and blind spots of contemporary theoretical 
trends that would insist on Affect rather than exploring individual affects (shame is her 
primary example), an omission that she finds worth rectifying. And she also chooses to 
think with Tomkins in part because she finds something about his work, his writing, to be 
affecting, an admission that she offers up without apology. This admission links Touching 
Feeling, in my view, to the kind of work that is deliberately enacted by anthropologist 
Kathleen Stewart in her book Ordinary Affects, a daring experiment preceded by only the 
briefest explanation of what she is attempting.  
Ordinary Affects is a short series of loosely connected vignettes and anecdotes 
that explicitly seeks to elicit affect from the reader. It is a provocative attempt at a 
deliberate performance of the pull of the text, as Stewart endeavors “to slow the quick 
jump to representational thinking and evaluative critique long enough to find ways of 
approaching the complex and uncertain objects that fascinate because they literally hit us 
or exert a pull on us.”72 Everything in the universe of ordinary affects is dynamic. The 
Freudian language of objects, aims, and so forth would often be markedly out of place 
here; Stewart’s vocabulary, like Massumi’s, is Deleuzian (although not exclusively so), 
full of circuits, flows, relays, intensities, energetics. But she is also attracted to stills. She 
observes and describes minute interactions that would normally go unnoticed. This is not 
limited to the field of the individual, for Stewart is also interested in affective contagion, 
how a single event can transform the affect of a group, a room, a community. She gets at 
                                                
71 Ibid., p. 94.  
 
72 Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects, p. 4.  
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this notion of the impersonality of affect by speaking of ordinary affects as “public 
feelings” that are “at once abstract and concrete.” Moreover, they are constantly in 
circulation, not bounded or contained neatly within individual bodies.73  But the impact 
on what is experienced as the individual body (as well as collective bodies) is what draws 
her in. Describing the experience of an ordinary affect, she writes that “...a charge passes 
through the body and lingers for a little while as an irritation, confusion, judgment, thrill 
or musing. However it strikes us, its significance jumps. Its visceral force keys a search to 
make sense of it, to incorporate it into an order of meaning. But it lives first as an actual 
charge immanent to acts and scenes—a relay.”74 Here Stewart’s language, evoking the 
“jump” of affect, is quite reminiscent of the early Freud, where the affect jumps from 
symptom to symptom or attaches to a dream element to which it does not strictly 
‘belong.’   
What I find so singular about Ordinary Affects is the way in which Stewart, while  
gesturing toward a distinctly non-Cartesian view of the subject, while using the category 
of affect to displace so many of the implications of that model of subjectivity, 
nonetheless portrays the phenomenologically experienced reality of subjects who do, in a 
meaningful way, experience themselves as subjects who can at times distinguish 
themselves from their worlds. She is clear that ordinary affects work against a coherent 
notion of autonomous, self-contained subjectivity. Her subject is “a collection of 
trajectories and circuits,” she writes, and declares, even more tellingly: “The self is no 
                                                
73 Ibid., pp. 2-3.  
 
74 Ibid., p. 39, emphasis mine.  
 
 53 
match for all of this.”75 Yet there are selves in Ordinary Affects, bodily subjects 
embedded in distinct lives; they are porous, yes, but imaginary, no. They do have 
boundaries, but they are neither strict nor constant. One has the sense that she is 
implicitly working with the Buddhist philosophical distinction between conventional and 
ultimate truth, in the sense that, well, in terms of ultimate reality, I might just be a bundle 
of psycho-physical aggregates to which time gives a false sense of unity and stability, but 
conventionally—and I pretty often face the day in a conventional as opposed to an 
ultimate manner—when I experience an affective charge, I seem to feel something move 
from a space that seemed external to one that seems internal, regardless of the potentially 
flawed beliefs that might underlie that feeling. Subjects in Ordinary Affects seem to 
experience themselves as discrete subjects at times; other times, markedly less so. Thus 
Stewart can both have a narrator and distinct characters and landscapes and describe them 
as they collide or bleed together, and yet simultaneously state that this is “transpersonal 
or prepersonal—not about one person’s feelings becoming another’s but about bodies 
literally affecting one another and generating intensities: human bodies, discursive 
bodies, bodies of thought, bodies of water.”76  
Furthermore, this constant play of affect (I was tempted to write signifiers, and 
that might be just fine here as well) conjures up what Stewart does not explicitly frame as 
an ethical stance, but rather a way of being in the world for which all of Ordinary Affects 
nonetheless argues persuasively: “a mode of attunement, a continuous responding to 
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 54 
something not quite already given and yet somehow happening.”77 Given this attention, 
her ordinary and extraordinary are one and the same. Finally, what makes Ordinary 
Affects so striking is that it is not simply a theory of the pull and movement of affect. 
Rather, Stewart’s storytelling, documenting “the intimate impacts of forces in 
circulation,” enacts its own undeniable affective pull just as it provokes meditation on the 
phenomenon, a potent reminder of the intimate relationship between text and affect. 78   
Stewart makes it impossible not to consider the moment that interests me, the moment 
when you are reading and a text seems to grab out at you in a visceral way, and not 
because it mirrors you back to yourself. Neither passive voice nor active voice are 
adequate to represent it. There is an event. Something occurs. Something transmits. 
Something is experienced as transmitted. Stewart chooses the active formulation but 
leaves the subject empty: “Something throws itself together in a moment as an event and 
a sensation; a something both animated and inhabitable.”79 I think “something” is the 
right word. I am not sure that Stewart’s “throws itself together” gets at what I am trying 
to express. I think of something a bit less hectic, a bit less Deleuzian. Something arrives, 
or something is arriving, unlooked for. But I want to hear it with the resonances of the 
French arriver, which also carries the sense of “to happen,” and can function as an 
impersonal verb.  And if one puts it in French it isn’t necessary to choose between the 
simple present and the present progressive; one can hear them both simultaneously. 
Quelque chose...arrive.   
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V.  Philosophy’s peculiar allergy  
 Throughout the bulk of this chapter, I have been considering work primarily in the 
literary or poetic and the psychoanalytic realms. And as I turn to the work of Julia 
Kristeva and Luce Irigaray in subsequent chapters, whose writing is unquestionably 
situated within those realms as well as within the domain of philosophy, those concerns 
will remain relevant.80 But my primary interest is with the role of affect in the reading 
and writing of philosophy, albeit a strand of philosophy that is engaged in an ongoing and 
often devastating immanent critique. As I read Kristeva and Irigaray in order to argue that 
they demand to be read affectively, with an attunement to the manners in which they 
solicit and elicit affective responses through stylistic experimentation, I read them as 
philosophers concerned with the parameters of what counts as philosophical, as 
intelligible, as meaningful.  
My worry about affect is very much related to the fact that philosophy seems to 
have a peculiar allergy to affect that is intimately intertwined with its aversion to poetic 
language. There are certainly noteworthy exceptions—I think, for example, of Hume’s 
and Smith’s theories of “moral sentiments,” which take emotional reactions very 
seriously indeed as the basis for philosophical (specifically moral) judgments. But for 
much of the history of Western thought, a privileging of systematic and linear discourse 
as a crucial signifier of philosophical rigor has gone hand in hand with a certain disdain 
for the body and the emotions.  While I am primarily concerned with philosophical 
writing that reacts to the ideals of Enlightenment thought, I cannot resist a brief detour 
through Plato’s famous—but eminently relevant—expulsion of the poets from his ideal 
                                                
80 I will discuss the relationship between the categories of philosophy and literature, particularly as 
theorized by Jean-Luc Nancy, at more length in Chapter Three.  
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city in the Republic. When Plato kicked out the poets and installed the philosopher-kings 
at the head of the kallipolis, he claimed that the “quarrel” between poetry and philosophy 
was already an ancient one.81  The poets, Plato tells us, are far too dangerous, especially 
the good ones. They do not appeal to the rational part of our souls, but rather exercise an 
undeniable affective pull upon us.  For philosophy, in this view, is the domain of reason, 
which clarifies, whereas emotion and desire inevitably weaken, muddle, and bewilder us.  
Hence in Plato’s view, we are powerless to resist the draw of these poets, inspired to 
imitate the fantastical deeds they recount—is it not patently obvious that they have to go? 
His pupil Aristotle learned this lesson all too well for my taste. Plato wrote dialogues, 
exploiting the rhetorical skills he shared with these dangerously good poets. Meanwhile, 
Aristotle bequeathed to us the dry form of the systematic philosophical treatise, designed 
to treat every aspect of any given inquiry until it—and likely the reader—is utterly 
exhausted.   
One way to read the history of the Western philosophical tradition is as an 
interplay between these registers of the “philosophical” and the “poetic.” It may be a 
commonplace to state that this tradition is a series of conversations or arguments. I would 
add, however, that many of these arguments beg to be understood along the axis of style.  
Two major precedents for the sort of affective labor that I locate in Kristeva and Irigaray 
are Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche.82 In the nineteenth century, Kierkegaard 
and Nietzsche sought to disrupt and discredit the equation of philosophy and 
systematicity, refusing both in content and in style the steady march of analytic logic in 
favor of something more intuitive, more experimental, and eminently more risky. They 
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82 In Chapter Four, I will also discuss a third precedent, Friedrich Schlegel.  
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prefigure the sort of experimentation with affectivity as a positive quality of 
philosophical thinking with which I am concerned. Nietzsche reserved much of his ire for 
Immanuel Kant, whose Critical philosophy tried to comprehend and account for every 
knowable aspect of reality. In his railings against what he considered the entire trajectory 
of Platonic-Christian thought, Nietzsche singles out Kant as the emblematic perpetrator 
of the type of bloodless thinking and reasoning that his entire body of work both 
explicitly contests and stylistically resists. Kierkegaard saw the culmination of this desire 
for systematicity in G.W.F. Hegel and declared himself the implacable enemy of this 
impulse, writing of his own work: “This is not the system; it has not the least thing to do 
with the system.”83  
Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, often read as the ancestors of poststructuralism, 
understood the perils of the attempt to know everything, say everything, and bind it all 
together in one comprehensive system that refuses to concede that anything might fall 
outside its boundaries. Hence Kierkegaard gave us “crumbs,“ “philosophical fragments.” 
He told stories. He traveled in circles rather than straight lines, implicitly insisting that 
certain philosophical questions could not be addressed rationally and systematically. 
Nietzsche wrote in aphorisms, cryptically, and also in gleeful polemics, “philosophizing 
with a hammer.” Kierkegaard wrote of faith that it occurs only in the domain of the 
incalculable, the unthinkable, the “moment of crisis.” Nietzsche emphasized drives, the 
body, the Dionysian impulse. Their writings constitute radical stylistic experiments that 
unsettle the presuppositions undergirding the very notion of systematicity.  
                                                
83 Kierkegaard, Søren. Fear and Trembling, p. 8. Kierkegaard, of course, was not the only philosopher who 
utilized the fragment, which was crucial for Friedrich Schlegel and the circle involved with the Athenaeum 
journal.  For a brilliant analysis of the fragment, see Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s and Jean-Luc Nancy’s The 
Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanticism, particularly Chapter 1: “The 
Fragment: The Fragmentary Exigency.” 
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It is not coincidental that both of these figures were obsessed, in some way, with 
religious thinking, although their concerns run the gamut from Kierkegaard’s radical 
notion of faith to the atheistic messianism of Nietzsche’s coming Zarathustra. Both pose 
challenges to rigorous thought as essentially a non-affective process or entity. In style and 
content (not that I wish to suggest these are more than heuristically separable), both 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche insist upon a conceptual rigor the condition of the possibility 
of which could be called passion, will, emotion, or drive. Kristeva and Irigaray, 
influenced (differently but significantly in both cases) by Freud by way of Lacan, are also 
experimental stylists who place a formidable affective burden on their readers. In the 
following chapters, I will develop a theory of affective hermeneutics through a close 
examination of their theorization and performance of affect in terms of their 
philosophical styles.  I will insist throughout—like the reader-response theorists, like 
Bion—that it is necessary to expand the “intelligible field of study” to include what 
arrives and how and to whom, to situate the reading of these philosophical texts in a 
reconfigured field that includes the transmission of affective cues and demands.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Fragile Readers: Affect and Analysis in Kristeva and Duras 
 
 
“We now understand why Duras’ books should not be put into the hands of oversensitive readers.”  
–Julia Kristeva, Black Sun 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 It is one of the foundational tenets of psychoanalysis that transference is its motor 
energy, its driving force, so to speak.  Freud may have performed his own analysis—
albeit hardly to the satisfaction of many later commentators—but this was a structural 
necessity, and his is a solitary case.  The “talking cure,” as Anna O. dubbed it, acts not 
only by way of the bringing to light of subterranean truths through the process of verbal 
free association; it also requires an other, a beloved other, in order to function at all.  For 
as Julia Kristeva argues persuasively in Tales of Love, transference is indeed a form of 
love.  "If it lives, your psyche is in love,” she writes. “If it is not in love, it is dead. 'Death 
lives a human life,' Hegel said. That is true whenever we are not in love or are not in 
analysis."84  While the degree or the “reality” of transference love remains a controversial 
point, it is far less contentious to maintain that analysis stands or falls with the 
transference relationship between analyst and analysand.  That is to say, speech alone is 
not enough. Analysis—by which I mean to indicate both the production of speech and its 
interpretation—rests also upon affect.  As Freud writes as early as his Studies on 
                                                
84 Julia Kristeva, Tales of Love, p. 15; Histoires d’Amour, p. 21.  
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Hysteria, while the theory and practice of analysis were still in the earliest stages of 
development, “recollection without affect almost invariably produces no result.”85 
 Since Freud, of course, there has been a wealth of scholarly work that uses various types 
of psychoanalytic theory as a method of literary analysis.  Some of this is less than subtle, 
such as various attempts at an interpretation of a text through lay analysis of its author; 
some of it is highly sophisticated.  Deconstruction, for instance, is difficult to imagine 
prior to the Freudian unconscious.86  And psychoanalysis itself has also proceeded by 
way of philosophical and literary analysis, most notably in the case of Jacques Lacan, 
Kristeva’s greatest psychoanalytic influence apart from Freud.   
It is my contention that Kristeva’s gesture toward the necessity of taking affect 
seriously as an integral component of textual analysis as well as personal analysis results 
in an expanded horizon not only for a theory of the subject87 but also for a theory of 
interpretation that would not simply be a recapitulation of deconstruction and its 
associated movements. It is this notion of interpretation by way of affect that I wish to 
explore here, through a consideration of the role of affect in her reading of the work of 
Marguerite Duras. In her early writings, Desire in Language and Revolution in Poetic 
Language, Kristeva’s distinction between what she terms “the semiotic” and “the 
symbolic” modalities of language provides a theoretical scaffolding that insists on the 
                                                
85 Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud, “On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary 
Communication.” Studies on Hysteria, p. 6. Cited in Jonathan Lear, Freud, p. 17.   
 
86 This is not to say that I wish to quarrel with Derrida’s many claims that deconstruction is not a method 
(despite the many attempts, particularly within the American academy, to treat it as such); however, it 
certainly bears some relation to practices of reading and warrants mention in this regard.  
 
87 Apart from her notion of the semiotic, Kristeva is perhaps best known for her conception of the subject in 
process/on trial (le sujet en procès) and her insistence that every theory of language contains or implies a 
theory of the subject. See especially “Le Sujet en Procès” and “D’Une Identité l’Autre” in Polylogue (the 
latter is translated as “From One Identity To Another,” in Desire in Language:  A Semiotic Approach to 
Literature and Art). 
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necessity of affect as the precondition of any linguistic event and whose dialectical 
interaction determines the nature of the event. I will argue that her later work, during the 
period of her 1980s “trilogy” on horror, love, and melancholy, generates the possibility of 
an affective hermeneutics that is simultaneously commonsensical, yet counter-intuitive 
from the perspective of any type of “close reading” that seeks to draw us ever nearer to 
the texts that we are reading.  
While Freud learned to read the bodies of his female patients through the affect 
‘beneath’ their symptoms, Kristeva teaches us to read with the body itself. The category 
of affect, which knots together the “symbolic and the somatic,” allows Kristeva to 
perform a sort of interpretation that demonstrates not only the compatibility of analytic 
rigor and visceral response but their intimate relationship. Kristeva makes us concede that 
we must pay attention to the affective bond between the reader and text, to its strength, its 
quality, its tenor.  Freud already hints at this in the Studies on Hysteria when he writes 
that hysteria restores a certain truth of language to its “original meaning.”88 But Kristeva 
goes further: she makes us consider that listening to the body might be a condition of the 
possibility of rigorous thinking itself.  For Kristeva, the affective bonds formed in 
analysis, in transference love, possess their own reality, their own incontrovertible truth. 
If it is the cathexis of transference love that makes analysis work, might this not also be 
the case for reading?  A confusion of boundaries and realities that catalyzes the 
emergence of its own distinctive clarity? 
 
 
                                                
88 Freud, Studies on Hysteria, SE Volume II, p. 181. 
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II. Freud, humility, and the productions of the hysterical body 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the way in which affect is theorized in Freud’s 
early work. Here I want to sketch briefly the interactions with the patients through whose 
analysis he came to this conception, with particular attention to the way that he finds a 
truth in the way that their symptoms, their bodies, speak.  These interactions are crucial in 
setting up my discussion of Kristeva. As I will argue, she is in a real sense Freud’s 
psychoanalytic heir in the realm of affect. And what is more, both she and Freud seem to 
find a truth in these “productions” of women’s bodies that they cannot locate elsewhere.  
Freud and Breuer define hysteria, and more specifically its cure, explicitly in 
terms of affect. As they write in their introduction to the case studies,  
For we found, to our great surprise at first, that each individual hysterical symptom 
immediately and permanently disappeared when we had succeeded in bringing clearly  
to light the memory of the event by which it was provoked and in arousing its  
accompanying affect, and when the patient had described that event in the greatest  
possible detail and had put the affect into words.89 
 
It is this abreaction, or discharge, of the symptom by way of verbalizing its affect that 
constitutes the goal of Freud’s treatment and signals, in a successful case, the resolution 
of the hysteria. Importantly, as Freud would insist throughout his later work, and, as I 
will argue, he learned most thoroughly in the course of analyzing these women, it is the 
patient herself whose words are always at issue. The analyst, in this sense—setting aside 
for the moment the issue of the transference—can only be a catalyst for the patient’s 
setting into words of her own idiosyncratic truth.  
 I am most interested in examining the notion of affect in these case studies 
because they capture a moment in Freud’s development of psychoanalytic theory and 
                                                
89 Breuer and Freud, “On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena,” Studies on Hysteria, p. 6, 
emphasis in original.  
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practice that is utterly distinctive.  To be sure, Freud was notoriously unafraid throughout 
his life to revise his views and to correct in print what he deemed to be errors in earlier 
theoretical formulations.  Yet there is a quality of humility and fumbling in the Studies on 
Hysteria that is absent in his later work even at its most speculative.  Nowhere else does 
Freud cast himself so overtly as a student, even a neophyte; he is, in these case studies, a 
student of the bodies and voices of the women through whom he discovered and refined 
his therapeutic techniques.  It is here, above all—and particularly in his first attempt at 
employing Breuer’s cathartic method, with Frau Emmy von N.—that Freud learned to 
listen.90  
I shall not defend Freud against many of the charges that have been leveled 
against him regarding his manner of handling patients.  Other case studies, most 
famously that of the adolescent girl he dubbed “Dora,” adequately demonstrate that he 
frequently ignored his own imperative that it is of no use, and even actively 
counterproductive, to impose an interpretation upon a patient. He is by turns insensitive, 
overbearing, and paternalistic, which may well be the reason that Dora terminated her 
analysis. 91 And indeed he displays all of these traits in turn in the cases of Frau Emmy 
von N., Miss Lucy R., and Fräulein Elizabeth von R.92  At this point in his therapeutic 
                                                
90 This may be even truer of ‘Cäcilie M,’ (Anna von Lieben),  with whom Freud conducted an extensive 
analysis and to whom he alludes throughout the Studies, although he does not discuss her case at length for 
fear of compromising her identity; she is not one of the five “official” case studies of the text. As Lisa 
Appignanesi and John Forrester note, Freud referred to Cäcilie M. as his Lehrmeisterin, his (female) 
teacher, in an 1897 letter to Fliess. See Freud’s Women, p. 86.  
 
91 See Freud, Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria. Also see the many incisive commentaries on 
this case in the essay collection In Dora’s Case: Freud-Hysteria-Feminism, eds. Charles Bernheimer and 
Claire Kahane.  
 
92 In the third of his four studies in Studies On Hysteria, that of “Katharina ____,” by far the shortest of the 
four, Freud is dealing with a delicate situation with a young girl who is not officially his patient but who 
has approached him while he is vacationing in the mountains.  He displays with her a remarkable delicacy 
and kindness.  
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process, Freud is also still very much under the sway of theories of hypnosis such as 
those advanced by Charcot, with whom he had recently studied in Paris. Thus he 
intervenes with his patients through physical techniques such as pressing their foreheads 
while demanding answers to his questions, even (or especially) those they claim to have 
forgotten. He also cajoles, bullies, and on one occasion even threatens to terminate his 
treatment if a patient did not reconsider her refusal to accept his point of view within 
twenty-four hours.93 
But alongside such episodes and the triumphant declarations of newly won 
apodictic certainties—“I turned out to be invariably right,” he notes in his case study of 
Miss Lucy R.—runs an unmistakable counter-narrative.94 Both the text and the copious 
footnotes to Studies On Hysteria speak not only of uncertainty but of error and regret.95   
I did this wrong, Freud says again and again in one form or another; I went too far, I 
pushed too hard; I did not go far enough; above all, I spoke for my patient when I should 
have let her speak.  “I did not carry the analysis of the symptoms far enough, nor pursue 
it systematically enough,” he writes in his introduction to the study of Frau Emmy von N.  
A few pages later he drops a footnote to a remark about his attempt to reassure Frau 
Emmy that there was nothing to fear, commenting: “Didactic suggestions of this kind 
always missed fire with Frau Emmy, as will be seen from what follows.” And indeed, in 
                                                
 
93 Freud, “Frau Emmy Von N.,” Studies on Hysteria, pp. 81-2.  
 
94 Freud, “Miss Lucy R.,” Studies on Hysteria, p. 111.  
 
95 Given that it is, after all, Freud who is under discussion, I would be remiss not to note that these 
declarations of certainty (which are numerous and at times so categorical as to be grandiose) only bear out 
my contention that these case studies represent Freud at his least confident. It is also appropriate that the 
admissions of uncertainty often appear quite literally in the margins, in the form of footnotes. But much 
like his Miss Lucy R., who simultaneously knows and does not know that she is love with her employer, 
Freud often listens while simultaneously not listening.  
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what follows, Freud continues to interrupt her with his own interpretation of her 
symptoms, only to be chastened by the maddening lack of progress that results from such 
interventions: “I now saw that I had gained nothing from this interruption and that I 
cannot evade listening to her stories in every detail to the very end.” 96  The study of Frau 
Emmy is entirely shot through with such instances of self-correction and, further, self-
rebuke.   
In the wake of Frau Emmy’s case, such textual admissions become markedly 
more rare in the Studies. Yet in the final theoretical section of the text, it seems clear that 
Freud has not only incorporated and even embraced the importance of the element of 
uncertainty that attends every analysis,97 but has also arrived at a therapeutic principle 
that requires him to refrain from imposing an interpretation upon his patient. He writes,  
experience has taught us...that it is quite hopeless to try to penetrate directly to the  
nucleus of the pathogenic organization. Even if we ourselves could guess it, the  
patient would not know what to do with the explanation offered to him and would  
not be psychologically changed by it.
 98  
 
He resolves to proceed obliquely, sneaking up on the symptom by way of the “periphery 
of the psychical structure,” by allowing it, as it were, to slowly unfold and to speak 
itself.99 This does not mean that he is obliged to avoid inducing discomfort in his patients; 
after all, he is attempting to get them to reveal, however obliquely and by whatever 
lengthy process of association, precisely that material which is too abhorrent for 
                                                
96 Freud, “Frau Emmy Von N.,” pp. 48, 60-61, emphasis mine.  
 
97 Consider, for instance, the passage that reads quite like a Freudian version of Heidegger’s hermeneutic 
circle: “It is very hard to obtain a clear view of a case of neurosis before one has submitted it to a thorough 
analysis—an analysis which can, in fact, only be brought about by the use of Breuer’s method; but a 
decision on the diagnosis and the form of therapy to be adopted has to be made before any such thorough 
knowledge of the case has been arrived at.” (p. 256) 
 
98 Freud, “Psychotherapy of Hysteria,” Studies on Hysteria, pp. 291-2, emphasis in original.  
 
99 Ibid., p. 292. 
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consciousness to confront. But it leaves to him, above all, the task of listening and, in a 
certain sense, of reading. And I would argue that the primary object of both these tasks is, 
precisely, the patient’s affect.   
Indeed, the development that Freud himself describes taking place in Studies on 
Hysteria, the transformation of Breuer’s cathartic method into psychoanalysis, is 
constituted by Freud’s learning to read and interpret affect, this symptom beneath the 
symptom.  Later psychoanalysts—notably Jacques Lacan—will distrust affect as 
deceptive to both the analyst and the analysand.  For Freud, however, it may appear in all 
sorts of distorted forms, but its eventual bringing to light is nothing short of revelatory.  
Freud has been rightly, in my view, criticized for his biologism, particularly by feminist 
critics who have been highly sensitive to the ways in which Freud treated biology as 
destiny and the role to which this conceptual framework condemned women as a result in 
psychoanalytic theory.100  And we should not be deaf to the ways in which the model of 
the abreaction of the physical hysterical symptom recapitulates millennia of Western 
philosophical models of the subject, in which progress toward knowledge and a 
meaningful life takes the form of the breaking free of the body, the material realm, which 
has been almost invariably associated with the feminine. Socrates’ speech about 
philosophy as preparation for death in the Phaedo is only the most obvious example of 
this tendency.  The hysteric’s breaking free of the symptom, here, does constitute a 
                                                
100 See, for instance, Simone de Beauvoir’s section on psychoanalysis in The Second Sex and Luce 
Irigaray’s opening essay “The Blind Spot in an Old Dream of Symmetry” in Speculum of the Other 
Woman. Juliet Mitchell’s Psychoanalysis and Feminism, the first major English-language text to argue for 
the productive possibilities of the marriage of Freud and feminism, insisting that the Freudian analysis of 
femininity is descriptive rather than prescriptive, also includes a useful section (Part Two, Section II) that 
considers Freud’s reception by American feminists such as Betty Friedan, Germaine Greere, Shulamith 
Firestone, and Kate Millett. Sarah Kofman’s The Enigma of Woman, which is sharply critical of Irigaray’s 
interpretation of Freud, is well worth consulting in this connection for an original and extremely nuanced 
reading of Freud’s work on women and femininity.  
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breaking free of the body, of the way that the soul—for this is, after all, the meaning of  
the word “psyche”—cripples the flesh.  But this is not the only dynamic at work here. For 
Freud also grants a peculiarly privileged status to the moment when the patient’s truth 
bubbles up, usually unbidden, and by definition previously unknown, to the body’s 
surfaces, whether in physical symptoms or in words, when the patient’s body begins to 
mean, to signify. In a successful analysis, this will be the result of waiting until every 
detail has been gone through, not trying to push the patient or impose interpretation. As 
the analyst listens closely as these affects make their way to the surface of the skin or 
cross the threshold of the mouth, to signify in flesh or word, a distinctive truth can 
emerge. It is not the truth of propositional logic, but rather truth in a sense akin to 
Heidegger’s aletheia, a revelation, a bringing to light of something that, once unearthed, 
cannot be denied.  
 
 
III.  Affect and the semiotic 
 Is affect in Kristeva the same as it is in early Freud? Not precisely. But I would 
argue that in Kristeva’s thinking, the role of affect nonetheless constitutes a significant 
return to Freud’s view as I have presented it here. This is most obviously the case in the 
sense of highlighting emotion or feeling, as in her “trilogy,” as Kelly Oliver puts it, of the 
1980s: Powers of Horror, Tales of Love, and Black Sun.101 The first deals with horror and 
what she terms the “abject,” the second with love in its many forms, and the last with 
                                                
101 Pouvoirs de l'horreur : essai sur l'abjection appeared in 1980 (translated as Powers of Horror: An 
Essay on Abjection, 1982); Histoires d’amour in 1983 (translated as Tales of Love, 1987); and Soleil Noir: 
dépression et mélancolie in 1987 (translated as Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, 1989). 
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depression and melancholia.  Moreover, like Freud, for whom affect in its more 
undifferentiated sense of a psychic force attaching to a mental representation proved 
critical from the outset, a more undifferentiated notion of affect is likewise present in 
Kristeva’s earliest writings on “the semiotic.” I characterize this as a “return” to Freud 
here because Freud, for Kristeva, is often mediated through Lacan, with whom Kristeva’s 
theoretical writings are deeply and often contentiously entangled.102   
But in Kristeva’s early work Revolution in Poetic Language and the essays that 
make up the collection Desire in Language,103 in her initial expositions of the modality of 
“the semiotic,” she appeals directly to Freud. For the category of the semiotic, although 
the term is linguistic, referring to a crucial element in the process of signification 
[signifiance], requires and rests upon the Freudian conception of drives [pulsions]: 
We understand the term “semiotic” [le sémiotique104] in its Greek sense: !"µ#îov=distinctive  
mark, trace, index, precursory sign, proof, engraved or written sign, imprint, trace,  
figuration.  This etymological reminder would be a mere archaeological embellishment  
(and an unconvincing one at that, since the term ultimately encompasses such disparate 
meanings), were it not for the fact that the preponderant etymological use of the word, the  
one that implies a distinctiveness, allows us to connect it to a precise modality in the  
signifying process [procès de la signifiance]. This modality is the one Freudian  
psychoanalysis points to in postulating not only the facilitation and the structuring 
disposition of drives, but also the so-called primary processes which displace and  
condense both energies and their inscription.105  
 
Kristeva also gets at the notion of the semiotic through the idea of heterogeneity in 
language, particularly what she calls “poetic language,” in which the operations of the 
                                                
102 I return to Kristeva’s relationship to Lacan at more length on pp. 74-5 below.  
 
103 The essays in Desire in Language translate most but not all of those collected in French as Polylogue 
(Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1977). 
 
104
 Le sémiotique, the semiotic, should be distinguished from la sémiotique, or semiotics, the study of 
signs.  
 
105 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 25; La révolution du langage poétique, pp. 22-3, emphasis 
in original. 
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semiotic are the most pronounced and the most easily observable. This passage is 
juxtaposed with another version of the above passage in a piece published shortly after 
Revolution: 
 While poetic language can indeed be studied through its meaning and signification (by  
revealing, depending on  the method, either structures or process), such a study would, in  
the final analysis, amount to reducing it to the phenomenological perspective and, hence,  
failing to see what in the poetic function departs from the signified and the transcendental  
ego and makes of what is known as ‘literature’ something other than knowledge... 
Consequently, one should begin by positing that there is within poetic language  
(and therefore, although in a less pronounced manner, within any language) a  
hetereogeneousness to meaning and signification. This hetereogeneousness, detected  
genetically in the first echolalias of infants as rhythms and intonations anterior to the first 
phonemes, morphemes, lexemes, and sentences; this heterogeneousness, which is later  
reactivated as rhythms, intonations, glossalalias in psychotic discourse, serving as ultimate  
support of the speaking subject threatened by the collapse of the signifying function; this 
heterogeneousness to signification operates through, despite, and in excess of it and produces  
in poetic language ‘musical’ but also nonsense effects that destroy not only accepted beliefs  
and significations, but, in radical experiments, syntax itself, that guarantee of thetic  
consciousness (of the signified object and ego)—for example carnivalesque discourse, Artaud,  
a number of texts by Mallarmé, certain Dadaist and Surrealist experiments.  The notion of 
heterogeneity is indispensable, for though articulate, precise, organized, and complying with 
constraints and rules (especially, like the rule of repetition, which articulates the units of a 
particular rhythm or intonation), this signifying disposition is not that of meaning or  
signification: no sign, no predication, no signified object and therefore no operating  
consciousness of a transcendental ego... 
It goes without saying that, concerning a signifying practice...this semiotic  
heterogeneity posited by theory is inseparable from what I shall call, to distinguish it from the 
latter, the symbolic function of significance [signifiance]. The symbolic (le symbolique), as 
opposed to the semiotic, is this inevitable attribute of meaning, sign, and the signified object  
for the consciousness of Husserl’s transcendental ego. Language as social practice necessarily 
presupposes these two dispositions, though combined in different ways to constitute types of 
discourse, types of signifying practices.106 
 
Given these two passages, I will “unpack” the semiotic as best as I can, given the 
peculiar difficulty of explicating a part of the signifying process—the part that is pre-
verbal, pre-Oedipal, and in a certain respect pre-linguistic—in a mode of language (the 
scholarly or theoretical) whose admixture of the semiotic is much less obvious than in the 
cases of poetic language, avant-garde literature, or the babblings of infants (to invoke 
                                                
106 Kristeva, “From One Identity to Another,” Desire in Language, pp. 132-4; “D’Une Identité l’Autre,” in 
Polylogue, pp. 158-9 (originally published in Tel Quel 62, summer 1975), emphasis in original. 
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several of Kristeva’s pet examples).107  The semiotic is one of the two registers, or 
modalities, or dispositions, in Kristeva’s various formulations—the other is the symbolic, 
le symbolique108—that dialectically interact in each and every signifying event. That is to 
say, every time someone produces words, both the semiotic and the symbolic are at work, 
although in varying proportions depending on the sort of discourse produced. It is 
perhaps easier to begin with the symbolic, for it comprises nearly everything that one 
thinks of when thinking about language. Everything that might traditionally serve as the 
object of a linguist’s study belongs to the register of the symbolic: phonology, 
morphology, syntax, semantics.  A purely symbolic utterance—impossible for a speaking 
subject, in Kristeva’s view, save as a thought experiment—would have to be in the voice 
of an automaton, utterly devoid of rhythm, tone, feeling, or genre.  
But the semiotic is not confined to vocal utterances: the rhythm of a line of text 
belongs to the semiotic just as thoroughly as the rise and fall of a human voice.  The 
semiotic signals the entrance of the drives into language; put bluntly, it is the body as it 
                                                
107 Kristeva, for instance, on two types of discourse that emphasize the symbolic and the semiotic, 
respectively: “Scientific discourse, for example, aspiring to the status of metalanguage, tends to reduce as 
much as possible the semiotic component. On the contrary, the signifying economy of poetic language is 
specific in that the semiotic is not only a constraint as is the symbolic, but it tends to gain the upper hand at 
the expense of the thetic and predicative constraints of the ego’s judging consciousness.” (“From One 
Identity to Another,” Desire In Language, p. 134; “D’Une Identité de l’Autre,” Polylogue, p. 160) 
 
108 When Kristeva uses the term le symbolique, at times she is indicating the symbolic register (her own 
term, that dialectically interacts with the semiotic in the process of signification) and at times referring to 
Lacan’s Symbolic. Kelly Oliver helpfully comments on the relationship between Kristeva’s symbolic and 
Lacan’s Symbolic as follows: “Kristeva identifies both semiotic and symbolic elements within the 
Symbolic order.  She argues that Lacan reduces the Symbolic order to its symbolic elements; he defines the 
Symbolic order in terms of the symbolic function. For Kristeva, however, to enter signification is not to 
merely enter the realm of the symbolic element.  Rather, it is to enter the Symbolic order that is constituted 
by heterogeneous elements.  To enter the Symbolic order is to take up a position, which is possible only 
through the symbolic function.  Yet not all signification involves taking up a position; or, at least, there is 
more to signification than taking up a position.  Kristeva has a more sophisticated definition of the 
Symbolic than Lacan’s.  For her the symbolic function—the ability to take a position or make a 
judgment—is just one aspect of signification.  She suggests, however, that for Lacan signification is 
synonymous with the symbolic function.” (Kelly Oliver, Reading Kristeva: Unraveling the Double-bind, p. 
39) 
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makes its way into language. Both of these formulations fall a bit short, in fact, because 
they preserve the idea of language as a previously existing abstract entity that is 
penetrated in localized ways by individual, discrete bodies. The obvious wrongness of 
this language exposes the way in which the formulation is inadequate. I used the word 
admixture earlier, and while not perfect, it is also not a misleading choice, for it preserves 
the sense in which the semiotic and the symbolic are both constitutively involved in every 
linguistic event. In insisting on the presence of the semiotic in each instance of 
signification, Kelly Oliver remarks that Kristeva “brings the speaking body back to 
signification by maintaining that bodily drives make their way into language....Bodily 
drives make their way into signification through the disruptive but necessary force of this 
semiotic element.”109 In Oliver’s view, this is the first (and more remarked) half of a two-
pronged strategy, because Kristeva, she maintains, seeks also to “reinscribe language 
within the body.”110 
So how can we conceive of Kristeva’s semiotic? It is distinctive and 
unmistakable, she tells us. We cannot separate it from the symbolic in any given act of 
signification, but we can detect it within language by certain signs or markers, such as 
musicality, rhythm, tone, and emotionality, and we can tell whether there is more or less 
of it. We find it lessened in the case of any mode of signification that strives toward 
objectivity or univocality, that wishes simply and transparently to mean and be 
comprehended. And we find it heightened in the case of deliberately poetic language or 
in avant-garde literature, for we sense the semiotic when we find words that bewilder, or 
wherever meaning is obviously plurivalent or undecidable. But this sort of multiplicity of 
                                                
109 Oliver, Kelly. Reading Kristeva, p. 3.  
 
110 Ibid.  
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meaning is not the heterogeneity that she speaks of in the above passage. The point is not 
that particular instances of language, or even language in general, are polysemous. 
Rather, it is that language—which we mistakenly think to be only that which is 
encompassed by what she terms the symbolic—always includes, as a condition of the 
possibility of its production, something that is pre-linguistic. That something—the 
semiotic—does not mean in any way that we can understand or express verbally as a 
position or stance; it is not, to use one of Kristeva’s favorite words, thetic, it precedes and 
is heterogeneous to language that expresses a position. It is the non-meaning that is 
always already integral to the production of meaning, and that accounts for what, in 
language, is excessive to what it signifies. Paradoxically, however, it is “always 
contingent on the symbolic.” It only makes itself available to thought or analysis through 
linguistic utterance:  “what is ‘prior’ to language is accessible only through the very 
process of language.”111 Yet language always preserves this non-meaning that is essential 
to its production. This, too, is a Freudian doctrine; the infantile, however 
unacknowledged, is preserved in the adult; the earlier contents of the unconscious may be 
written over, but they are not destroyed. Furthermore, Kristeva associates the semiotic 
with the maternal and the pre-Oedipal, categories that receive insufficient attention and 
even active suppression by Freud and later, Lacan. For the semiotic also represents a 
deliberate critique of and corrective to the Lacanian notion of the masculine structure of 
signification. Contra Lacan, whose rewriting of the Oedipal phase includes the entrance 
                                                
111 “General Principles in Semiotics,” interview with Kristeva conducted by Pierre Oullet and Charles 
Bauer in 1976, Julia Kristeva Interviews, p. 185. This point is also—see below in footnote 26—what I 
think must give rise to Judith Butler’s contention that “language for Kristeva is understood as a system in 
which the Symbolic remains hegemonic except when the semiotic disrupts its signifying process....” 
(Gender Trouble, p. 105) 
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into the Symbolic realm (the world of culture and of signification, the entrance into 
which constitutes us as subjects and forever precludes the experience of the Real), 
Kristeva is unwilling to admit the Real as totally barred to us, totally inaccessible.112 For 
her, “the notion of the semiotic allows us to speak of the real without simply saying that 
it’s an emptiness or a blank; it allows us to further elaborate it.”113  
Kristeva does not put it in these terms, but I would contend that she implicitly 
casts the semiotic—at least within literary practice and experiment—as essentially 
seductive. This is why she considers that the reading of, for instance, avant-garde 
literature can be deeply therapeutic in a very specific sense. Joyce is one of her favorite 
examples, and she references him here both with respect to the effects of his work and to 
his conviction that “imaginative writing” can create an experience of transubstantiation. 
"If the reader enters the alchemy of the word,” she writes, “he is caught up in that force, 
and the reading consequently becomes more than a process of comprehension and 
mentalization.  It allows the reader to recover his own memory, his own body, and it can 
be a truly revitalizing experience."114 She posits, here, a transformative encounter with a 
text that does not mean straightforwardly or even, initially, intelligibly. But it is the force 
                                                
112 For a lengthier and more nuanced discussion of Kristeva’s semiotic and symbolic and its intervention in 
Lacan’s theory of signification, see Oliver, Reading Kristeva, pp. 37-9. For a significantly more critical but 
extremely illuminating account, see Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, Chapter 3, “Subversive Bodily Acts,” 
although I believe Butler misreads Kristeva in only discussing the semiotic as at work in poetic language, 
whereas Kristeva clearly conceives the semiotic as present in all signification but merely more detectable in 
poetic language (“Because the subject,” she writes, “is always both semiotic and symbolic, no signifying 
system he produces can be either ‘exclusively’ semiotic or ‘exclusively’ symbolic, and is instead 
necessarily marked by an indebtedness to both.” See Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 24; Révolution du 
langage poétique, p. 22). Further, it seems to me that Butler does not distinguish between when Kristeva 
refers to her symbolic modality of language or to Lacan’s Symbolic.  
 
113 “An Interview with Julia Kristeva,” by Edith Kurtzweil. Partisan Review 53, no. 2, 216-29, cited in 
Oliver, Reading Kristeva, p. 39.  
 
114 “Avant-Garde Practice,” interview with Kristeva conducted and translated by Vassiliki Kolocotroni, 
originally published in Textual Practice, 1991 (Julia Kristeva Interviews, p. 220-1). 
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of the semiotic within that bewildering text that the patient/reader encounters that brings 
him back to his own body— which in Kristeva’s view, as Oliver points out, always 
already contains “the logic of signification”— through effecting a reintegration of the 
semiotic and the symbolic registers. 115 This is not a dry and papery encounter, abstract, 
disembodied; it is a reading that effects a return to one’s own materiality and restores 
oneself to oneself as an embodied speaking subject.  And in order for it to occur, one 
must be receptive, must give oneself up to poetic language, be drawn in, allow it to exert 
its force, to do its work.  One must allow oneself to be seduced, rent asunder, put back 
together again. But it is not simply a question of surrender, of a desire to be seduced that 
creates the event of seduction. There is a palpable force in this language—it is not too 
strong to say that the semiotic creates the, is the force in language, that irrupts and 
disrupts the patient/reader and compels the seductive, shattering encounter.  
 
As Kristeva underlines the semiotic “modality” of language – which is, precisely, 
the affective, bodily dimension to language, that register without which structure, syntax, 
and grammar fail to mean, she argues persuasively that not only is the body always 
structured by language, but that language is always already a bodily process or event.116  
For while it was Lacan who famously asserted his fidelity to Freud throughout his 
lifetime—proclaiming in 1980, the year before his death,“C’est à vous d’être lacanien, si 
vous voulez. Moi, je suis freudien.”—it is Kristeva who retrieves the notion of affect from 
                                                
115 Oliver, Reading Kristeva, p. 3.  
 
116 Oliver’s Reading Kristeva is, among other things,  a book-length discussion of this point.  
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Freud, refines it, corrects it.117  Where Lacan, in a sense, took the body out of 
psychoanalysis, maintaining that a faithful reading of Freud reveals that his purported 
biologism was never there in the first place, Kristeva insists upon its return. Lacan recasts 
the Oedipal struggle as the mirror stage, the entrance into what he calls the Symbolic. For 
Lacan, as for so many of his followers (and I would include here a host of French 
feminist thinkers who are simultaneously indebted to and critical of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, not only Kristeva but, for instance, the arguably more radical Luce 
Irigaray), the subject comes into being and is constituted in and through language.  
Kristeva, however, contends that Lacanian thought forgets the pre-Oedipal, 
meaning both the pre-linguistic and the maternal. “I believe,” she says, “that the 
Lacanians have neglected the role of the drive. The drive is clearly an imaginary 
construction (we can neither see it nor locate it), but it is an essential one that enables the 
analyst to remain at the crossroads between the symbolic and the somatic.”118 Thus 
Kristeva can remain Lacanian insofar as she maintains that psychic reality is structured 
linguistically, while redefining and expanding the linguistic realm to include bodily 
processes.  Kristeva’s notion of the semiotic constitutes a persuasive critique of the 
notion that language could ever lack affect. Her insistence on the presence of the semiotic 
within every signifying event, that register of feeling, rhythm, tone, drive, without which 
structure, syntax, and grammar fail to mean, suggests to me that any interpretation of any 
instance of signification must require attention to both the presence and the effects of the 
                                                
117 Stuart Schneiderman, Jacques Lacan: The Death of an Intellectual Hero, p. 91. (Colloquially translated: 
“It’s up to you to be Lacanian, if you want. I am a Freudian.”) 
 
118 “New Maladies of the Soul,” 1993 interview with Kristeva conducted by Catherine Francblin in the 
wake of Kristeva’s book of the same name, originally published in Art Press International and L’Infini 
(Julia Kristeva Interviews, p. 87).  
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semiotic within that signifying event. As I will discuss below, her studies of the work of 
Marguerite Duras leads me to the same conclusion.  
 
 
IV.  Fragile readers 
 
My inquiry into the development of an affective hermeneutics takes as its point of 
departure a 1987 interview in the wake of the publication of Black Sun, Kristeva’s book 
on depression and melancholia. During this phase in her oeuvre, Kristeva has shifted, so 
to speak, from writing about affect in a more undifferentiated form (the semiotic) to 
discrete affects such as horror, fear, love, and so forth. This brief passage from the 
interview with Kristeva—my encounter, as it were, with the passage and my subsequent 
inability to stop thinking about it—is in fact the original point from which this entire 
project has unfolded. Kristeva’s comment itself seems almost an afterthought in the 
discussion, a response to the interview’s final question. In the psychoanalytic context, of 
course, it is always these seemingly “throwaway” moments that prove to be the most 
critical; it is the mark, Freud would say, of a successful repression, that what is most 
important should appear to be peripheral or insignificant. Kristeva is discussing the 
fiction of Marguerite Duras, with particular attention to tone and mood rather than plot. 
What I wish to draw attention to here is Kristeva’s highly unorthodox method of analysis 
of Duras’ work.  If textual analysis normally begins—logically enough— with a 
consideration of the text itself, Kristeva proceeds, rather, through a series of detours, an 
elaborate circuitry, moving in fact further and further outward from the text under 
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consideration. In the interview, she elaborates upon her claim in Black Sun that Duras’ 
work is fundamentally noncathartic. She writes, 
Duras clearly exhibits a sort of genius that is both clinical and magical.119 But Duras’  
entire work calls for a fusion with the state of female malaise and melancholia and  
suggests a complacent fascination with destruction and despair.  In my view then,  
hers is a literature that is noncathartic, embodying what Nietzsche calls the nihilism of 
contemporary thought.  With Duras, there is no afterlife, even for the beauty of a text.  
I will tell you how I feel about her writings: they are cleverly careless, written in the  
manner of clothes or makeup that are taken off to hint at a malady that can never be  
cured and must be preserved. [“Voyez comment sont les écrits de Duras: une écriture  
savamment négligée, à l’instar d’une toilette ou d’un maquillage défaits pour suggérer  
une maladie à ne pas surmonter, à maintenir.”] Her texts are at once captivating and  
deadly. I have often discussed Duras’ writing with my female students. Do you know  
how they respond to them? They respond with a sense of loyalty [fidélité] and a sense  
of fear.  They dread reading her texts, especially when they feel weak [quand elles sont  
fragiles], because they are afraid of being caught up in her world. They feel imprisoned  
by the truth Duras reveals. [Parce qu’elles ont peur d’y rester. La vérité de Duras les 
emprisonne.]120  
 
This is Ross Guberman’s translation, which mildly overstates the emotional 
overtones of the passage; I will speak to that in a moment. Let us examine Kristeva’s 
critical moves.  First, she turns to her own response to Duras; in the English translation 
this is made out to be literally about her own personal feelings: “I will tell you how I feel 
about her writings.” The French is quite different, rather more terse: “Voyez sont les 
écrits de Duras,”  “You see how Duras’ writings are.”  But what follows makes the 
translator’s impulse to gloss this as “I will tell you how I feel” more defensible, as 
Kristeva’s response to Duras’ writing is intensely, perhaps even disproportionately, 
visceral. For it transpires that her feelings, as the translator has it, are expressed through 
the conjuring of a pair of exceptionally vivid images. They are images, further, of tropes 
                                                
119 As Kristeva’s relationship to Duras’ work is highly ambivalent, it is somewhat surprising that she uses 
the word genius (“génie”) to describe her, given her later uses of that term. Kristeva’s second ‘trilogy,’ 
published between 1999 and 2002, is on the subject of female genius, or rather female geniuses, and is a 
three-volume study of Hannah Arendt, Melanie Klein, and Colette. See Kristeva, Le génie féminin: la vie, 
la folie, les mots : Hannah Arendt, Melanie Klein, Colette.  
 
120 “Melancholia and Creation,” interview with Kristeva conducted by Dominique Grisoni (Julia Kristeva 
Interviews, pp. 83-4), originally published as “Les Abîmes de L’Âme,” Magazine Littéraire 244, July-
August 1987, p. 18, emphasis mine.  
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of the feminine and specifically of feminine artifice, make-up and clothing. She uses a 
most peculiar expression. What can it mean to say that something is written in the manner 
of clothes, or make-up? Is this an image of the concealment of an original essence by 
means of an overlying artifice, the naked face beneath the cosmetic, the naked body 
beneath the dress—for in the case of Duras’ women it would most often be a dress? Or is 
it, rather (and here the work of Judith Butler comes to mind) an image of the performance 
of the feminine that itself creates femininity? A femininity that would be captivating, 
deadly, imprisoning—essentially melancholy?  
The image is further complicated because it is, more precisely, that of an absence 
of make-up, yet make-up that we know was once applied, or of nakedness, yet not an 
unselfconscious nudity, but the nakedness of a body that was once covered.  And this 
outfit, these cosmetics, have not been shed or undone for the purposes of seduction, but 
for the purpose of making visible an incurable malady, the malady of an absolute 
vulnerability and melancholy whose display was only held at bay through a careful 
making up of the self, with all of the possible attendant associations of that phrase. This 
image, then, is what Kristeva tenders as her response to Duras’ work.  
From her own visceral reaction, Kristeva turns to that of her students.  It is 
noteworthy that only her female students (“mes étudiantes”) are under consideration here. 
And she is not primarily concerned with what they say, but rather how they react, not 
with their intellectual responses, but their self-reported affective cues: their dread, their 
captivation, their fear. And this is no Kierkegaardian dread which would be the other side 
of radical freedom, but its opposite, a cramping-inward, a (self-)recognition of the “truth 
that Duras reveals,” which is the truth of imprisonment.  While Kristeva does not qualify 
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their dread—it seems unequivocal—yet she observes them as caught between “loyalty” 
and “fear.”  The word Kristeva uses for the former is fidelité; Duras is faithful to an 
affective reality they recognize and they respond in kind with their own faithfulness. 
Indeed, it is her fidelity that inspires their fear. Kristeva says, “elles ont peur d’y rester,” 
they are afraid to rest there, to remain there, wherever there is.121 The referent of that y, 
the there, is ambiguous, and appropriately so; it refers at a minimum, I think, to the actual 
process of reading of Duras’ books as well as to the imaginative world that she conjures 
within them. It is within this diegetical space of her books that they fear to remain, and 
they fear to remain there because they recognize this there, and themselves, within it. 
Guberman’s translation of the final sentence that I cited, “La vérité de Duras les 
emprisonne,” errs again on the side of attributing a feeling that may be implicit, but 
which Kristeva omits or leaves unstated: “They feel imprisoned by the truth Duras 
reveals.” Kristeva’s original is, again, more terse, expressed as a factual statement. It is 
not merely that they feel imprisoned (although clearly they do, which is why they 
approach her work with trepidation, in anticipation of that experience) but rather that they 
are imprisoned by it. Kristeva’s statement takes the form of a factual claim about the 
inevitable affective consequence of the encounter with Duras. 
This is, among other things, an astonishing pedagogical moment, in which 
Kristeva listens, psychoanalytically, to her students.  Reading the affects of her students 
(her students, let us recall, not her patients), Kristeva almost eerily recreates the primal 
scenes of the founding of psychoanalysis, Freud’s reading of the bodily symptoms of 
“his” hysterics. Freud, it should be noted, argued—quite against the tenor of his times—
                                                
121 Kristeva, “Les Abîmes de L’Âme,” p. 18.  
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that hysteria was not specifically a female illness. And Kristeva, among those theorists 
often termed, in America, “the French feminists,” (Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, Hélène 
Cixous,  Monique Wittig) is the least sensitive to and indeed the least concerned with 
sexual difference; for her, individual difference, singularity, takes priority over sexual 
difference.  Yet, like Freud, she seems to locate a distinctive form of truth that emerges 
from a scrupulous attentiveness to the ways that women’s bodies speak.  
 When Kristeva describes Duras’ literature as fundamentally noncathartic, she is 
making an affective claim, not only in the sense of the specific affects of fear, dread, and 
so forth, but in the more powerful sense that it creates in Duras’ reader a cathexis—an 
investment of psychic energy—that cannot be discharged.  Although Kristeva does not 
put it in these terms, I would say that she accuses Duras of creating a new symptom in 
her readers, albeit a symptom that is already deeply congruent with their experience of 
reality, which includes, in this case and in Kristeva’s understanding, the experience of 
femininity. And these readers (or at least Kristeva and the students that she describes), 
trapped in a cathexis from which they cannot free themselves, recognize the truth of this 
symptom and the impossibility of its eradication—of either the symptom or its truth—
and they feel an inexorable dread. 
 
The Duras section of Black Sun, with which the book concludes, bears out my 
theory that Kristeva’s implicit claim against (and as I will elaborate below, against rather 
than about is indeed the more precise term here) Duras is her ability and will to create 
such a symptom in her readers.  The language that Kristeva selects to describe Duras’ 
work is striking, as well as the force that she attributes to it.  She uses two (often distinct, 
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but at times fused) types of language to describe what it is that Duras creates: the 
language of trap or seduction, and the language of illness.  The two images are most 
frequently combined in the language of contagion or infection, describing an 
uncontainable illness that spreads and confines.  Here is Kristeva characterizing Duras as 
trapping or seducing, using the rather obvious image of the spider: “Death and pain are 
the spider’s web of the text, and woe to the conniving readers who yield to its spell: they 
might remain there for good.”122 Duras, she writes, “chooses or yields [succombe] to the 
appeal of another path—the conniving, voluptuous, bewitching contemplation of death 
within us, of the wound’s constancy.”123 And on illness and contagion, she comments: “A 
complicity with illness emanates from Duras’ texts.”124 “Lacking catharsis,” she writes, 
“such a literature encounters, recognizes, but also spreads the pain that summons it [aussi 
propage le mal qui la mobilise]. It is the reverse of clinical discourse—very close to it, 
but as it enjoys the illness’ secondary benefits cultivates it and tames it without ever 
exhausting it.”125 Kristeva notes the congruence of the pain or the evil (“le mal”) that 
Duras spreads about, with which she infects her readers, with the experience that has 
brought the text into being; it is a contagion that is neither foreign nor arbitrary. But she 
is distressed by the effect that Duras unleashes upon her audience, as she conjures up and 
                                                
122 Kristeva, Black Sun, p. 229; Soleil Noir, 237.  
 
123 Ibid., p. 236; p. 244.  
 
124 Ibid., p. 228; p. 236. 
 
125 Ibid., p. 229; p. 237, emphasis mine.  
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situates her readers within what Kristeva calls “un univers de malaise troublant et 
contagieux.”126   
For regardless of whether she is using the discourse of seduction/trap or of illness, 
she imputes a potent force to Duras’ words that acts directly on her readers. This is why 
she remarks, “We now understand why Duras’ books should not be put in the hands of 
oversensitive readers [lecteurs et lectrices fragiles].” The comment seems wry and 
offhand until she continues, revealing herself to be quite in earnest: 
Let them go see the films and the plays; they will encounter the same malady of distress but 
subdued, wrapped up in a dreamy charm that softens it and also makes it more feigned and  
made up—a convention. Her books, on the contrary, bring us to the verge of madness. They  
do not point to it from afar, they neither observe it nor analyze it for the sake of experiencing  
it at a distance in the hope of a solution, like it or not, some day or other....To the contrary, the  
texts domesticate the malady of death, they fuse with it, are on the same level with it, without 
either distance or perspective. There is no purification in store for us at the conclusion of those 
novels written on the brink of illness, no improvement, no promise of a beyond, not even the 
enchanting beauty of style or irony that might provide a bonus of pleasure in addition to the 
revealed evil.127 
 
Again she treats the affective response brought on by the encounter with Duras’ texts as 
inevitable, factual. There is, however, a slight hint that perhaps it is some quality in the 
reader (the quality of a certain version of femininity?) that makes this response possible, 
which I infer from her specification of her female students and from the fact that she goes 
out of her way to specify both male and female readers: “On comprend désormais qu’il 
ne faut pas donner des livres de Duras aux lecteurs et lectrices fragiles.”128   
In the French, this has the effect less of emphasizing parity than of singling out 
and highlighting the female readers, who would otherwise have been subsumed under the 
                                                
126 Kristeva, Soleil Noir, p. 264 (Translator Leon S. Roudiez renders this as “a world of unsettling, 
infectious ill-being,” (Black Sun, p. 258) but malaise, which has, after all, made its way into English by 
now, is quite precise here, and vital to the atmosphere of languorous illness that Duras evokes and Kristeva 
describes. 
 
127 Kristeva, Black Sun, pp. 227-8; Soleil Noir, p. 235.  
 
128 Kristeva, Soleil Noir, p. 235.  
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default masculine plural lecteurs. In combination with the interview in which she cites 
only the reactions of her female students, this suggests to me that she is primarily 
concerned with les lectrices and les étudiantes, particularly those who are or who feel, 
whether before or after the encounter with the text, fragile, a word she employs in both 
the interview and the passage from Black Sun above. In the interview, she describes her 
students’ trepidation toward reading Duras when they are already in this state: “They 
dread reading her texts, especially when they feel weak [quand elles sont fragiles]”; it is 
the readers in the same state, les lecteurs et lectrices fragiles, whom she recommends 
should not be given Duras’ books.  These students, these readers, should not be exposed 
(the contagion metaphor imposes itself) to Duras’ writing, or can be exposed to it only 
with anticipatory dread, because they are particularly susceptible to its effects. There is a 
French verb, fragiliser, that one could apply in this case to the work that Duras’ texts 
perform on the reader, especially on the reader who is already in a state congruent with 
the texts’ effects. Her texts weaken, undermine: they “fragilize,” as it were, and they do 
so especially to those who are already weakened, susceptible to infection. This is a 
particular sort of weakness/fragility, however. It belongs to what one could call the 
Durassian feminine, a mode of being mixed of equal parts malaise, passivity, and artifice 
that both sexes can recognize but in which female students/readers, Kristeva suggests, are 
perhaps more likely to recognize themselves.  
But while Kristeva worries about these readers, she dwells primarily on the effect 
of the texts, not the idiosyncrasies of those affected. In the passage cited on the preceding 
page, she tells us that Duras’ books “bring us to the verge of madness [Les livres...nous 
font côtoyer la folie].” And it is a madness made all the more terrifying because the texts 
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present the reader with no escape: they “domesticate the malady of death,129 they fuse 
with it [ils font un avec elle], are on the same level with it, without either distance or 
perspective.”130 Here we learn more precisely what it means for Kristeva to call Duras’ 
work non-cathartic. For it is not simply that Duras’ writing fails to result in a release, that 
there is no outpouring of feeling while or after the reader is subjected to Duras’ 
contagious malady. Instead of the cleansing discharge of emotion, one is entombed 
within it. Non-cathartic means not only that there is no release, but also no escape. The 
malady of death is introduced, the exits barred.  
 
 
V. The speaking subject and the malady of death 
In the interview with which I began, it is not entirely clear that Kristeva intends 
non-cathartic as a pejorative. But making one’s way closely through the Duras section of 
Black Sun, it becomes slowly evident that Kristeva is quite angry with her; she admires, 
perhaps, or at least admits the affective power that she wields, but she views it as a snare, 
perhaps even an ambush. This cathexis that I described—the symptom Duras creates that 
is so compelling, even hypnotic, in part because it is so recognizable—angers Kristeva 
because it runs precisely against the function that she hopes for in literature, which is a 
therapeutic function.  I do not intend that phrase in a dismissive sense; Kristeva, as 
analyst and literary critic, appears to find no conflict in the study of literature for its own 
                                                
129 Kristeva deals briefly with Duras’ 1982 novel La Maladie de la mort in Soleil Noir, but when she uses 
the phrase here, I take her to mean that the idea of the malady of death—and the atmosphere Duras creates 
within that novel, which is truly paralyzing, to the point that I have had genuine difficulty re-opening it 
ever since I first discovered what lies within—more generally represents the contagion with which Duras 
infects her readers. I return to the novel itself at more length on pp. 89-92 below.  
 
130 Kristeva, Black Sun, pp. 227-8; Soleil Noir, p. 235. 
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sake and for what she views as its very real therapeutic effects, allowing the 
subject/patient to begin to speak, to produce her own words. Thus when she says non-
cathartic, it also indicates anti-therapeutic. It shuts down the production of language; it 
forecloses on the possibility of the patient’s using literature to reconnect the semiotic and 
the symbolic, to produce meaningful, singular, affective utterances.  
The symptom that Duras transmits, which Kristeva cannot forgive—the symptom 
of the malady of death, as it were—is silence. And not just any absence of speech; rather, 
it is the silence of the silenced, involuntary and utterly familiar. It is a silence that 
militates against the production of language. Kristeva has consistently maintained that 
analysis helps people to re-connect the semiotic and the symbolic, and it is for this 
purpose that she prescribes avant-garde literature as well.  Her fear is generally that 
people have lost the ability to produce meaningful language due to a disconnection 
between the semiotic and the symbolic, preventing them from creating their own 
meaningful utterances.  A successful analysis will result in the production of such 
utterances, will result in self-knowledge but also in the capacity to speak, act, and, in a 
limited fashion, in the capacity for a certain amount of self-transformation. In a more 
recent text, New Maladies of the Soul, Kristeva writes,  
The psychic realm may be the place where somatic symptoms and delirious fantasies  
can be worked through and thus eliminated: as long as we avoid becoming trapped 
inside it, the psychic realm protects us [le psychique est notre protection, à condition 
qu’on n’y reste pas enfermé].  Yet we must transform it through linguistic activity into  
a form of sublimation or into an intellectual, interpretive, or transformational activity.   
At the same time, we must conceive of “the psychic realm” as a speech act [il est  
indispensable de poser la question du «psychique» comme acte de langage], that is,  
neither an acting-out nor a psychological rumination within an imaginary crypt, but the  
link between this inevitable and necessary rumination and its potential for verbal  
expression.... 
 ...Freudian analyses have already noted that while this network of signifying 
relations that characterize symptoms, discourses, transference, and subjects is a  
theoretical construction, it is nevertheless the only reality in which psychic life can be  
manifested and developed. A fortiori, it constitutes the sole reality that offers the  
analyst—to whom someone has made a direct request—the possibility of intervening  
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and modifying it.131 
 
Most of this view is not wholly outside the mainstream of psychoanalytic or 
psychodynamic thought. I bring it up because it is idiosyncratic or at the least highly 
emphatic in two particular ways. First, in the view (which could also be identified as 
Lacanian) that the patient’s language is the “sole reality” with which the patient and 
analyst can together interact. More specifically, it is idiosyncratic in the identification of 
the psychic realm with the linguistic, both in the more pragmatic sense that change in the 
psyche is only effected through linguistic activity (this is indeed by now a fairly prosaic 
idea if one considers the analytic or therapeutic setting and its implicit aims) and in the 
bolder insistence on conceiving the psychic realm not in terms of a metaphor of place but 
of speech act. Second, it is idiosyncratic in terms of Kristeva’s emphasis on the psychic 
realm as a space (I find it impossible, given her use of “place [le lieu]” and its inevitable 
associations, to do away completely with the metaphor of space or place) that can either 
give shelter or else confine, incarcerate, against one’s will.  
If I understand her correctly, one can shelter within (again, the metaphor is 
slightly but not completely off) the psychic realm only if there is a linguistic dynamism at 
work that allows for change, growth, transformation. When the linguistic function is 
fettered or shut down, this sheltering space/process becomes a prison. This is her 
complaint against Duras. Although Duras’ work itself does not suffer from the disconnect 
between the semiotic and the symbolic—to the contrary, the ability to conjure up such 
extraordinary affective response suggests quite the opposite—it functions to effect such a 
severing in the reader’s own language, especially in the case of les lectrices fragiles. The 
                                                
131 Kristeva, New Maladies of the Soul, pp. 29-33; Les Nouvelles Maladies de l’Ame, pp. 51-57, emphasis 
in first sentence mine, otherwise Kristeva’s. 
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experience leaves the reader, and particularly those readers most susceptible, drowning in 
cold affect that replicates recognizable social norms at their most devastating, at their 
limit experience, so to speak. Regardless of whether or not reading Duras results in any 
insight, either personal or textual, it is, in Kristeva’s view, radically anti-therapeutic. 
Kristeva’s simultaneous insistence on Duras’ work as anti-therapeutic and even harmful, 
coupled with her admission that it contains a certain truth recognizable to those whom it 
harms, calls to mind one of Freud’s most crucial therapeutic realizations. Early on, as 
evidenced in the Studies on Hysteria, The Interpretation of Dreams, as well as his case 
studies, Freud grasped the critical idea that simple intellectual awareness of the root of a 
symptom on the part of the patient—as if, for instance, Freud were to discover it and 
simply inform him or her—will be absolutely ineffective in terms of resolving or 
exorcising the symptom or the neurosis as a whole. For as Kristeva depicts her (and I 
would concur), no one, but no one, writes the truth of feminine melancholia like Duras.  
But what Kristeva cannot forgive is that the experience of reading Duras simply 
does not work in service of putting oneself back together through the insight of 
recognizing the truth of what she evokes: it is not a recognition that sparks a passage 
toward wellness. “With Duras,” she writes, 
...we are dealing more with an ever nostalgic quest for the same as other, for the other as  
same, within the array of narcissistic mirage or a hypnosis that the narrator [narratrice] 
finds inevitable. She relates the psychic substratum previous to our conquests of the other  
sex, and which still underlies the eventual, perilous encounters between men and women.  
One is accustomed to pay no attention to that nearly uterine space. 
And one is not wrong. For in that crypt full of reflections, identities, bonds, and  
feelings destroy one another.132 
 
In most psychoanalytic thinking, to be mirrored—to play with identities and identity-
construction as one can within the analytic situation—should lead to progress of some 
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sort, whether or not such progress is measured in externally perceptible transformation. 
This need not even mean progress toward the realization of any specific telos—
happiness, “mental health,” lessening of symptoms—but it does indicate, at a minimum, 
the possibility of a psychic dynamism rather than a stasis or paralysis. And in the analytic 
situation, dynamism is expressed verbally, in the ability to go on speaking. But the 
opposing state of mute paralysis is precisely what Kristeva considers Duras to induce. 
Kristeva continues, condemningly, 
  Suffering, in Duras’ work, in a mannered way [précieusement] and with empty words  
evokes that impossible mourning, which, if its process had been completed, would have  
removed our morbid lining [notre doublure morbide] and set us up as independent, unified 
subjects. Thus it takes hold of us and carries us to the dangerous, furthermost bounds of  
our psychic life. [Aussi nous saisit-elle et nous entraîne-t-elle aux confins risqués de nos  
vies psychiques.]133  
 
This mourning is impossible because it cannot be completed; Duras ushers her reader into 
an interminable space of mourning, conveys her to what Kristeva calls “un naufrage des 
mots,” a disaster or (ship)wreck of words. She writes of Duras’ work, “It is a literature of 
limits because it also displays the limits of the nameable. The characters’ elliptical 
speech, the obsessive conjuring up of a ‘nothing’ that might epitomize the malady of 
suffering, point to a disaster [naufrage] of words in the face of the unnameable affect.”134 
In evoking (through words) an affect that cannot be named in words, in writing 
recognizable characters that speak only cryptically and obliquely, to themselves, to one 
another, whose speech functions only to continually intensify the atmosphere of dread, 
Duras spreads the malady of death to her readers, who recognize it, and whose response 
is to find themselves utterly incapable of speech.  
                                                
133 Ibid., pp. 257-8, emphasis mine; pp. 263-4.  
 
134 Ibid., p. 258; p. 264.  
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 The main female character in La Maladie de la mort has no name and no story. 
She is the diagnostician of the malady of death to the male protagonist, and she is also its 
bearer, the vector of contagion, its announcing angel. Maladie is written entirely in the 
second person (vous), narrated by the also nameless male. He sees her at a bar or a hotel 
and offers her money to come to a place (his apartment? all the reader knows is that it is 
by the sea, because they can hear it) and stay there while he attempts to try to love her, or 
to know her, or to do whatever it is that he likes to her, sexually or otherwise. Primarily 
she sleeps, or lies prone. She seems always to be naked, or covered at most in a sheet. 
Physically she is his to do with what he wishes. He touches her, penetrates her, sleeps 
next to her in various elaborate configurations of flesh to flesh, trying in every way that 
he can to get inside her. She speaks only occasionally, like an oracle. Her self-possession, 
when she speaks, is complete; she informs him that he cannot love, that he is dying, that 
he has always been dying of the malady of death. He would like to use her body to 
connect, clearly, to join with something, to remove his anesthetization to the world. His 
view of her is simultaneously clinical and eroticized. She is all openings, but he can never 
gain access to her. Our view of her, as readers, is entirely through his narration (to 
himself, an endless recursive apostrophe), but she emerges, in some way, as a character, 
whereas he is only a blank space, numbness his only characteristic.  
She is also a blank space, but a self-conjured one. She takes his money, allows his 
intrusions, remains utterly indifferent to his touch and to his presence or absence. She is 
beyond blasé, totally passive—quite literally she is unmoving, and unmoved, save for her 
occasional quiet, oracular pronouncements. As I said, everything we learn about her we 
learn through him, through his eyes. But everything he learns about himself is through 
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her speech and through the impassable, impossibly solid and self-contained space that her 
body occupies. Her body is his mirror and she reflects back to him nothing, his 
nothingness, his infection by the malady of death. Looking at her stretched out the bed, 
he narrates (note the formal second person not directed to the reader but rather deployed 
in relating his own experience in the present tense, an act of constant disassociation and 
distancing from the recounting self):  “Vous découvrez que c’est là, en elle, que se 
fomente la maladie de la mort, que c’est cette forme devant vous déployée qui décrète la 
maladie de la mort. [You realize it’s here, in her, that the malady of death is fomenting, 
that it’s this shape stretched out before you that decrees the malady of death.]”135 
 If there is a climax to La Maladie de la mort, it arrives in this realization, after 
page after page of his running his eyes and hands over her totally compliant, totally 
resistant body: she will not be the agent of his salvation but only the prophet of his 
terminal disease. I pause here with the plot, if one could call it that, and in particular with 
the female character of Maladie, because I find her to be the best example of the affective 
contagion of a peculiarly feminine suffering that Kristeva locates in Duras. While there is 
a sense in which she triumphs over the male character, it is impossible not to feel that for 
all her impenetrability she is nonetheless compromised, invaded, handled in a way that 
induces a sort of cold nausea. She is not hollow, she is solid flesh, self-contained, inward, 
able, when she so desires, to speak. But the sense of cold and numbness that begins on 
the first page only intensifies as the narration unfolds. One begins to think, perhaps, about 
how it is that she seems to still exist as a subject even as she is subjected to his ultimately 
masturbatory ministrations. How can her experience of being penetrated and stroked co-
                                                
135 Marguerite Duras, La Maladie de la mort, p. 38; The Malady of Death, p. 34. 
 91 
exist with her ability to be the sole character to explain what it is that has occurred to 
him? Can she only endure it through languor, by sleeping all the time, by recourse to 
totally inhabiting her body, her nakedness, using what is taken to be her weakness as her 
strength? (“You look at this shape,” the narrator tells us, “and as you do so you realize its 
infernal power, its abominable frailty [fragilité], its weakness, the unconquerable strength 
of its incomparable weakness.”136) How can she be so unaltered? How much effort must 
it cost her, the appearance of being utterly unharmed in the face of the physical 
manifestations of masculine despair? Is the pretense of being undefended her defense? 
How can she be so calm, with his hands, his mouth, on her, in her, feverishly trying to 
gain entrance, oblivious to her response? Does she take refuge within her body, curled 
securely in an inviolable inwardness, or does his contagion inevitably spread to her as 
well? Is she a casualty of this contagion or has she brought it with her?  
 Ultimately, the male character of Maladie is thwarted by the very aspect of her in 
which he seeks (physical, metaphysical) release: her body, and specifically her sex. When 
this experiment begins, her body is supposed to be the locus of his salvation, in which he 
is supposed to find himself, find his health. Instead it becomes a rebuke, drives him to 
interminable sleeplessness, while she sleeps on and on. The only communication, the 
only connection, that occurs, is in the announcement of his disease.  On one reading, we 
can indeed believe that she lacks subjectivity, lacks interiority, that she only exists for 
him, as a body and, intermittently, as an oracle. For when she speaks, it is only about 
him.  Her speech is the proclamation of his incapacity for communication; she is simply 
the mirror in which he discovers this truth.  Or else, on another reading, we can believe 
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that she is violated. And in so saying, I do not simply mean that she is “objectified.” For 
in Duras’ writing there is always both a cold sensuality and a significant, if occasionally 
malevolent power in being established as an object of desire; it is a mixed blessing that is 
nonetheless worth longing for, if one is a woman in a Duras novel.  And I would be 
remiss if I were not to note that Maladie is as erotic as it is chilling, even or perhaps 
because of his fumbling attempts at her body, his constant cataloguing of its parts. But if 
we are to impute to her any form of subjectivity—even in the marginal or distant way of 
the male character who refers to himself as vous rather than je—then we have to say that 
she is not all smooth surfaces and willing (or at least not closed) entrances, as he comes 
to see her. We must say that she is not untouched by all of his touches, perhaps resigned 
or even comfortable, but not content in her instrumentality. We must conceive her as 
unable to speak of and for herself, as the possessor of an inwardness that has turned to 
ice, filled with the “nothing” that Duras conjures that so concerns Kristeva. For Kristeva 
writes,  “Duras does not orchestrate it [the “nothing”] in the fashion of Mallarmé, who 
sought for the music in words, nor in the manner of Beckett who refine a syntax that 
marks time or moves ahead by fits and starts, warding off the narrative’s flight forward. 
The reverberation among characters as well as the silence inscribed as such, the emphasis 
on the ‘nothing’ to be spoken as ultimate expression of suffering, leads Duras to a 
blankness of meaning [sens].”137  
It is this nothing—this disaster or wreck of words—with which Duras infects her 
readers, the incapacity for speech. And this is a place, or a moment in which Kristeva, in 
a deeply uncharacteristic move, insists that we must not linger but must sublate this 
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moment. I call this uncharacteristic not because Kristeva is opposed to Hegel (in fact she 
is deeply Hegelian in many ways), but because she resists the Hegelian synthetic move, 
as is particularly evident within her notion of the semiotic and the symbolic, such that 
these two registers are eternally irreducible one to the other, the semiotic never merely 
aufgehoben into the symbolic.  For the semiotic, as I have detailed above, is the constant 
introduction, reintroduction of what is heterogeneous to/in language, and is never 
subsumed or sublated into the symbolic.  But here, reading Duras, Kristeva departs from 
this resistance and invokes the Hegelian move, claiming that “the point now is to see in 
‘the malady of grief’ only one moment of the narrative synthesis capable of sweeping 
along in its complex whirlwind philosophical meditations as well as erotic protections or 
entertaining pleasures.”138  The transmission of the melancholia of the Durassian 
feminine is simply too potent; Kristeva insists that the reader not tarry too long in this 
diegetical space, but inhabit it, incorporate it, and move on, recover, become once again a 
speaking subject.   
Thus for Kristeva this shipwreck of words can only be useful (that is to say, 
escapable) insofar as it is one moment within a dialectical and possibly teleological 
(because therapeutic) process of reading. But it is clearly remarkably successful on other 
grounds: first, in causing the reader to relate to the text, with or without her consent, as a 
cathected object; and second, in inflicting upon her a symptom that she recognizes as her 
own. However, given Kristeva’s investment in a form of reading that would be 
therapeutic and her diagnosis of Duras’ writing as actively opposed to that goal, why is it, 
one might pause to ask, that Kristeva chooses to deal with Duras at all—apart from the 
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fact that Soleil Noir in particular is a reflection upon melancholia and depression and 
Duras la maîtresse of their conjuring? The inevitable answer, it seems to me, comes back 
to the notion with which I began my discussion of Freud at the beginning of this chapter. 
Simply put, Kristeva cannot avoid or ignore her, just as Freud, despite his hubris and his 
missteps, could not, eventually, fail to hear the bodies and words of “his” hysterics. 
Because when one cares to listen, Duras brings to light a certain distinctive truth, “une 
certaine vérité de l’expérience feminine qui touche la jouissance de la douleur.”139 It is 
this truth to which the affective reactions of her students attests. And indeed, upon 
reading through the entirety of the Duras section of Soleil Noir, it becomes apparent that 
Kristeva’s reaction to Duras (couched in telling metaphor in the interview) is scarcely 
different from that of her students: it is a dread born of recognition and identification. 
 
 
VI. Objections; implications 
 But why not simply take the instance recounted in Kristeva’s interview remarks as 
a rendering, however provocative, of a particular moment in time when Kristeva’s 
students responded viscerally to the work of a particular novelist and move on, stipulating 
that it is in fact the mark of a good novelist that she speak to the concerns of her day and 
the mark of engaged students to be moved by them? My answer to this is twofold, and I 
will first give the version most likely to raise immediate objections. As I am writing, 
here, in the register of visceral experience, it seems pertinent to note that I read Kristeva 
on Duras before I ever read more than occasional snippets of Duras’ own work.  I was 
                                                
139 Soleil Noir, p. 252.  
 95 
skeptical of Kristeva’s insistence on the noncathartic quality of her work, and, above all, 
the legitimacy of a critic designating an affective response, or lack thereof, in this case, as 
the defining quality of any body of work.  It was this skepticism that motivated not only 
my own reading of Duras but, later, the project of this chapter and in a sense the larger 
question of the dissertation. But upon reading and rereading some of the texts that 
Kristeva considers, particularly L’Amant and La Maladie de la mort, it became more and 
more clear to me that her reading of Duras in terms of the way that it binds the reader and 
refuses to release her reveals some truth of Duras that is essential to understanding her 
work.   
Stated bluntly, I found in my own visceral reaction to Duras’ work what I could 
call, if I wished to be provocative, an empirical confirmation of Kristeva’s thesis.  I came 
to dread—indeed, I still dread, and I can think of no other word to describe the 
sensation—opening a text by Duras, any text, because I know all too well what that act 
will set loose.  I return here to Teresa Brennan, whom I invoked in the introduction to 
discuss her example of the transmission of affect in a room that one has just entered. It is 
not at all a claim about receiving the affect that Duras herself is having, but about 
responding to that which she has created and is transmitting, much like walking into a 
room in which the atmosphere precedes one’s entrance. It is not that the subsequent 
thoughts or associations I have in the wake of reading Duras precede me or are granted to 
me by the text; those are mine, necessarily particular and idiosyncratic. Reading Duras, 
however, it is the feeling that persists.  
But there are many chilly books, one might respond. And that is certainly the 
case. Indeed, I think of an example of another contemporary novel that shares a number 
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of features with Maladie, for instance: Hanif Kureishi’s Intimacy, another cold, spare, 
brief, and utterly ruthless text in which communication between lovers fails to occur in 
quite as spectacularly painful a fashion as it does between the pair in Maladie.  But 
here—and more typically, I would suggest—it is the words that persist as well as the 
unfolding of events, all set into motion by the opening line that is impossible to forget: “It 
is the saddest night, for I am leaving and not coming back.”140 Duras’ language, in 
contrast—more minimalist than Kureishi’s, if possible—seems to evaporate from the 
mind as the eye moves down the page, leaving in its wake image and concomitant affect.  
The knowledge that each time I open such a text I will be forced to endure and recognize 
that affective reality is enough to instill an anticipatory reaction of near-Pavlovian 
avoidance.  
 
 But even if one should wish to disregard this entire line of thinking, there is yet 
another answer as to why this moment in Kristeva should not be simply set aside. We 
should linger with this moment precisely because Kristeva, as I have detailed above with 
respect to her notion of the semiotic, has always excelled at pointing out when something 
we have previously understood to be strictly or purely linguistic includes, as constitutive, 
an affective dimension that has been ignored or repressed. It is this potentially subversive 
use of the semiotic in her strategies of textual analysis that interests me in Kristeva’s 
reading of Duras.  I should mention, however, that it is nearly impossible to draw a neat 
line between textual analysis and individual psychoanalysis in Kristeva’s later work, as 
she has increasingly begun to include case studies in all of her texts, such that her 
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therapeutic and critical voices are inextricably mingled.141 In discussing affect in 
Kristeva, this deliberate ambiguity must be kept in mind. Pushing back against a position 
like Kristeva’s, Stuart Schneiderman, one of Lacan’s American disciples, makes a 
thoughtful plea for the separation of these two realms in his own reading of one of 
Freud’s famous case studies, the “Rat Man.” He writes, “The practice of reading a text is 
not the same as conducting a psychoanalytic treatment.  There is no question of treating 
or curing the text nor is there a concern with the therapeutic benefits that will accrue to 
the reader.” While I do not mean to dismiss Schneiderman—who continues with the 
infinitely useful caveat that “it is neither necessary nor desirable to see one’s own person 
in everything that one reads”—Kristeva has always contended that reading, especially 
that sort of reading that engages the reader in an unavoidable and always unsettling 
confrontation with the semiotic drives, as in avant-garde literature and poetic language, 
is, precisely, although not exclusively, therapeutic.142 
I want to turn to yet another excellent reader of psychoanalytic texts in continuing 
to sort out the implications of Kristeva’s interview remarks. There is a moment in Jane 
Gallop’s Reading Lacan where she writes of a transference that befalls “every 
psychoanalytic critic,” a sort of reading transference onto the body of psychoanalytic 
literature that consists in a belief that it is “the site of a ‘knowledge of meaning.’” In this 
relationship, moreover, “the critic is no longer analyst but patient,” a crucial shift from a 
position of ostensible mastery to one of potentially extreme vulnerability.143 Awareness 
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of this transferential relationship, Gallop notes, as with any transference, does not 
exorcise it; nor would that be necessarily desirable.  Thinking along Gallop’s lines, the 
text—she is speaking of psychoanalytic writing, but in the context of Kristeva and Duras 
I would like to extend her point to the literary realm as well—would thus be the cathected 
object, invested with the reader’s psychic energy, her affect.  What this teaching moment, 
as it were, in Kristeva’s interview can help us think our way toward is a kind of reading 
that would not simply be the type that Schneiderman warns us against, where “you find 
something...that seems to speak directly to you, that seems to have been written 
especially for your benefit...that,” he says, “is the place where you have made the most 
thorough misreading.”144 And indeed, as I indicated in the introduction in my analysis of 
Derrida’s “bad reader,” I too wish to guard against this sort of misreading (thorough or 
otherwise), in which one simply sees oneself reflected in the text and declares it to have 
always been there.  
Yet Kristeva, it seems to me, although she has argued on a number of occasions 
for the personal therapeutic benefits of reading avant-garde literature, is suggesting and, 
more to the point, performing something more complex.  The investment of a text with 
affect, even against one’s will, as seems often to be the case with her students, could lead 
to a reading that is not personal, per se. Because, as I have discussed most extensively in 
the context of Freud, affect is in its most important sense an indeterminate entity.  It is a 
malleable energy that can attach and detach itself from objects, whether that be an object 
like the breast, a person, an idea, an image, or a text. Reading Kristeva on Duras, one 
catches a glimpse of a way to read that situates the reader and the text as her cathected 
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object in a dyad that foregrounds the passage of an affect evoked through language into 
the lived reality of the reader and selects the movement of that affect as the privileged 
object of analysis.  Further, this mode of analysis does not simply replicate a relationship 
of unreflective transference onto the text, of imputing to the text one’s own singularities. 
It does not constitute “bad reading”—far from it—although it may require a modicum of 
sensitivity or receptivity. For the transmission of this affect often arrives—and, crucially, 
may be most visible—when it occurs against the reader’s will. And it cannot be 
accounted for by reader-response theory, for while it brings the reader-text dyad to the 
forefront as its field of analysis, it does not conceive of affect as an entity that is wholly 
personal or wholly idiosyncratic, but rather as something that moves with equal ease 
between the membranes of texts and bodies, for it is the body that receives this 
transmission. Or to be more precise, I should say, it is the speaking subject, which is 
always embodied and for which writing and speech are necessarily embodied 
phenomena.  
I have read Kristeva here primarily in her role as literary critic, and have 
deliberately chosen to focus on her reading of exclusively literary texts. In the next two 
chapters, I elaborate the gesture that I have located within Kristeva’s reading of Duras—
analysis by way of affect—by shifting it into the arena of self-consciously philosophical 
writing, to confront the additional, and considerable, resistances that await it within that 
realm.  
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Chapter Three 
 
In Praise of Unintelligibility 
 Irigaray, Freud, and Styles of the Unconscious 
 
 
“’My only fear is that it may become unintelligible again!”’ –the Impartial Person, in Sigmund Freud, The 
Question of Lay Analysis 
 
 
“That is to say, the question of style, of the genre of philosophy—the question of how to present and 
expose philosophy, or, to say this in an absolute way, of philosophical exposition—must have been posed 
within philosophy itself.” -Jean-Luc Nancy, The Discourse of the Syncope: Logodaedalus 
 
 
“With the writer of bliss (and his reader) begins the untenable text, the impossible text.  This text is outside 
pleasure, outside criticism, unless it is reached through another text of bliss: you cannot speak “on” such a 
text, you can only speak “in” it, in its fashion, enter into a desperate plagiarism, hysterically affirm the void 
of bliss (and no longer obsessively repeat the letter of pleasure).” -Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
            If what follows proves to be lucid and not entirely unconvincing, it runs the risk 
of undermining itself altogether. Nevertheless, if, in (re-)opening the question of style, I 
bracket a discussion of my own for the time being, I beg pardon for the inconsistency on 
the grounds that after all—in the present instance—there are rules to be followed. In this 
chapter, I examine Luce Irigaray’s valorization of unintelligibility in philosophical 
writing. I am interested, more precisely, in a specific version of unintelligibility that 
presents the reader with a double gesture, an offering and a withdrawal. First, a text that 
appears deliberately to fail by the standards of ready comprehensibility, that hints at the 
necessity of being deciphered, as if by a code. Second, embedded within that text, a 
movement of either explicitly declining to provide the reader with the key to such a code, 
or else an implicit refusal of the terms of that type of thinking, a radical opposition to the 
notion that one should read in order to decipher. Irigaray’s work belongs to the latter 
type. The former is quite neatly enacted in a recent work by Hélène Cixous, Rêve je te dis 
 101 
(Dream I Tell You). The example is worth briefly elaborating for the contrast with 
Irigaray.  
Cixous presents the reader with the unedited text of fifty of her own dreams, 
selected from among thousands recorded in the dark of night or predawn in her dream 
journal over the course of ten years.  While she provides a preface to the reproduced 
journal entries, it is only to announce that there will be no interpretation, no analysis. Or 
rather, there may be, but it will not be given here: “These secrets, in this volume, I don’t 
give them away. I never shall. [Je ne les livre pas. Je ne les livrerai jamais.]” Indeed, she 
notes that from the outset the structuring conceit was to write “’a book of dreams without 
interpretation.’”145  The play on words in French—for livre is the noun for book as well 
as a form of the verb livrer, to deliver, or (with secret) to betray or tell, or, when reflexive 
(se livrer) to give up to, to open up, indicates that she will never “book” them, never 
make them into the type of textual object that renders itself open to being read. The 
dreams—for Cixous makes it clear that the material we see here is integral to her being, 
to her work, her writing, her identity—could, if thus read, yield much of value through 
analysis.  But such analysis would be at odds with the project of the book and its 
publication. She presents the reader with a choppy, opaque, utterly idiosyncratic text, and 
indicates decisively that no further offering will be forthcoming.   
           I have in no way ‘corrected,’ censored, touched up the tales set down by my hand in the 
             twilight hours.  They are reproduced in their entirety, unpolished, innocent, such as they  
             disported themselves in the preanalytic dawn.  I could, for my own benefit, analyse them. 
             Only I could do this, since only I have the keys.  I do not do this here.146 
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146 Ibid., pp. 8-9.  
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I give you, she tells us, that which is the rawest, the most telling, the most revealing, and 
simultaneously acknowledge it as a form of concealment rather than revelation. The 
reader is not, will not be the analyst. The reader lacks the keys. What promised to be an 
intimate experience, a privileged access, is kindly but firmly denied.  
 The image of the keys suggests that Cixous adheres here at least to one axiom of 
classical Freudian dream interpretation: the distinction between the manifest and the 
latent content, such that the manifest is made up of the elements of the dream as 
experienced and related by the dreamer, and the latent consists of those that underlie 
them, requiring elucidation through the analytic process. Cixous’ gesture is, of course, 
quite different from Freud’s, whose interest in the manifest is primarily insofar as it can 
lead him to the latent, as well as in the process of the dream-work itself; in presenting 
only the manifest and withholding any version of the latent, Cixous clearly indicates that 
for her, the former has some value “in itself,” so to speak. Yet for Cixous (as for Freud, 
who acknowledges that each dream has a “navel,” an unknown which can never be 
plumbed or elucidated), the task of dream interpretation may be partial at best, but it must 
proceed only with the “keys” that can transform the manifest into the latent material.147  
 Irigaray does away with locks and keys altogether. She hints in a passage from 
her seminal work Speculum de l’autre femme at a type of writing that would utterly 
refuse the manifest/latent distinction. Curiously, in a book that opens with a nearly book-
                                                
147 Cixous is instructive here as a far more radical example of a gesture that Freud himself inaugurates in 
the first “specimen dream” of The Interpretation of Dreams, the dream of “Irma’s injection,” a gesture that 
he repeats throughout the book. In his final comments within the first foray at interpreting this dream, he 
writes, “I will not pretend that I have completely uncovered the meaning of this dream or that its 
interpretation is without a gap.   I could spend much more time over it, derive further information from it 
and discuss fresh problems raised by it.  I myself know the points from which further trains of thought could 
be followed. But considerations which arise in the case of every dream of my own restrain me from 
pursuing my interpretive work. If anyone should feel tempted to express a hasty condemnation of my 
reticence, I would advise him to make the experiment of being franker than I am.” (The Interpretation of 
Dreams, SE Volume IV, pp. 120-121, trans. James Strachey, emphasis mine.) 
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length essay on Freud, this radical undermining of one of the most crucial underpinnings 
of Freud’s theory of dream interpretation comes elsewhere, in an oblique passage from 
one of the shorter central essays, “Toute Théorie du Sujet...” (“Any Theory of the 
‘Subject’ Has Always Been Appropriated by the ‘Masculine.’”)  I would like to examine 
this passage carefully in an attempt to tease out what precisely Irigaray is suggesting, 
what is at stake for her own project in what I read as her refusal of Freud’s insistence on 
the necessity of translating the text of a dream from its manifest to its latent content. 
While Irigaray’s commentary on Freud’s work on feminine sexuality has been much 
remarked, the passage on what she terms his “two syntaxes” has been less scrutinized and 
is remarkable both in its own right and in its consequences for a re-thinking of the 
implications of her style. I develop from her reading of Freud the notion of a rigorous 
unintelligibility, that deliberately forces an affective response alongside or before a 
predominantly intellectual reaction. This chapter confines itself to those selections from 
Irigaray’s work in which she reflects self-consciously on her own style and method. The 
following chapter will focus on her explicitly performative writing in order to argue that 
the effect of such work is to trap the reader in Irigaray’s own idiom, to foreclose upon a 
verbal response that would reduplicate the protocols of philosophical discourse, and to 
produce a specific affective reaction. 
 
 
 
II. Philosopher or hysteric?  
 
 Before I turn to this passage, however, I would like to make my way through two 
preliminary discussions. First, I will turn to the literature on Irigaray’s style, in order to 
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examine how previous commentators on her work have found it integral to a discussion 
of her overall project. In the process of doing so I hope to give the reader an adequate 
sense of that project. Second, I will address the necessity of re-opening the question of 
style in philosophy, both in Irigaray’s work and more broadly in the context of twentieth 
century Continental thought.  
    Many have characterized Irigaray’s style as coy, flirtatious, or seductive. In the 
fairly extensive secondary literature on her work, the question of style consistently recurs. 
Several such pieces are devoted entirely or primarily to this question, but nearly every 
scholar who comments, in particular, on her early writing treats it at least in passing.  
Most take their cues from a 1975 interview with Irigaray, “Pouvoir du 
discours/subordination du féminin,” which also begins with a discussion of her views on 
Freud.148 “Pouvoir du discours,” in which she reflects upon the choices she made in 
writing Speculum, is the text in which Irigaray most explicitly outlines her methodology.  
Speculum, in which Irigaray launched her opening salvo in the face of what she terms the 
writing out of “the feminine” in philosophical and psychoanalytic discourse, is a 
sprawling opus that consists of ten short essays bracketed by two nearly book-length 
close readings, the first of Freud’s lecture on “Femininity,”  the second an analysis of 
Plato’s allegory of the cave that reads the cave as womb.149 In the interview, she explains 
                                                
148 This interview was originally published in Dialectiques no. 8, and later included as one of the essays in 
her book Ce Sexe qui n’en est pas un (1977), published in 1985 in English as “The Power of Discourse and 
the Subordination of the Feminine” in This Sex Which Is Not One.  
 
149 Throughout her work, Irigaray refers to ‘le féminin’ as that element which has been written out of the 
discourses of Western philosophical and religious thought. There is a significant body of writing devoted to 
whether or not her work should be conceived as essentialist. I tend to find it most productive to understand 
her use of ‘the feminine’ as designating that which has been considered to be aligned with femininity, such 
as the body, irrationality, and so forth; it is, at any rate, a shifting target, its contours emerging differently in 
each of her encounters with a specific text. Following Irigaray, I will henceforth use ‘the feminine,’ sans 
scare quotes, in the same way. For more extensive accounts of the Irigaray and essentialism conversation, 
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why she must undertake a rereading of the history of Western philosophy so as to make it 
reveal its “sexual indifference,” the means by which its tropes, concepts, symbols, and so 
forth have always rested upon the elaboration of a theory of a singular (male) subject 
disguised as neuter/neutral and which has, in so doing, served to repress the feminine 
while simultaneously covering up the traces of that repression.  
 Irigaray begins with Freud, she remarks here and elsewhere, not only in order to 
engage in the scathing critique of his theories of female sexuality that appear in Speculum 
and Ce Sexe qui n’en est pas un. More crucially, for Irigaray—herself a practicing 
analyst—psychoanalysis reveals a crucial truth about the sexual indifference that is the 
condition of the possibility of discourse itself. Hence the necessity for the interrogation, 
at the level of the sentence, of crucial texts within the Western philosophical tradition. As 
the structure of Speculum makes abundantly clear, this is a trajectory which in her view 
includes and perhaps even culminates in psychoanalytic thought, which belongs to the 
tradition even as it betrays its secrets, the exclusions upon which it has erected its 
pretentions to knowledge.   
 My purpose here is not to summarize “Pouvoir du discours,” but rather to briefly 
explicate it in order to flag certain passages that have been taken up by subsequent critics. 
The overarching thrust of the piece is the elaboration of the necessity for the undertaking 
of the rereading of philosophical texts, for “it is indeed precisely philosophical discourse 
                                                
see the essay collection Engaging with Irigaray, eds. Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor, and Margaret Whitford, 
particularly Schor’s two pieces: “Previous Engagements: The Receptions of Irigaray,” and “This 
Essentialism Which Is Not One: Coming to Grips with Irigaray.” For a convincing dismissal of the charges 
of essentialism on the grounds of style, see Gayatri Spivak’s astute comment in the interview that opens 
Outside in the Teaching Machine, p. 19: “I like reading Irigaray, but I read her within the general tradition 
of French experimental writing, foregrounding rhetoric. It is only if she is read as the pure theoretical prose 
of truth—whatever that may be—that she may seem essentialist when she talks about women.  Broadly, 
Kojèvian French intellectuals read Hegel and Marx with an eye to rhetoric. We know Derrida has to be read 
that way.  Why do we become essentialist readers when we read someone like Irigaray?” 
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that we have to challenge, and disrupt, inasmuch as this discourse sets forth the law [fait 
la loi] for all others, inasmuch as it constitutes the discourse on discourse.” Irigaray 
continues, “This process of interpretive rereading has always been a psychoanalytic 
undertaking as well.  That is why we need to pay attention to the way the unconscious 
works in each philosophy, and perhaps in philosophy in general.”150 Although the 
language of the unconscious is distinctively psychoanalytic, Irigaray’s project as she 
announces it here also has obvious Heideggerian echoes, with the re-opening of the 
question of the meaning of Being replaced by that of the question of the feminine: “this 
hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments which it has brought about 
must be dissolved” through the “destruction of the history of ontology.”151  
 Within this overarching proclamation of Irigaray’s critical project are two primary 
strands, which map somewhat crudely onto what could be called the critical and the 
constructive moments. The first is her use of mimicry or mimesis: 
          There is, in an initial phase, perhaps only one “path,” the one historically assigned to  
 the feminine: that of mimicry [mimétisme]. One must assume the feminine role deliberately. 
 Which means already to convert a form of subordination into an affirmation, and thus to 
 begin to thwart it.  Whereas a direct feminine challenge to this condition means demanding 
 to speak as a (masculine) “subject,” that is, it means to postulate a relation to the intelligible 
 that would maintain sexual indifference. 
           To play with mimesis [mimésis] is thus, for a woman, to try to recover the place of her 
 exploitation by discourse, without allowing herself to be simply reduced to it.  It means to  
 resubmit herself – inasmuch as she is on the side of the “perceptible,” of “matter”—to “ideas,” 
 in particular to ideas about herself, that are elaborated in/by a masculine logic, but so as to 
 make “visible,” by an effect of playful repetition, what was supposed to mean invisible: the  
 cover-up of a possible operation of the feminine in language.152  
 
This mimetic tactic, which she deploys in a variety of contexts and personae in close 
readings of a vast swathe of philosophers and psychoanalysts, leads to the second 
                                                
150 Irigaray, This Sex, pp. 74-5; Ce Sexe, pp. 72-3.  
 
151 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 44.  
 
152 Irigaray, This Sex, p. 76, emphasis mine; Ce Sexe, pp. 73-4. 
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moment, a gesturing toward the theorization of what this “feminine” would or may be, in 
language, in subjectivity, in sexual pleasure, all in the utopian mode of that which is yet 
to come.153  For to speak of the feminine in positive, determinate terms would be at 
present simply to reduplicate a long history of such formulations, of which, for Irigaray, 
Freud’s “Was will das Weib?” is simply the latest and most transparent iteration. Thus it 
is not a question of spinning out 
 a new theory of which woman would be the subject or the object, but of jamming the  
 theoretical machinery itself, of suspending its pretension to the production of a truth and of  
 a meaning that are excessively univocal...they should not put it, then, in the form “What is  
 woman?” but rather, repeating/interpreting the way in which, within discourse, the feminine 
 finds itself defined as lack or deficiency, or as imitation and negative image of the subject, 
 they should signify that with respect to this logic a disruptive excess is possible on the  
 feminine side.154 
 
It is this “disruptive excess” and its many possibilities with which I am concerned, and 
which has interested many of Irigaray’s commentators, particularly those interested in the 
productive possibilities of her stylistic experiments.  
 Jane Gallop—noting that “without transference, psychoanalysis is merely literary 
criticism”—remarks that in Speculum, Irigaray, who must exist in a transferential 
relationship to Freud, creates the conditions of a training analysis for a possible “wild 
analyst” to read Freud. On this reading, Irigaray is the catalyst for the birth of a reader 
who would be uniquely equipped to interpret Freud without the affective baggage with 
which Irigaray herself, “likely to have been seduced by Freud, seduced by his theory,” is 
laden.155 Elizabeth Grosz also employs the language of seduction in describing Irigaray’s 
                                                
153 For a discussion of Irigaray as utopian theorist, see Chapter One of Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: 
Philosophy in the Feminine.  
 
154 Irigaray, This Sex, p. 78; Ce Sexe, p. 75.  
 
155 Jane Gallop, “The Father’s Seduction,” The Daughter’s Seduction: Feminism and Psychoanalysis, p. 
72. 
 108 
style, citing (as does Gallop) her self-proclaimed intention “to have a fling [faire la noce] 
with the philosophers, which is easier said than done.”156  Grosz reads her as a very 
specific type of seductress, self-consciously playing the hysteric (one senses she has an 
Anna O. or a Dora in mind, those hysterics who made analysts aware of the transferential 
relationship in famously uncomfortable ways), making the body speak: 
 Her critical technique, her amorous flirtation with phallocentric texts is hysterical  
 prick-teasing, phallo-deflation.  It is the only way that she is able to both inhabit and 
 challenge phallocentrism without being entirely absorbed by her investments and history 
 in it.  For this reason, her style is feminine in the extreme: it is based on masquerade, 
 semblance, mimesis, artifice and seduction—all the characteristics of the feminine 
 ‘resolution’ of the oedipus complex.157  
 
Grosz is at pains to affirm the deliberate nature of this posturing, insisting repeatedly on 
Irigaray’s self-conscious assuming of the hysterical position, adding that if she mimes the 
hysteric’s body-talk, expressing herself symptomatically, she bears resemblances to the 
figure of the analyst that are just as important as those of the hysteric. Grosz exhibits a 
certain amount of discomfort with the idea that Irigaray’s hysterical manifestations might 
be anything other than entirely controlled. “Unlike the hysteric,” she writes, Irigaray’s 
strategy is self-consciously undertaken and does not or need not reproduce the ultimately 
self-destructive and self-defeating debilitation of hysteria.”158  
 Amy Hollywood notes the ways in which Irigaray’s writing has been associated 
with hysteria, but she departs from psychoanalytic language when she suggests that 
Irigaray “mimes mystical modes of writing” at points of “creative tension” within her 
                                                
 
156 Irigaray, This Sex, p. 150; Ce Sexe, p. 147, emphasis in original.  
 
157 Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists, pp. 136-7.  
 
158 Ibid., p. 138.  
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work.159 Hollywood writes, “The elision of the subject in Irigaray’s fragmented 
sentences, the confusion of pronouns, and her almost ejaculatory and incantatory style 
mirror the dispersal of the subject as knowing agent, in control of his or her discourse, 
just as for the mystic such linguistic performances serve as an analogue of the union 
between subject and object, soul and divine.”160 For Hollywood, Irigaray’s work is 
always at odds with language due to its association (by way of Lacan) with the 
masculine, and as such, like the mystic, Irigaray is always engaged in a project of saying 
and simultaneous unsaying.161  
 Margaret Whitford, author of the most comprehensive study of Irigaray qua 
philosopher, argues that Irigaray needs her reader, “and that this need is inherent in her 
theory...She cannot, on her own, bring about change in the symbolic order.  So far from 
being an impediment, the effort of understanding needed to read her may be part of the 
cost of change.  I want to insist on the time of understanding, and to reject the idea that 
immediate intelligibility is always and under every circumstance a desirable goal....”162 
Whitford’s personal reflections upon the experience of reading Irigaray’s texts are also 
worth citing. She focuses here on her affective response to the experience of reading 
                                                
159 Amy Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual Difference, and the Demands of History, p. 5.  
 
160 Ibid., p. 197.  
 
161 I will return to Hollywood’s important reading of Irigaray at more length in Chapter Four. See also 
Hollywood, “Beauvoir, Irigaray, and the Mystical,” (Hypatia 9: 4 (1994)) in which Hollywood notes that 
both Beauvoir and Irigaray share a distressing and a-historical tendency to allow the actual texts and 
particularities of the mystics they discuss to recede in their analyses of the categories of the mystical, the 
feminine, the body, and so forth.  
 
162 Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine, p. 5, emphasis in original.  
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Irigaray’s texts, contrasting them with the crisp lucidity of Michèle le Doueff’s feminist 
philosophical work: 
  Irigaray fascinates me despite myself and in a completely different way.  She is more  
 than a little inaccessible; she is associative rather than systematic in her reasoning; it has  
 been a struggle to read and elucidate her, and to come to some understanding of her critique  
 of rationality which appeared to go against my whole intellectual training.  She represented  
 an otherness about which I could not say in advance: this is important and valuable, or else  
 this is not going to be of any use....
163
 
 
These are peculiarly ambivalent reflections in the preface to a work that quite self-
consciously attempts to render Irigaray’s work legible to a philosophical audience, to 
legitimize her as a philosopher in the face of an assumed audience that would deny her 
that status.  
Finally, the most penetrating remarks on the question of Irigaray’s style, in my 
view, come from Elizabeth Weed, who devotes a lengthy essay to the subject, exploring 
what she terms her “radical citationality.”164 Weed’s piece centers upon a reading of 
Irigaray’s essay “Così Fan Tutti,” itself a reading of Lacan’s twentieth seminar, Encore, 
on feminine sexuality. Structurally, the essay consists of a series of citations from 
Encore, accompanied by Irigaray’s commentary. Lacan’s name is mentioned only once, 
in a terse footnote on the first page of the essay identifying Encore as the source of all 
quotations.  Yet while the citations from Lacan are set off in quotation marks, at times 
Irigaray speaks as if for Lacan, elaborating the logical consequences of the points on 
which she cites him; at other times she assumes a sardonic and even hostile tone in which 
she seems to distinguish herself entirely from him, only to lapse back into an ambiguous 
register.  But the essay unfolds entirely in what Sherry Turkle terms “Lacanian space”; its 
                                                
163 Ibid., p. 4, emphasis mine.  
 
164 Elizabeth Weed, “The Question of Style,” in Engaging With Irigaray, p. 83.  
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figures, its themes, without exception, are Lacan’s.165 Indeed, at times she sounds 
uncannily like the Lacan of Encore; her mimicry is note-perfect, unparalleled.  
Weed zeroes in on Irigaray’s refusal to distinguish strongly between her own 
writing and the text that she is reading. “For her,” Weed comments, “taking on a writer 
means more than intertextuality; it means inhabiting his text. She does not write on 
Heidegger, she writes Heidegger.”166 The effect is a performance of the sort of merging, 
the lowering and weakening of ego boundaries that Freud tells us is symptomatic of love. 
It is a “critical intimacy,” to borrow Gayatri Spivak’s phrase, pushed utterly to its 
limits.167 But Weed is not only interested in this radical intertextuality in considering 
Irigaray’s style; she is also particularly attentive to Irigaray’s relationship to 
intelligibility:  “The cunning Irigarayan text invites the reader in but then refuses to 
display the protocols of its reading. It cannot be said to bar intelligibility but rather 
always to problematize it.”168  
Weed makes two points, both well taken, which are particularly striking when 
juxtaposed. First, she locates the moment where Irigaray departs from Lacan and 
Derrida169 in the former’s emphasis on “female positivity.” Weed reads Irigaray as 
working both within and beyond the limits of deconstruction.  Whereas those who attack 
                                                
165 Sherry Turkle, Psychoanalytic Politics: Jacques Lacan and Freud’s French Revolution, p. 82. 
 
166 Weed, p. 84.  
 
167 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Appendix: The Setting to Work of Deconstruction,” A Critique of 
Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present, p. 425. 
 
168 Weed, p. 84.  
 
169 I would suggest that these two styles should not, perhaps, be elided, but in this section of the essay 
Weed appears to be primarily interested in distinguishing Irigaray from Derrida in particular.    
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her for her essentialism might understand her work as reversing the binary of masculine 
and feminine and simply lingering with the second term, failing to find a third term that 
would destabilize the binary itself, Weed insists to the contrary that Irigaray is not 
engaged in a stunted or incomplete deconstructive project, but indeed exceeds 
deconstruction in a certain respect:  
....in evoking a female positivity Irigaray always remains engaged in the deconstructive  
project while, at the same time, extending it beyond its limits.  The positivity she evokes is  
one that cannot be summed up; it is not thematizable, translatable into some kind of formula, 
however utopian.  The positivity she promotes, indeed her whole project, is to be grasped  
through her style.170 
 
This female positivity, then, cannot consist in a mere hierarchal reversal, a corrective 
privileging and thematization of the feminine, for “it is precisely the thematizable, the 
demonstrable, the formalizable...that one must write against.”171  
Where I part company from Weed, however, is in her claim that this positivity—
and the departure from Lacan, Derrida, and so forth—is evident within Irigaray’s 
evocations of the “blind spots” of the philosophical and psychoanalytic texts that she 
reads. It seems to me that this, precisely, belongs to the critical rather than the 
constructive aspect of Irigaray’s project. For now, I want to juxtapose another of Weed’s 
remarks with her observation about Irigaray’s relationship to deconstruction. She 
comments in a footnote that Irigaray’s having been so often misread is “due in part to her 
style, which is simultaneously more and less ‘intelligible’ than Derrida’s.”172 It is with the 
latter pole that I wish to linger.  Weed claims, as cited above, that Irigaray 
‘problematizes’ but does not ‘bar’ intelligibility. I wish to address the ways in which she 
                                                
170 Weed, p. 86, emphasis mine.  
 
171 Ibid., p. 84.  
 
172 Weed, note 25, p. 105.  
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valorizes its opposite, in which she praises the unintelligible.  This will require one more 
excursus.  
 
 
III. Style and philosophy 
For as the question of style in Irigaray has clearly received ample critical 
attention, why, then, re-open it? Especially as one hears that the avant-garde flourishes of 
that curious object that many in the United States have come to refer to simply as “French 
Theory” are passé, no longer relevant or worthy of the intense scrutiny that is required to 
wring the slightest bit of sense from them. My answer, in brief, is that I take seriously the 
notion that these are precisely not flourishes, decorative embellishments on an underlying 
entity that could be made clear, intelligible, explicable in a 100-word abstract, if only 
someone with a remarkable gift of brevity and lucidity were to undertake to do so. To 
understand “style” as a mere overlay is to miss the work that it performs. Of course, as 
the reception of “French Theory” in America has demonstrated, philosophical writing 
outside the Anglo-American style (for such work has, indeed, a style of its own) has 
provoked a broad range of reactions, from uncritical adoration to outright hostility, from 
the unexpected fruitfulness that has arisen from the de- and re-contextualizations of such 
writing to profound méconnaissance, to borrow a favorite word from Lacan.173   
                                                
173 On the making of the distinctively American phenomenon that is “French Theory” and the American 
reception of the work of Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze, Kristeva, and others, see François Cusset, French 
Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, &Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life of the United States. On 
the “question of style,” in addition to Jean-Luc Nancy (see pages 115-123 below), see also Jacques Derrida, 
Éperons: Les styles de Nietzsche (Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles). 
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For by now, we have learned how to explain “what Derrida/Lacan/Foucault/[insert 
theorist’s name here] ‘meant,’” have we not? We now have theory as sound-bite, to be 
deployed more or less skillfully, metonymically, as shorthand for the knowing reader. 
The metaphysics of presence. The feminine is the repressed of Western culture. Desire 
does not desire satisfaction; desire desires desire. We have incredulity toward 
metanarratives, we have desiring machines, we have the aleatory, the yet to come, 
endless chains of signifiers, the semiotic dimension to all signifying processes, the map 
that precedes the territory, and we have a body of English-language scholarship that has 
moved beyond some of the early reactive (mis)understandings of “French Theory” to 
present these various theorists in thoughtful, nuanced readings that are highly attentive to 
the specific strands of the Western philosophical lineage from which they have emerged 
and with which they are in conversation.  
The texts have been translated, and they have been “translated,” as well, into a 
more familiar and less mystifying idiom. But now that we have this body of work, this 
making-comprehensible (for which, let me be clear, I am intensely grateful), do we not 
often forget to ask the question as to whether or not the goal of comprehension or 
comprehensibility is, in fact, always desirable, and in what sort of relationship such 
knowledge might stand as regards fidelity to the texts? Nietzsche, that prophet of 
“postmodern” thought, issues a polemical warning to this effect in The Gay Science, 
contending that the knowledge that we seek is only a reduction of the foreign to the 
already familiar. He speaks at first in the context of “the common people,” but within the 
span of only two sentences he extends his remarks to encompass “we philosophers” as 
well: 
Then I asked myself: what is it that the common people take for knowledge? What do they 
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want when they want “knowledge”? Nothing more than this: Something strange is to be  
reduced to something familiar. And we philosophers—have we really meant more than this 
when we have spoken of knowledge? What is familiar means what we are used to so that we 
no longer marvel at it, our everyday, some rule in which we are stuck, anything at all in which 
we feel at home.  Look, isn’t our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the  
will to uncover under everything strange, unusual, and questionable something that no longer 
disturbs us?174 
 
I am struck here, by two items, one that concerns so-called “French Theory” more 
generally, and one that pertains specifically to my reading of Irigaray and is, 
unabashedly, an affective as well as an intellectual reaction. The first is the consistent 
thematics of misrecognition and misunderstanding that not only pervades the reactions to 
writers such as Lacan, Derrida, and Irigaray, but is predicted, proclaimed, or even 
enjoined by these writers themselves.  Consider Lacan’s insistence, arguing against an 
ego psychology that would proceed from a concept of the ego as the home of the 
“perception-consciousness system” or the locus of the reality principle, insisting rather 
that psychoanalysis “take as our point of departure the function of misrecognition [partir 
de la fonction de méconnaissance]....”175 Or Derrida in 1967 already maintaining that 
“the concept and above all the work of deconstruction, its ‘style,’ remain by nature 
exposed to misunderstanding and nonrecognition [restent par nature exposés aux 
malentendus et à la méconnaissance].”176  Or Irigaray, rejecting the possibility of 
“remaining within the same type of utterance as the one that guarantees discursive 
coherence.”177 These announcements are not made in an apologetic mode, but rather 
                                                
174 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, pp. 300-301. See also The Will to Power, Book Three.  
 
175 Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic 
Experience,” in Écrits, p. 80; “La Stade du Miroir comme formateur de la fonction du Je  
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176 Jacques Derrida. Of Grammatology, p 14; De la Grammatologie, p. 26.  
 
177 Irigaray, This Sex, p. 78; Ce Sexe, p. 75.  
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proclaimed as a positive task to be undertaken, a necessary confrontation with a scene 
that was previously, naively taken to be truth without consideration of what operations 
underlie the creation of coherence or recognition. Or even (Derrida, in particular, here) 
asserted in the mode of a quiet acceptance, not a valorization but a practical statement 
that I, that this, this text, this corpus, this method, will not be understood.  
Yet in the later work of, at least, Derrida and Irigaray, a note of complaint or 
dismay at the sheer persistence of such méconnaissance on the part of their readers 
begins to sound. In response to a 1987 interview question, Irigaray snaps, “It makes me 
wonder how Speculum was translated in America for me to hear such misunderstandings 
of this book.  Of course, it is a difficult book, as it defines a new horizon of thought.”178 
And in Derrida’s poignant, elliptical essay “Circumfession,” he laments, “that’s what my 
readers won’t have known about me....to be bound better and better but be read less and 
less well over almost twenty years....”179 Such frustration, of course, is to be expected 
from even the most deliberately oblique philosopher. Yet it is nonetheless a peculiar 
series of textual moves: the production of a difficult or unintelligible text or corpus, the 
insistence on its difficulty or unintelligibility, and finally an expression of incredulity at 
its having, somehow, been misread, misunderstood.  
 
A reading of Jean-Luc Nancy’s Discourse of the Syncope: Logodaedalus—a 
study of Kant’s style—might suggest that these explicit articulations of the effects of 
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179 Jacques Derrida, “Circumfession,” in Jacques Derrida, p. 154; “Circonfession,” pp. 145-6.  
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style in philosophy simply make visible a phenomenon that is always at work in 
philosophical texts, that in fact inaugurates philosophy itself.  Nancy writes,  
a philosophical tradition as such becomes possible only from the point where it, insofar as it  
takes its object and condition its own presentation, produces the category and the problem of 
Darstellung.  Because it is under the name of this category and in the face of this problem that 
something can from this point on present, exhibit, and designate itself as philosophy.180  
 
He locates the inception of this tradition with Kant, that is to say (among other things) 
with the birth of a philosophy that takes itself to be truly systematic and exhaustive.  For 
it is within this philosophy that the question of the presentation (Darstellung) of 
philosophy presents itself and makes a demand on philosophy.  Philosophy has to ask 
itself how it presents itself. And it must present itself in words, discursively; it is, as Saul 
Anton remarks, “obliged to write itself.”181 Nancy claims that with the question of the 
presentation of philosophy, the categories of philosophy and literature are simultaneously 
produced, as philosophy must distinguish itself in its very self-constitution from any 
other form of exposition. He proposes the following formula for what it is that occurs 
when the question of the Darstellung of philosophy arises: “thinking the thing as a 
presentation (as a PHENO-menon) implies the presentation of thought [la pensée de la 
chose comme présentation (comme PHÉNOmène) implique la présentation de la 
                                                
180 Jean-Luc Nancy, Discourse of the Syncope: Logodaedalus, pp. 62-3; Le Discourse de la Syncope: 
Logodaedalus, p. 73. Avital Ronell also rehearses Nancy’s argument in a far more digestible manner in her 
book Stupidity, in the section “Kant Satellite: The Figure of the Ridiculous Philosopher; Or, Why I Am So 
Popular,” especially pp. 280-287. For instance: “Because, don’t forget, ever since Kant, as Heine and 
Nietzsche remind us, in order to be a philosopher one has to write badly.  This became part of the contract, 
an obtrusive imperative of the Kantian text.  Owing to Kant’s legacy a true philosopher henceforth will 
have to be a poor writer or rhetorically strung out, syntactically boorish, impoverished in terms of diction—
in sum, decisively unliterary. The concept could not be made to appear in pink ballet slippers: it was to 
show up scientifically, that is, rhetorically unadorned....Philosophical exposition was to be downed without 
honey or the similarly sweet but troubling enticements of art.” (p. 283) 
 
181
 Saul Anton, “Kant in Stereo,” translator’s introduction to Discourse of the Syncope, p. xv.  
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pensée].”182 But presentation suggests a layer of remove or of mediation that systematic 
philosophy would like to resist; it would prefer, Nancy suggests, to present itself in a 
form that it can conceive of as pure, such as mathematics.  
Thus the possibility of style is sheared from philosophy insofar as it considers 
itself to be pure philosophy or at least asymptotically to approach the possibility of 
purity. Henceforward the goal of philosophical writing (as embodied in Kant) will be an 
absence of style: 
This prose, itself compared to calculations, to columns of numbers—this prose somehow  
bound up with a mathematics that is debased and fallen into the empirical—constitutes a  
‘style’ apart from all style....Philosophy installs itself thus not as merely another tone— 
the tone of the shopkeeper as opposed to the tone of the superior, but as the absence of tone,  
the absence of the seductive, affect-laden voice... [comme l’absence de ton, l’absence de la 
voix séduisante et chargée d’affects communicatifs...]183  
 
The founding move which demarcates philosophy from literature as it brings both into 
being assigns (or relegates) beauty, fashion, and style to literature. That which cannot be 
philosophical is literary. Yet this means that there is no philosophy without the thought of 
style. This is the case, first, in the strong sense that presentation, Darstellung, always is or 
has a style, because the seeming absence of style is always itself a style. And second, in 
the sense that philosophy demarcates what is proper to it by way of the exclusion of style 
(if style is what is outside of philosophy, philosophy cannot present itself except insofar 
as it excludes style—and yet as we have seen, presentation always involves style no 
                                                
182 Nancy, Discourse of the Syncope, p. 69; Le Discourse de La Syncope, p. 79, emphasis in original.  
 
183 Ibid, p. 78; pp. 88-9. The language here is remarkably similar to the passage I cited from A.S. Byatt’s 
Possession in Chapter One, especially in the invocation of mathematics and particularly accounting in her 
example of dry academic prose: “There are readings...that are dutiful, readings that map and dissect, 
readings that hear a rustling of unheard words, that count grey little pronouns for pleasure or instruction 
and for a time do not hear golden or apples (Possession, p. 471).  
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matter how rigorously it attempts to avoid it, because we do not inhabit the serene non-
discursive realms of mathematics).  
 But Kant still wants and needs style even as he disavows it. Nancy pays close 
attention to claims about Kant’s writing, both by other writers and those by Kant himself. 
For Kant is a bad writer of legendary proportions. It is generally less remarked, however, 
that he contemplated his own bad writing quite extensively. What is more, his reflections 
(and apologia) as to the badness of his writing or his lack of talent recur throughout his 
oeuvre.  (“For Kant, wrote Kant, could not write,” says Avital Ronell .)184 Nancy gives us 
two readings of the badness of Kant’s writing, as articulated by Kant. First, Kant cannot 
write; he does not possess the talent for it, unlike others that he names, notably David 
Hume.  But second, contradicting this position, Nancy argues that Kant demonstrates in 
some of his early work that he is in fact eminently capable of style, of writing well. 
Hence his lack of talent must be read as a sort of renunciation, an ascetic moment in 
which he renounces style for the sake of philosophy. On the first reading, Kant cannot 
write well insofar as he is a philosopher, and to philosophize is to write badly. On the 
second reading, Kant deliberately gives up style insofar as style is popular, not eternal: it 
is fashion or flair, something external, wholly extraneous to content. In the preface to the 
second version of the Critique of Pure Reason, he notes that nothing would be changed in 
the system if his prose were to become more lovely or even more clear.  
Indeed, beautiful prose might even pose a distinct danger to philosophy itself. 
Nancy cites Kant on Rousseau: “It is a burden for the understanding to have taste.  I must 
read and reread Rousseau until the beauty of his expressions no longer disturbs me, and 
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Avital Ronell, Stupidity, p. 282.  
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only then can I first investigate him with reason.”185 Reason, Kant suggests here, cannot 
operate in the presence of taste or in the atmosphere conjured by a philosopher who has 
the misfortune to write so well. Reason is distracted by style, to the detriment of 
reasoning. If Kant writes so badly, he does so as a service, even as homage, to reason. 
Style, on the other hand, sweetens, and in so doing it distorts and infantilizes: Kant uses 
the image of honey to characterize “the aesthetic,” which is for children, as when 
someone rubs honey on the rim of a glass.186 Honey is not only sweet but slippery, 
misleading; it disguises the underlying taste. Moreover, such sweetness is only granted 
for children. And Kant, after all, was probably a child for as brief a period as possible.187 
The active and deliberate use of our reason, for Kant, is how we grow up, a goal toward 
which he famously urges us in his essay “What is Enlightenment?” as he insists upon the 
necessity of our “emergence from” our  “self-imposed nonage.”188  
 But insofar as Kant is barred from style by the demands of philosophy, a demand 
which is inaugurated in his own work, according to Nancy, style becomes a temptation: 
the law (of reason) creates the desire for it.  As Nancy writes, “elegance of style” 
becomes “at once desirable and suspect.”189 The temptation of philosophy is what it 
                                                
185 Cited in Nancy, Discourse of the Syncope, p. 58; Le Discourse de la Syncope, p. 68. The final line of 
the French translation of Kant that Nancy uses (trans. Kempf, Paris, Vrin 1969) is as follows: “Il me faut 
lire et relire Rousseau jusqu’à ce que la beauté de l’expresion ne me trouble plus; alors seulement, je puis 
le saisir avec la raison.” While “saisir” does denote to comprehend, to understand, or to grasp (as in to 
apprehend with the mind), it also denotes to seize or to grab or grasp physically, which would suggest that 
reason might be as easily distracted by its own (internal) violence as by an external sweetness.  
 
186 Ibid, p. 58; p. 69. 
 
187 The counter-example of Rousseau rather obviously suggests itself.  
 
188 Kant, Immanuel. “What is Enlightenment?” p. 1.  
 
189 Nancy, The Discourse of the Syncope,” p. 70; Le Discourse de la Syncope, p. 80.  
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created through its exclusion in its self-definition. For “Dichten or erdichten, ‘to poetize’ 
[or, ‘to fiction’] is to tap a source other than that of pure reason; or, rather, it is to disturb 
or pollute this source.”190 But it is pure reason itself, for Kant, that determines the form 
that the Critical philosophy assumes, its Darstellung. And furthermore, Kant in obeying 
the determinations of pure reason more rigorously than any of his predecessors is also 
forced into the role of the poet himself. In this role, he plays not only the philosopher but 
simultaneously the logodaedalus whose subject matter requires the creation of new 
words, the author whose writing, Nancy claims, for the first time in the history of 
philosophy conceives of itself as a work (and thus, a fortiori, as a work of art) and as 
such requires an author, a distinctive signature.  
Moreover, the fact that Darstellung—and hence, style—becomes an issue for 
philosophy with Kant is not only bound up with the project of systematic philosophy nor 
the exhaustive investigation of pure reason that begins with the first Critique. The 
simultaneous production of philosophy and literature that Nancy asserts in Discourse of 
the Syncope is specifically linked to the entire project of transcendental idealism, such 
that “literature will only come to be determined as fiction from the point of view of the 
philosophy that determines the ideal beyond the limits of possible experience.”191 I am 
not sure that I follow Nancy here in his apparent designation of Kant’s “ideal” as things-
in-themselves. It is not as though he is hostile to phenomenal objects, after all. And in 
fact one could plausibly argue that his demarcation of the limits of knowledge along the 
axis of the noumenal/phenomenal split actually serves to redirect philosophical 
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191 Ibid., p. 106; p. 116, emphasis in original.  
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investigation into the realms that are proper to it, that is to say, the human categories of 
experience and forms of intuition themselves and what they yield.192  Nonetheless, Kant 
does strive toward a mathematical purity, as expressed in the search for synthetic a priori 
propositions, that makes Nancy’s characterization of his ideal as that which lies beyond 
human experience explicable and that lands any question of discursive presentation 
firmly in the realm of experience.   
 Nancy uses the image of the syncope to describe the moment of the co-production 
of literature and philosophy from within philosophy’s investigation of its self-
presentation. The word “syncope” is not often used in English, although it exists and 
denotes two of the same phenomena as its more common French counterpart: first, in 
medical terminology, fainting or heart failure; and second, in the realm of grammar, to 
indicate the omission of a letter from the middle of a word. And we more commonly use 
its musical sense—in English we say “syncopation”—to denote the shift of emphasis or 
stress in a musical measure or piece. Nancy is also playing on the multiple meanings of 
the idiomatic expression avoir une syncope, which corresponds to the first definition I 
gave (fainting, heart attack, blacking out) but also works colloquially, “as when someone 
says, ‘I almost had a heart attack when I heard (...)!’”193  
 Nancy writes, “Philosophy syncopates its own foundation; that is how it forms 
itself [La philosophie syncope son propre fond: c’est ainsi qu’elle se forme].”194 Anton 
                                                
192 This argument is substantially weakened if one tends to read, as I do, Kant’s postulates of practical 
reason in the second Critique as an attempt to sneak back into the game of trying to know or at least say 
something (under the guise of extrapolating necessary postulates) about transcendental objects, but in the 
context of the present quotation, Nancy is primarily dealing with the first Critique.  
 
193 Anton, “Kant in Stereo,” Discourse of the Syncope, p. xvii.  
 
194 Nancy, The Discourse of the Syncope,” p. 70; Le Discourse de la Syncope, p. 80. 
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glosses the musical sense of syncope as “indicating an interruption in the flow of a 
musical line” and associates it with jazz. He aligns it with all of the other senses of the 
term, the omission of a word, the faint or black-out in which consciousness is 
momentarily suspended, the heart skipping a beat. But musical syncopation, which this 
gloss does not convey, does not indicate an omission. Nothing is left out of a syncopated 
measure. It is a shift of emphasis rather than an absence or an omission. And syncopation 
is eminently stylish, precisely in the sense of fashionable, the popular style that Kant 
sought to avoid.  It transforms the steady beat of a one two three four march into a one 
and (two) and (three) and (four) and.  Syncopation in this sense differs from the rest in 
that it does not, like the heart, like the truncated word, skip a beat. So what does it mean 
for the figure of the syncope to preside over Nancy’s claim about philosophy’s 
simultaneous production of itself and of literature? What does it mean to say that 
philosophy syncopates itself?  In the most immediate sense, the syncope here refers to the 
philosophy/literature production and division that occurs when philosophy, with Kant, 
confronts the question of its necessary Darstellung, which excludes and produces a 
problematic and ongoing relation to and preoccupation with Dichtung. But it also means 
that philosophy begins with a skipped beat, or else, highlighting the musical inflection, 
with a gesture that is figured rhythmically, with a shift of emphasis that is inevitably 
stylish.  
 The implications of Nancy’s argument for my reading of Irigaray’s style are 
significant. His analysis, first of all, provides a compelling argument for why 
experimental writers like Irigaray, Derrida—as well as figures like Nietzsche and 
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Kierkegaard—have been so threatening to philosophy’s self-conception that they have 
often been excluded from its ranks. Far easier, then, to simply categorize Irigaray (whose 
corpus is almost exclusively composed of readings of philosophers whose status within 
the discipline is not in question) as a feminist theorist or a psychoanalyst, at a 
comfortable distance from philosophy. For self-conscious reflection on philosophy’s style 
makes philosophy tremble; as Nancy remarks a number of times, the presentation of 
philosophy is fragile.  Nancy makes us see that even (or especially) Kant—“the worst 
writer in the history of philosophy”— knew, at some level, that the absence of style, 
however desirable, was impossible: that philosophy would, however regrettably, be 
forever involved with or contaminated by Dichtung.195 But the pretense must be not only 
maintained, but believed, in order to secure philosophy’s self-conception and to cover 
over the problem of the syncope. If philosophical style is ever to be praised, it should be 
only in terms of lucidity, clarity, or intelligibility. To modify George Orwell, good 
philosophy should be like a window pane.196 
I would like, then, to turn here to what I read as Irigaray’s theorization of the 
unintelligible in “Toute Théorie du Sujet.” While I am not prepared to follow Weed’s 
declaration that Irigaray’s entire project can or must be understood through a 
consideration of her style, I do read that style as enacting a forcible crippling of any 
possible response in terms of more traditional philosophical modes of discourse.197  As 
such, it seems to me that Irigaray has something specific to teach her reader about the 
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value and the valorization of the unintelligible. This conviction arises as well from my 
own examination of a question that I find it impossible not to pose to myself when 
reading Irigaray: what does it mean that what I find to be her most incisive and important 
writing is by far the most oblique, the most obscure? And that her later work, which in 
some sense “drops” the style of Speculum, Ce Sexe, and Amante marine (although that is 
a most inadequate formulation, presuming as it does the possibility of an absence of 
style), is far more simplistic and even in some ways—as Toril Moi points out with 
reference to Je, tu, nous—appallingly dystopian?198  
 
 
IV. Remaining with the rebus: Irigaray on Freud’s “two syntaxes” 
 Reading “Toute Théorie du Sujet” requires at least a passing acquaintance with 
Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams. Irigaray does not cite it directly, but its underlying 
principles are clearly at issue. To be clear, the sketch of Freud I give here is not mine. It 
is intended only to be faithful to, not to concur with, the version of Freud that Irigaray 
evokes within “Toute Théorie du Sujet.” For indeed there are convincing readings of 
Freud and even passages from the Interpretation of Dreams itself that would suggest that 
Irigaray’s assertion that Freud reduces the manifest to the latent is itself overly reductive, 
missing the crucial importance of the dream-work itself and dramatically overplaying the 
                                                
198 Toril Moi, Simone de Beauvoir: The Making of an Intellectual Woman, p. 309, note 51. Irigaray, I 
should note, insists that there is no break between her earlier and later work (see, for instance, Je, tu, nous, 
p. 82), although many scholars disagree and I would argue that the stylistic shift is too significant to ignore, 
even if many of her concerns remain the same.  
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extent to which the latent dream-thought is Freud’s ultimate goal.199 Nevertheless, an 
explication of Freud’s manifest/latent distinction charitable to Irigaray’s reading is crucial 
for an understanding of her style.  
Upon concluding the lengthy literature review with which he commences the 
book, Freud aligns himself with at least one “obscure feeling” that has guided “lay 
opinion” on the interpretation of dreams since antiquity: that “every dream has a 
meaning, though a hidden one, that dreams are designed to take the place of some other 
process of thought, and that we have only to undo the substitution correctly in order to 
arrive at this hidden meaning.”200 Moving beyond lay opinion, working out his own 
theory of interpretation through recourse to analysis of his own and others’ dreams, he 
asserts that we “must make a contrast between the manifest and the latent content of 
dreams.”201 The manifest content is what the layperson would consider to be the dream 
itself, the often fragmented, seemingly incoherent images, events, narratives, words and 
feelings that the dreamer recalls upon waking. The latent content— the repressed dream-
thoughts, which when uncovered are expressible in ordinary, grammatical language—is 
that which lies beneath the manifest and that which Freud seeks and obviously privileges, 
                                                
199 See in particular Samuel Weber, The Legend of Freud, especially the chapter “The Meaning of the 
Thallus.” Weber argues persuasively that it is not the latent meaning of the dream that is its “essence,” in 
Freud’s view; rather, it is the dream-work itself. He reads Freud as already having stated what Irigaray 
wishes he would acknowledge: that “the dream works in and through a medium that is structurally 
irreducible to the predicative grammar of conscious thought.” (p. 103) In addition, he cites a clarifying 
remark that Freud added to the sixth book of the Interpretation of Dreams in 1925 in order to correct the 
mistake that analysts had begun to make in overvaluing the latent dream-thoughts: “They seek to find the 
essence of dreams in their latent content and in so doing they overlook the distinction between the latent 
dream-thoughts and the dream-work.  At bottom, dreams are nothing other than a particular form of 
thinking....It is the dream-work that creates the form, and it alone is the essence of dreaming—the 
explanation of its peculiar nature.” (cited in Weber, p. 102)  
 
200 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 96.  
 
201 Ibid., p. 135.  
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describing the “latent content....which is of far greater significance than their manifest 
one.”202  For there is an arbitrary aspect, in Freud’s view, to the manifest content, which 
is drawn from recent events, while the latent is connected with the material from one’s 
childhood. “If these chains of thought had been absent,” he remarks in connection with 
the manifest content of his famous dream of the botanical monograph, “others would no 
doubt have been selected.” Indeed, “the dream would simply have been different.”203 The 
latent meaning of the dream, however, would have remained the same.  
 Freud specifically disavows the language of “keys” and the so-called “decoding” 
method [“Chiffriermethode”] of dream interpretation, in which a dream-book could 
provide an impersonal and universal one-to-one correspondence between two concepts or 
symbols such that one could be “translated” into the other. For the interpretation of 
dreams is intensely personal and idiosyncratic, and “we are not in general in a position to 
interpret another person’s dream unless he is prepared to communicate to us the 
unconscious thoughts that lie behind its content.”204 As Freud proclaims at the outset of 
his magisterial chapter on the “dream-work” (the passage is important for understanding 
Irigaray’s commentary and so I quote it at length), 
 It is from these dream-thoughts and not from a dream’s manifest content that we  
 disentangle its meaning.  We are thus presented with a new task which had no previous 
 existence: the task, that is, of investigating the relations between the manifest content of 
 dreams and the latent dream-thoughts, and of tracing out the processes by which the  
 latter have been changed into the former. 
  The dream-thoughts and the dream-content are presented to us like two versions 
 of the same subject-matter in two different languages. Or more properly, the dream- 
 content seems like a transcript of the dream-thoughts into another mode of expression, 
 whose characters and syntactic laws it is our business to discover by comparing the 
 original and the translation. [Traumgedanken und Trauminhalt liegen vor uns wie zwei 
Darstellungen desselben Inhaltes in zwei verschiedenen Sprachen, oder besser gesagt,  
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204 Ibid., pp. 97-98, 241; Die Traumdeutung, p. 102, Gessamelte Werke, Volumes II/III.  
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der Trauminhalt erscheint uns als eine Übertragung der Traumgedanken in eine andere  
Ausdrucksweise, deren Zeichen und Fügungsgesetze wir durch die Vergleichung von  
Original und Übersetzung kennen lernen sollen.]The dream-thoughts are immediately 
comprehensible, as soon as we have learnt them.  The dream-content, on the other hand, is 
expressed as it were in a pictographic script, the characters of which have to be transposed 
individually into the language of the dream-thoughts.  If we attempted to read these  
characters according to their pictorial value instead of according to their symbolic relation,  
we should clearly be led into error.  Suppose I have a picture puzzle, a rebus, in front of me.  
 It depicts a house with a boat on its roof, a single letter of the alphabet, the figure of a  
 running man whose head has been conjured away, and so on.  Now I might be misled into 
 raising objections and declaring that the picture as a whole and its component parts are 
 nonsensical.  A boat has no business to be on the roof of a house, and a headless man  
 cannot run.  Moreover, the man is bigger than the house; and if the whole picture is 
 intended to represent a landscape, letters of the alphabet are out of place in it since such 
 objects do not occur in nature.  But obviously we can only form a proper judgment of the 
 rebus if we put aside criticisms such as these of the whole composition and its parts and  
 if, instead, we try to replace each separate element by a syllable or word that can be  
 represented by that element in some way or other.  The words which are put together in 
 this way are no longer nonsensical but may form a poetical phrase of the greatest beauty  
 and significance.  A dream is a picture-puzzle of this sort and our predecessors in the 
 field of dream-interpretation have made the mistake of treating the rebus as a pictorial 
 composition: and as such it has seemed to them nonsensical and worthless.205 
 
Freud is correct to distinguish between the “decoding” method and this method of 
“translating” from the “language” of the (manifest) dream-content to the (latent) dream-
thoughts. The metaphor of translation, nonetheless, remains intact, and Freud uses a form 
of the same word in both instances (the verb übersetzen in the decoding passage, the noun 
Übersetzung in the passage cited above). He is, as such, still involved in a type of 
decoding, but it is a question of translation not from invariant symbol to symbol, but 
between two languages (Sprachen), or more aptly, as Irigaray puts it, between “two 
syntaxes.”  
 Freud presents these zwei Sprachen in some sense as distinct yet equal, each 
possessing their own peculiar “characters and syntactic laws” which must be uncovered 
and examined.  Interestingly, the manifest, which Freud declares earlier to be less 
significant, is represented by the original language, whereas the crucial latent material is 
the translation. Yet the values that generally attach to such a distinction, in which the 
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original is primary and the translation secondary, do not apply here except 
chronologically, as the original, in this instance, is in service of the translation. The less-
important or arbitrary manifest is the original only insofar as it is phenomenologically 
prior in the experience of the dreamer. Translation, here, is always a re-translation. For in 
fact, even chronologically speaking, the latent dream-thoughts which are at issue are, in 
Freud’s view, chronologically prior, and give rise to the manifest. The manifest is the 
original inasmuch as it is the only text, the only language of the dream, to which the 
dreamer and the analyst already have access.  The rebus or picture-puzzle, once decoded 
through free association and analysis, will yield up the “true” original, artfully scrambled 
and fragmented so as to evade the censor in the process of becoming the “apparent” 
original. What was unintelligible or even ludicrous—a running headless man, a boat on 
the roof of a house—will resolve into a conscious, grammatical, and comprehensible 
dream-thought.  
In “Toute Théorie du Sujet,” as I read her, Irigaray asks: why must the rebus be 
decoded? Why not remain, as it were, with this enigmatic picture-puzzle? Why embark 
upon this act of (re)-translation? Why must the manifest be disinterred, its enigmatic 
figures and the riddles of its syntax forced into another, more familiar idiom? For in 
Irigaray’s view, “the fact that the dream can be interpreted only as a ‘rebus’ should have 
persuaded the ‘reader’ to turn it in all directions and positions, and not favor one type of 
inscription that would already prescribe a meaning to it.”206 And, I would add, why must 
the manifest be considered so arbitrary and replaceable, even if never meaning-less? 
Irigaray writes of a dreamer for whom it is not “enough for him to be entranced, let us 
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say, by a double syntax, without claiming to regulate the second by the standard of 
representation, of re-presentation, of the first. [S’il lui suffisait d’etre séduit, disons, par 
une double syntaxe sans prétendre régler la seconde à l’étalon de la représentation, re-
présentation, de la première.]”207 The translation here obscures the sexual metaphor; it is 
not simply a question of the dreamer’s entrancement, but seduction. A failed seduction, in 
fact: an inability to be seduced by the contours and the content of the dream itself. For it 
is not enough for him (one might speculate that this child-dreamer is a young Freud, for 
elsewhere in the essay Irigaray calls him “l’homme-Freud,” the man-Freud) to dwell with 
the “figure that is present for him,” the dream as it presents itself to him, but must 
regulate it, reduce it, to a form that is already acceptable, recognizable, intelligible 
according to conscious standards of transmissible language, “so that order, good 
‘conscious’ order, may prevail.”208  
To paint with a broad brush for a moment, Irigaray’s great theme—sexual 
difference—is and has always been the question of the two. How are there to be two 
differing subjects, male and female, such that the latter is not simply reduced in some 
way to what Irigaray calls the economy of the Same, reduced to the former or its relation 
to the former, as its mirror, its lacking other that shores up its own self-identical value? 
Her analysis of the two syntaxes relies upon precisely the same logic, with the additional 
caveat that, as indicated by a barbed phrase—“he will make the unconscious into a 
property of his language”209—she is reading a number of explicitly Lacanian views back 
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into Freud, namely the unconscious as structured like a language and the masculine 
nature of the economy of signification.210 Discourse, here, as she discovers as well in her 
analyses of/“flings” with the philosophers, is coded as inescapably masculine. As a 
woman, in the Lacanian framework that Irigaray inherits, one cannot speak, or only, in 
Grace Jantzen’s striking phrase, as a man “in drag.”211 
As in her work on female subjectivity (to which the production of a feminine 
language is essential), Irigaray’s primary task is to insist on the necessity that there be 
two subjects, not one.  As Margaret Whitford points out, in Irigaray’s view, this state of 
affairs is not yet possible; this is what she is working toward, attempting to alter the 
prevailing cultural imaginary to enable the conditions of the possibility of the being of 
two sexually different subjects. This, Whitford notes, is why she writes in a utopian mode 
that is often misrecognized as essentialist, since it is impossible to say what the being of 
the female subject, or language, will be; it is yet to come.  Only with the advent of such 
an imaginary will a woman be able to say, and hear: “I stop in front of you as in front of 
an other irreducible to me: in body and in intellect, in exteriority and in interiority.”212 
The first step toward what Irigaray later terms this “horizontal transcendence,” the 
construction of a space between two mutually loving subjects that is fundamentally non-
hierarchical, must of necessity be the recognition of the irreducibility of the two to the 
one.  
                                                
210 On the latter point, see Lacan’s twentieth seminar, Encore, on female sexuality, and Irigaray’s stinging 
response, “Così Fan Tutti,” in This Sex Which Is Not One.  
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Returning to Freud with this insight, what are its implications for Irigaray’s 
reading of the two syntaxes? The theorization—even the existence!—of woman qua 
woman in Irigaray’s terms may not yet be possible. But the double syntaxes of the 
manifest and the latent are available to be studied with no need for an appeal to an 
unknowable utopian future. Let us look closely at Irigaray’s most sustained attention to 
the issue of the two syntaxes: 
 Now, let us imagine—for what else is there to do when rereading Freud but imagine a  
response, or else admit one’s inability to survey such an imagination—let us imagine  
that man (Freud in the event) had discovered that the rarest thing—the most exciting as  
well as the most scientifically rigorous, the most faithful to factual materiality and the most 
historically curative—would be to articulate directly, without catacombs, what we are  
calling these two syntaxes. Irreducible in their strangeness and eccentricity one to the  
other.  Coming out of different times, places, logics, ‘representations,’ and economies.  In  
fact, of course, these terms cannot fittingly be designated by the number ‘two’ and the  
adjective ‘different,’ if only because they are not susceptible to com-parison.  To use such  
terms serves only to reiterate a movement begun long since, that is, the movement to speak  
of the ‘other’ in a language already systematized by/for the same.  Their distribution and 
demarcation and articulation necessitate operations as yet nonexistent, whose complexity  
and subtlety can only be guessed at without prejudicing the results.  Without a teleology  
already in operation somewhere.  But had the man Freud preferred the play, or even the clash,  
of those two economies rather than their disposition in hierarchical stages by means of one  
barrier (or two), one censorship (or two), then perhaps he would not finally have cracked his  
head against all that remains irreducibly ‘obscure’ to himself in his speculations.  Against the  
non-visible, therefore not theorizable nature of woman’s sex and pleasure.  Whatever the 
explorations he attempts and which tempt him concerning this ‘dark continent,’ he always  
refers back to some still blind and incomprehensible ‘horizon’ of investigation.  And there, in  
what he recognizes as outside the range [hors-jeu] of his systematic prospecting (beyond the  
self? [hors-je?]) Freud is in fact indicating a way off the historico-transcendental stage, at the  
very moment when his theory and his practice are perpetuating, in the mode of enunciation and  
the drama of enunciating, that very same stage, which we may now call the hysterico-
transcendental.  Announcing by this re-mark, by this effect of repetition—re-petitio principii— 
of recapitulation and, without his knowledge, of mimicry, that his breath is privileged. And he  
is out of breath.213  
 
Freud, Irigaray suggests, need not have ignored the irreducibility of the manifest to the 
latent. Indeed, he was peculiarly positioned to have seen the former as more and 
otherwise than instrumental in understanding the latter. For Freud—unlike the vast 
majority of the philosophers Irigaray reads—understands that there is an “hors-jeu,” an 
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off-sides. He sees, indeed, has in a sense (re)-‘discovered’ what Irigaray, in quite another 
context, calls “that other scene, off-stage, that [consciousness] finds cryptic,” thus 
making visible the fact of staging, the existence of the stage, and the conditions of the 
possibility of representing something upon it.214 Irigaray’s play on words—“hors-jeu” 
and “hors-je”—dramatizes the symmetry of the ways in which Freud’s ‘discovery’ of the 
unconscious as another stage, realm, or process that makes possible the coherence of 
conscious life concurrently makes visible the same operation in the making of the 
seemingly self-contained autonomous subject (of philosophy or of everyday waking 
speech and life).  “Hors-je” is not merely beyond the self, beyond the subject’s self-
knowledge, but outside it, outside the bounds of the known and knowable; it implies a 
necessary re-fashioning of the conception of subjectivity, the installation, so to speak, of 
radically new epistemological parameters. For there is suddenly far more to be known 
and, simultaneously, much less that is or can be. The operations which create the sense of 
coherence in the waking self are made visible, as are those which create this sense in the 
realms of scientific inquiry and in discourse itself.  
What Irigaray laments, then, is that Freud did not follow this insight to what she 
considers its logical and radical implications.  Instead of reduplicating the logic of the 
same, succumbing to the drive to reduce the unknown to the familiar (against which 
Nietzsche, one might recall, warns), he could have “preferred the play, or even the clash, 
of those two economies rather than their disposition in hierarchical stages.” Instead, he 
seeks to  “translate” the manifest text of the dream—or the hysteric’s symptom—into the 
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familiar, intelligible order of everyday language.215 Freud, in her view, considers the 
extraction of the repressed dream-thought (the latent content) to be the revelation of the 
most radical alterity that resides within the psyche, the divination of the truly repressed 
material that could not escape the censors, as opposed to the relatively more harmless 
manifest content. But for Irigaray, this is a gross misunderstanding.  
In a certain sense, the question is, whose or which alterity is—crudely put—more 
other? Is it what consciousness cannot face, a question of content, a damning thought or 
affect that the conscious mind cannot stand to confront? Or is it, rather, a question of 
style? Irigaray suggests that it is far more challenging for “l’homme Freud” to 
acknowledge the possibility of a different order that would not be reducible to the same. 
This is not to say that Freud does not appreciate either the elegance or the strangeness of 
the manifest dream-content. Rather, it is the instrumental quality of Freud’s attitude 
toward the manifest that bothers Irigaray, his conviction that despite the fact that “the 
productions of the dream-work...are not made with the intention of being understood,” 
nevertheless they “present no greater difficulties to their translators than do the ancient 
hieroglyphic scripts to those who seek to read them.”216 Once the translation has been 
made, the content discovered, the specificity of the manifest content is no longer at issue.   
Freud, Irigaray suggests, in “discovering” the unconscious, has immediately 
repressed it in the full force of its alterity, such that the form in which the most 
scandalous revelations of the unconscious brought to consciousness is familiar, even if 
the content does not fail to shock. Irigaray’s anger at Freud is palpable, and not without 
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good reason. In positing this other, inscrutable language, this opaque picture-puzzle, as a 
legitimate field of scientific inquiry, in taking seriously the seemingly nonsensical 
products of condensation and displacement (Freud), metaphor and metonymy (Lacan’s 
gloss), Freud and his heirs come so very close to theorizing an alternate way of speaking 
that not only make visible the conditions of coherent speech but attend carefully to those 
alternate pathways themselves. How much more of a betrayal, then, when this other 
language turns out to be in demand only for what it can yield up that conforms to the 
standards of coherence, for what can be tidily ordered into a grammatical sentence. 
Irigaray prompts us to ask: why not continue to examine the picture-puzzle, turn it around 
and around? Why are we so bent upon decoding? What happens if we consider that the 
syntax of the manifest is in fact irreducible to the latent? That something is lost in this 
“translation”? 
The stakes of this question depend on Irigaray’s conviction—borne out as well in 
her readings of canonical Western philosophical texts—that Lacan was, however 
regrettably, correct when he famously claimed in his twentieth seminar, Encore, that 
woman cannot speak. And with dismal consequences, given that in his view, "the nature 
of things," reality, the world," is precisely contiguous with the "nature of words."217 We 
are all always already mediated and produced by language; indeed, language is 
constitutive of subjectivity. "The signifier," Lacan maintains, "is first and foremost 
imperative.....There's no such thing as a prediscursive reality.  Every reality is founded 
and defined by a discourse."218  But woman’s place in discourse, for Lacan, is to serve as 
                                                
217 Jacques Lacan, “God and Woman’s Jouissance,” Encore, p. 73; “Dieu et la Jouissance de la Femme,” 
Encore, p. 68.  
 
218 Lacan, "The function of the written," Encore, p. 32; “La Fonction de l’Écrit,” Encore, p. 33. 
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the “pas-toute,” the “not-whole” or “not-all.” Woman is precisely that which escapes 
discourse; she is “la femme,” barred from the symbolic. As such, she is closer to the real, 
and in Encore he suggests that she is possessed of a jouissance “beyond the phallus” 
which cannot be spoken and of which she can know nothing but that it occurs 
(arriver).219 According to Lacan, 
A woman can but be excluded [Il n’y a de femme qu’exclue] by the nature of things, which  
is the nature of words, and it must be said that if there is something that women themselves  
complain about enough for the time being, that’s it.  It’s just that they don’t know what  
they’re saying – that’s the whole difference between them and me.220 
 
But for Lacan, of course, the "nature of words" is always already given.  Language is the 
medium within which we are all caught; there is only one language, and it is the domain 
of the masculine.  
Furthermore, as Irigaray points out, as a consequence of that assumption, there is 
only one sex.  For woman is at issue, in Encore, only as the pas-toute, never in her own 
right.  Irigaray writes: 
 Psychoanalytic discourse on female sexuality is the discourse of truth. A discourse that 
 tells the truth about the logic of truth: namely, that the feminine occurs only within  
 models and laws devised by male subjects. Which implies that there are not really two 
 sexes, but only one.  A single practice and representation of the sexual.221 
 
Irigaray counters the assertion that there is only one discourse with the question, whose 
discourse? What logic, whose logic, is at work within the construction and functioning of 
such a discourse?  The designation of woman as the pas-toute, she points out, functions 
to uphold the singularity of discourse constituted as phallic or masculine.  For wholeness 
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implies unity, singularity, one-ness. Woman, in this economy, functions as an image of 
lack where man is whole, the figure of absence that shores up and reflects back the 
wholeness of male identity, figured most prominently in the phallus.  Femininity is 
written out of the signifying economy, and with dire consequences in a system in which 
subjectivity is predicated on the ability to speak.  For having circumscribed the feminine 
position in such an economy, the ability to signify—which means, of course, to speak 
about women, who cannot speak for themselves—falls wholly on the masculine side. 
And once having asserted the singularity of discourse—there is only one language, there 
is only one sex—and denied the possibility of a prediscursive reality, the writing out of 
the feminine position is concealed. Commenting on this concealment, Irigaray remarks, 
“The question whether, in his logic, they can articulate anything at all, whether they can 
be heard, is not even raised. For raising it would mean granting that there may be some 
other logic, and one that upsets his own.  That is, a logic that challenges mastery.”222 Yet, 
and here again I invoke Whitford’s insistence on Irigaray’s utopianism, this other logic, 
this feminine language and subjectivity, is yet to come.  At present, in her view, woman 
is figured as the unconscious, or on the side of the Lacanian real, that which is outside of 
consciousness and/or outside of language.   
As facile as it might sound, psychoanalysis can be so much more interesting than 
philosophy to anyone who is concerned with the repressed feminine simply because it so 
interests itself in repression. Consider Irigaray’s analysis of Plato’s allegory of the cave, 
in which she reads the origin story of philosophy as founded upon the repression of the 
feminine, the desire to exit the cave/womb, to cast off the distortions of a shadowy 
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subterranean metaphysics and see things as they truly are, in the light of the singular 
Sun/Father. In this story, the operation of such repression has been so thoroughgoing as 
to be nearly imperceptible. The cave is disavowed, covered over, its inhabitants brought 
into the light. In contrast, psychoanalysis not only seeks to make visible what has been 
covered over, but it has from its inception, in Freud and Breuer’s studies of female 
hysterics, realized the alliance or the alignment—however problematic from any number 
of feminist standpoints—of the unconscious with the feminine. It was their treatment 
with the cathartic method, discharging the hysterical somatic symptoms through speech, 
that led directly to Freud’s transfer of this technique to the analysis of dreams, treating 
them as symptoms.  
Yet as Irigaray and many others have noted, the “place” of the unconscious is 
hardly a privileged site from which to speak, let alone in which to locate femininity. And 
as the example of the drive to translate the manifest (the unintelligible, but vocal 
representative of the unconscious) into the latent (the intelligible) demonstrates, even a 
discipline devoted to “that other scene, off-stage” will force seeming non-sense into sense 
at all costs. Sarah Kofman, who is deeply critical of Irigaray’s reading of Freud but on 
this point, I think, would be a fellow traveler, writes that “the analytic treatment cannot 
be seen as a simple restitution of women’s right to speech; it is also an attempt to ‘tear’ 
from them their secret, to make them ‘admit’ or ‘confess,’—in short, an attempt not to 
give them speech but to extort speech from them.” Moreover, “the remedy it [analysis] 
offers is at the same time a poison, since it can cure women only by contaminating them, 
by forcing them to ‘collaborate,’ to espouse the viewpoint of the other, of men, who are 
supposed to possess truth.  The psychoanalytic solution restores speech to woman only 
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the better to rob her of it, the better to subordinate it to that of the master.”223 Both 
Kofman and Irigaray are aware of the strategic value (however ultimately problematic) of 
the stature of the “enigmatic woman,” silent, self-sufficient, self-contained. For to rupture 
that silence would be to collude with the analyst, to speak in (a) language that would 
always already be his.  
Hence Irigaray is uninterested in reifying the mapping of the feminine onto the 
unconscious, in merely affirming that identification. She is utterly aware of the delicate 
lineaments of this double bind, such that to be truly feminine is to be silent and to speak 
in a way that is understood is to assume, so to speak, the masculine position. It is in the 
face of this double bind that her critique of Freud’s two syntaxes assumes its full force.  
Irigaray asks us to consider the manifest—the dream itself, the symptom itself, Irma’s 
injection, the smell of burnt pudding—and to acknowledge that this unconscious style 
constitutes another order in and of itself, that it is not simply the Other of the same. The 
manifest need not resolve into the latent. It exists and can be contemplated on its own 
terms.  Properly understood, the disavowal of the necessity of “translating” the manifest, 
the insistence on maintaining the rebus in all its unintelligibility, with running headless 
men and boats on the roofs of houses, whether or not they have any business there, 
ruptures the carefully curated illusion that there is only one language, only one discourse.  
It forces a confrontation with the two syntaxes qua two, forces the recognition that they 
are discrete, irreducible one to the other.  
 And this unintelligible unconscious style can be written as well as dreamed or 
read in symptomatic flesh, in “ellipses and eclipses that deconstruct the logical grid of the 
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reader-writer, drive him out of his mind, trouble his vision to the point of incurable 
diplopia at least. Overthrow [Bouleverser] syntax by suspending its eternally teleological 
order....”224 One can induce, precisely, diplopia. Seeing, literally, double. Seeing the two 
rather than the one. Irigaray writes: 
It is still better to speak only in riddles, allusions, hints, parables.  Even if asked to clarify a  
few points.  Even if people plead that they just don’t understand. [Si on vous assure que l’on 
n’y comprend rien.] After all, they never have understood.  So why not double the misprision 
[méprise] to the limits of exasperation? Until the ear tunes into another music, the voice starts  
to sing again, the very gaze stops squinting over the signs of auto-representation and 
(re)production no longer inevitably amounts to the same and returns to the same forms, with  
minor variations.225 
 
Such riddling allusiveness or elusiveness is not a matter of careless wordplay; to the 
contrary, it demands precision, “a patient exactitude [une patiente rigeur].”226 In the next 
and final section of this chapter, I will consider the effects of this version of 
unintelligibility. 
 
 
V. Rigorous unintelligibility 
“Exactitude” here is “rigeur,” rigor. And it is this small expression that leads me 
to ask: what would it mean to be rigorously unintelligible? There are a number of 
options. First, reading rigor as systematicity or completeness, it would mean to be in no 
way understood, to seal off the possibility of comprehensibility, of any transmission of 
meaning. To search for a metaphor, it would be as if to confront a reader with a 
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manuscript in an as yet undiscovered alphabet.  This is precisely what Elizabeth Weed 
claims that Irigaray does not do; she does not “bar” intelligibility, says Weed, but 
“problematizes” it.227 And I would concur with Weed insofar as I cannot see Irigaray 
involved in a project of a systematic barring of comprehensibility, for she is surpassed 
perhaps only by Kierkegaard in her hatred of systematicity.  
A second possibility: we could read rigor, here, as a question of honesty about the 
parameters of the possibility of being understood, and an explicit treatment of who will 
be equipped (not) to read and to understand. This is the move that Cixous makes in her 
book of dreams when she sets forth the criteria for their legibility. She outlines the 
protocols of the text, announces the possibility of analysis, if only the proper 
accompanying material were made available, and then declines to provide such material. 
This text admits of intelligibility, she says, but not, dear reader, by you. Furthermore, 
lacking this material, any foray into interpretation will almost necessarily fail, but the 
option to attempt it remains.  And this, too, is not precisely Irigaray’s rhetorical move, 
although like Cixous she is interested in the question of who can read what, and how.  
Irigaray presents us with a rigorous unintelligibility in yet a third manner.  Having 
argued against Freud’s drive to reduce the “unconscious style” of the manifest content of 
a dream to a readily intelligible conscious order, she makes it apparent that she is by no 
means to be read in such a way.  If you attempt to “translate” Irigaray’s writing ‘back’ 
into some pre-existing philosophical idiom— or even into the protocols of anything that 
passes for easily legible coherent writing—then, put strongly, you betray it. Rigor, here, 
would not be systematicity, nor would it be clarity; it would be, curiously enough, a 
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question of force. Forcing the reader into the sort of merging that she performs with 
Plato, Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan, and a host of others. This is not to say that her work 
absolutely resists such “translation,” as the abundance of critical studies on her work 
attest, or even to say that it “lacks” content, that it is, so to speak, all style. It is to say that 
it resists such translation with a scrupulous thoroughness, that she is thoroughly and 
deliberately bewildering, that she fosters méconnaissance at the very moment when, 
precisely, connaissance (rather than savoir) is sought, knowledge in the sense of 
acquaintance with something that would already be familiar. In making visible the 
absolute inadequacy of retranslating her into what passes for philosophical discourse, she 
submits the reader to precisely the experience that she writes against: the condition of 
being unable to speak, save in one idiom, an idiom that is not your own.   
Others have read Irigaray’s inhabiting of the texts of others as a deconstructive 
strategy, to show up the gaps, the silences, the places where the feminine has been 
repressed. And this is certainly the case, but misses, I think a crucial dimension of the 
violence of Irigaray’s own textual strategies. I quoted Elizabeth Weed above as claiming 
that Irigaray does not write on Heidegger, but writes Heidegger.  I would push this claim 
further: Irigaray does not only write Heidegger; she makes Heidegger write Irigaray. Her 
insistence, in her reading of Freud, upon lingering with the exposition of this other order 
of meaning, remaining with the manifest dream, the symptom itself, and insisting upon its 
preservation, warn eloquently against submitting her own work to such a re-translation.   
For in the wake of reading Irigaray’s work—and here I will make a claim that I freely 
admit lacks meaning unless one concedes that there is an affective dimension to 
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philosophical writing, and that a responsible reader should attend to it—you should feel 
confined, speechless, forcibly rendered silent.   
 
 
 A common objection against work like Irigaray’s is that it is designed to exclude. 
Such writing, this argument goes, does not make sense without at least ten years of 
reading, without thinking—at minimum—in French and German and English, without an 
overly developed appreciation for wordplay and punning, and even then it is like splitting 
rock to actually get to the point.  All of these things I freely confess to be the case. 
Irigaray and such authors require their readers to have done their homework, and they 
require, too, an extraordinary amount of patience, especially in the instance that one 
wishes them to yield up a summary, a list of points, something more concrete or 
rewarding to the scholarly temperament than a vague sense or a feeling, a heightened 
attentiveness to certain words, a hunch. My contention is that it is precisely these 
affective cues that suggest that it is thoroughly worth examining why such texts alienate, 
remaining in the effect of that alienation and allowing oneself to be simultaneously 
affected and critically attentive to such a response. As such, in the next chapter, I will 
move on from Irigaray’s theorization of unintelligibility to develop the argument I have 
begun to make in this chapter’s final section through a reading of one of her stylistically 
experimental essays from Speculum, “La Mystérique.”  In examining “La Mystérique,” I 
wish to linger with and in the effects of Irigaray’s style in staging a reading of this essay 
that abandons the attempt to decipher its latent meaning and confines itself to the 
manifest text.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Unintelligibility’s Effects and Affects 
 
 
“There is no point in doing philosophy if it isn’t to try to accompany this exhaustion of discourse to its 
limit.” –Jean-Luc Nancy, The Discourse of the Syncope: Logodaedalus 
 
 
“These critics and colleagues may want to learn to read their own symptoms, may want to consider why it 
is that a little girl's work can provoke such reactionary responses.” –Avital Ronell, “Confessions of an 
Anacoluthon” 
 
 
“And what she discovers in this divine passion, she neither can nor will translate.” –Luce Irigaray, “La 
Mystérique” 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In spite of the considerable difficulty of speaking about affect, it is not 
synonymous with unintelligibility. However, I will argue in this chapter that rigorous 
unintelligibility permits affect to appear and to be read.  First, I will further develop the 
notion of rigorous unintelligibility I introduced in Chapter Three, with reference to the 
only precedent I have found for philosophy not only thematizing but insisting upon the 
necessity of unintelligibility: Friedrich Schlegel’s essay “Über die Unverständlichkeit,” 
which could be rendered as “On Incomprehensibility” or “On Unintelligibility.” In so 
doing, I situate Irigaray and Kristeva within a larger tradition of experimental 
philosophical writing and the effects that it has provoked.  Second, I will explore the 
relationship between affect and unintelligibility, using the example of Irigaray’s essay 
“La Mystérique” from Speculum de l’autre femme. I will give two readings of this essay, 
the first in which I do precisely what I argue Irigaray’s particular form of unintelligibility 
forbids, the second in which I read her affectively, in order to examine precisely how she 
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effects the shift to the production of affective response. Finally, I will examine the stakes 
of claiming the necessity of reading affect as a distinctly philosophical strategy. 
 
 
 
 
II. Irony, parabasis, anacoluthon, and other sins of rhetoric 
 
 I concluded Chapter Three by introducing the idea of a rigorous unintelligibility 
that would force the reader into an affective relationship with the text, such that rigor in 
that formulation is to be understood as a question of force. I want to linger now with the 
second term—unintelligibility—and bring to bear on it the insights forged in a historical 
moment when a group of thinkers was subjected to critique for their unintelligibility in 
much the same way that poststructuralists have been, and for many of the same reasons: a 
distressingly literary sensibility, a failure or refusal to distinguish strongly between 
philosophy and literature, and a general resistance to being readily comprehended.228 I am 
referring to Friedrich Schlegel and the other members of the German Romantic circle that 
produced the Athenaeum journal at the turn of the nineteenth century. Avital Ronell 
vividly cuts to the heart of the critique of the Athenaeum circle when she recounts the 
anecdote that “the King’s entourage was known to have repeated, ‘Was man nicht 
                                                
228 Indeed, as I write this, an article addressing these concerns (cast between the “clarity” of analytic 
philosophy and the “obscurantism” of Continental thought in an alleged attempt to “bridge” the two, by 
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gracing The Stone, the philosophy blog of today’s New York Times. Gary Gutting remarks: “But it is hard 
to see that there is much of serious philosophical value lost in the clarity of analytic commentaries on 
Heidegger, Derrida, et al.” See Gutting, “Bridging the Analytic-Continental Divide,” The New York Times, 
February 19, 2012.  
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versteht, hat ein Schlegel geschrieben,’” which she colloquially renders as “If you can’t 
understand it, it was probably written by a Schlegel.”229 
 In response to such attacks, Friedrich Schlegel penned the brief article “Über die 
Unverständlichkeit,” published in the Athenaeum in 1800. It is a peculiar essay, and upon 
an initial reading, deceptively straightforward. Indeed, early on he declares that for once, 
at least, he will take pains to be a paragon of clarity: “and so that the whole business 
shouldn’t turn around in too palpable a circle I had made a firm resolve really to be 
comprehensible [verständlich], at least this time.”230 Moreover, unlike the collections of 
Fragments he published in previous years, on the surface “Über die Unverständlichkeit” 
reads as an unremarkable philosophical essay. Despite its rather unorthodox topic, it 
announces from the outset with its title that it will take for its subject a single concept and 
attempt to elucidate it—what is Unverständlichkeit?— much in the fashion that one 
might pose the question of the nature of the good, the true, or the beautiful. Schlegel 
appears poised to define his terms. Upon a more careful reading, however, it becomes 
apparent that, his protests notwithstanding, nothing could be further from the case.  
 At the beginning of the piece, Schlegel appears at best ambivalent about 
incomprehensibility. He declares that he “detests incomprehension,” both by those who 
do and do not in fact comprehend, and he poses the question of whether communication 
                                                
229 Avital Ronell, Stupidity, p. 147. This becomes more telling and also significantly more amusing when 
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Labarthe and Nancy’s The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanticism, pp. 23-5, 
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230 Friedrich Schlegel, “On Incomprehensibility,” in Lucinde and the Fragments, p. 260. The German text 
of “Über die Unverständlichkeit” from the German critical edition of Schlegel is readily available online 
via zeno.org at http://www.zeno.org/nid/2000561905X, although unfortunately it lacks pagination (which is 
less problematic in this instance, as the entire essay is only twelve printed pages).  
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is even possible.  This seems, however, as if it is a problem to be addressed and then 
solved, an experiment to be undertaken specifically by way of the Athenaeum itself.  And 
when Schlegel declares, directly after his assertion of his intention to be clear, that he 
“wanted to focus attention on what the greatest thinkers of every age have divined (only 
very darkly, to be sure) until Kant discovered the table of categories and there was light 
in the spirit of man: I mean by this a real language [eine reele Sprache], so that we can 
stop rummaging about for words and pay attention to the power and source of all 
activity,” his thematization of incomprehensibility appears to be in service of its 
abolition.231  Such a “real language” would plainly accomplish this. There would be no 
more unnecessary “rummaging” for words to approximate what one hopes to 
communicate, no doubt to be met by an array of uncomprehending and likely irritated 
readers, but simply a pure, unmitigated transparency of meaning, a one-to-one 
correspondence between word and meaning.232  Put differently: no more latent, only 
manifest. Schlegel even throws in a rather oblique aside about the prospect of successful 
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232 This is not, claims Paul de Man, at all what Schlegel meant by “reele Sprache.” Nevertheless, I think 
the idea is present, especially when one considers the language of “rummaging about for words.” De Man 
cannot read this as about language as transparent because, among other reasons, he does not read any part 
of this essay straightforwardly, i.e. un-ironically. As I elaborate below, I am not sure whether one can read 
Schlegel non-ironically either in this context, but I nonetheless see a hint of longing for something 
primordial, if not wholly transparent, in this expression of irritation about rummaging for words, which 
certainly fits in with much of Schlegel’s other work, especially his romanticization of the feminine that is 
somehow in touch with everything, especially with the earth, and his own alienation, as a man, from that 
way of being in the world. See, for instance, the passages in Lucinde in which he explains why the 
reception of the book by young men and young women, respectively, will be so different. For instance: “It 
will be wholly different with women. There are none among them who are uninitiated; for every one of 
them already contains love completely within herself, a love of whose inexhaustible essence we youths are 
forever learning and understanding only a little more....A girl in her naive ignorance already knows 
everything, even before the lightning bolt of love has struck into her gentle womb and before the closed 
bud has opened into the full flower of sensuality.” (p. 60) 
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alchemy in the nineteenth century, with the suggestion that once we can all work 
exclusively in gold, there will be no need for any baser metals.  
 Once he has built up the triumphal aside as to the upcoming glories of the 
nineteenth century to a sufficiently absurd crescendo, of course, he brings us immediately 
back down to earth with a sudden paragraph break. There’s no such thing as alchemy, he 
reminds us. And everyone is still complaining about how my journal doesn’t make any 
sense. Hence the first—and most readily comprehensible—of several turns to the 
valorization of incomprehensibility. Far from apologizing, Schlegel reprints within the 
body of his essay one of the offending fragments in order to reiterate just how good it is, 
despite or perhaps because it has provoked such incomprehension.233  Finally, just when 
the reader has begun to wonder if Schlegel is going to return to the subject of 
incomprehensibility at all or remain eternally distracted by the explication of this most 
excellent fragment, he proffers an explanation for why so many people have 
misunderstood the journal: “A great part of the incomprehensibility of the Athenaeum is 
unquestionably due to the irony that to a greater or lesser extent is to be found 
everywhere in it.”234  And once again Schlegel is off, dropping the subject of 
incomprehensibility in order to chase down irony, culminating in what I can only 
describe as one of the most confusingly overdetermined passages I have ever 
encountered, on the necessity of all the myriad ways in which he must at present be 
understood as proceeding or not proceeding ironically—since it is, of course, necessary to 
read all of them, simultaneously, ironically, a state of affairs that is at once conceptually 
                                                
233 If anything, I am downplaying just how colloquial Schlegel’s language and diction are in certain 
sections of the essay.  
 
234 Schlegel, “On Incomprehensibility,” p. 265, emphasis in original.  
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clarified and practically further complicated by Paul de Man’s crucial observation as to 
what irony means to Schlegel. I will introduce it here before attempting Schlegel’s 
bewildering litany itself.   
De Man cites a line from Schlegel published as a note to the Fragments several 
years prior to the present essay: “Die Ironie ist eine permanente Parekbase.” (“Irony is a 
permanent parabasis.”)235 It is this figure of parabasis and its close relative, anacoluthon, 
that provide the crucial clue for de Man as to how to comprehend Schlegel on 
Unverständlichkeit. Parabasis, originally understood as “overstepping” or “turning 
aside,” first referred to a theatrical device in which the Greek chorus would interrupt the 
action of a play in order to address the audience directly. It also refers, in writing, to an 
extended aside addressed directly to the reader. In other words, start an apostrophe and 
just keep going, and you get a parabasis. The crucial point for Schlegel (as well as for de 
Man and Ronell) is that there is a break in the text, a break that turns, self-consciously, 
outwards to its interlocutors. De Man (and, reading him, Ronell) also invoke another 
rhetorical term: anacoluthon. While de Man says this is basically the same as parabasis 
(although in the instance of this essay by Schlegel I am not certain this is the case), he 
notes that the break of anacoluthon is by definition a syntactic one. Further, it does not 
necessarily seem to have the same connotations of extended apostrophe as parabasis236; it 
involves the reader insofar as it disappoints or confuses her expectations, but need not 
                                                
235 Cited in Paul de Man, “The Concept of Irony,” Aesthetic Ideology, pp. 178-9.  Die Parabase rather than 
die Parekbase is the usual German term for parabasis. In fact, there are two distinct Greek words, very 
closely related in meaning, of which “parabasis” rather than “parekbasis” refers to the action of the Greek 
chorus, and the latter is also used in political discourse, as in Aristotle’s Politics to describe how various 
forms of government turn into one another (i.e. tyranny as deviation from monarchy).    
 
236 This is my own formulation of parabasis that I have not encountered elsewhere, but I think the 
connection between the two rhetorical devices is both evident and important.  
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directly address her. Rather, anacoluthon is distinguished by creating and then deranging 
the expectations of a reader by way of a shift into a different syntactic register, often in a 
fashion that is grammatically incorrect or at least grammatically dissonant. De Man’s 
example comes from Proust, from a passage in which Marcel characterizes Albertine’s 
lies precisely in terms of “anacoluthe,” noting that she is able to begin sentences about 
herself in the first person and then somehow, by the end, turn out to be speaking about 
herself in the third person, such that, as Marcel comments, “Ce n’était pas elle qui était le 
sujet de l’action.”237  
De Man can elide parabasis and anacoluthon here because in terms of Schlegel, 
the two crucial attendant connotations are the demonstration of a certain structure of 
critical self-consciousness and the abrupt break of the line into another, unexpected 
register. Ronell follows his lead and uses not only the language of the break to 
characterize both, but also that of interruption, and specifically terms it an “interruptive 
force.”238 Nevertheless, I would prefer to preserve the distinction long enough to hear 
another nuance of parabasis that neither de Man or Ronell remarks, a nuance that I think 
should also be understood to apply to anacoluthon in the sense that both discuss it. In 
conceiving the theatrical or rhetorical sense, it is helpful to “hear” parabasis fairly 
literally as going to the side or turning to the side. But parabasis also carries deep 
                                                
237 Cited in de Man, “On the Concept of Irony,” p. 178. See also footnote 12 on p. 189 in de Man’s 
Allegories of Reading for a variety of examples from classical and modern literature, as well as a helpful 
definition of anacoluthon: “It designates any grammatical or syntactical discontinuity in which a 
construction interrupts another before it is completed.” The relevant passage from Proust in the 
Moncrieff/Kilmartin translation runs as follows: “She employed, not by way of stylistic refinement, but in 
order to correct her imprudences, abrupt breaches of syntax not unlike that figure which the grammarians 
call anacoluthon or some such name.  Having allowed herself, while discussing women, to say: ‘I 
remember, the other day, I...,’ she would suddenly, after a ‘semi-quaver rest,’ change the ‘I’ to ‘she’: it was 
something that she had witnessed as an innocent spectator, not something that she had done.  It was not she 
who was the subject of the action.” (“The Captive,” Remembrance of Things Past, Volume III, p. 149) 
 
238 Ronell, Stupidity, p. 137, emphasis mine.  
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theological overtones: the Greek word also means transgression, overstepping, or 
deviation. Indeed, in English versions of the New Testament, it is one of the words that is 
translated as sin in the Pauline epistles to indicate transgression of the law. De Man 
remarks of the passage from Proust that it “is a striking passage, a profound 
understanding of the structure of anacoluthon: this syntactical disruption, which, exactly 
in the same way as a parabasis, interrupts the narrative line.”239 I imagine that it is so 
striking in part because, as both Proust and de Man take pains to note, Albertine is using 
this device in order to lie, in order to dissociate herself from the first-person “I” that 
would speak as an agent and acknowledge responsibility by shifting into the third-person 
position of onlooker.  
Ronell writes, “There is no substantial commission of wrongdoing but 
anacoluthon establishes the fact, performed in Proust and elsewhere, of a rhetorical crime 
scene.”240 Her point about the rhetorical crime scene is clear enough. Anacoluthon is 
essentially an ungrammatical derangement of syntax, guaranteed to affect the (attentive) 
reader, primarily by means of confusion and possibly distress. Anacoluthon probably 
means that someone is trying to get away with something. But in the Proust example—
Marcel, catching Albertine in anacoluthon, essentially catches her in flagrante in the 
crime of constant lies—anacoluthon is in a real sense evidence of commission of 
wrongdoing, evasion of responsibility, disavowal of sin as attaching to her in any 
meaningful way.  Her very syntax indicts her. The gesture of the break in the line, 
whether it is the sort of attempt at concealment that actually serves to reveal, as in the 
case of Albertine, or the sort of extended apostrophe to the reader/audience that might 
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seem especially innocent in its directness, is essentially suspicious.  It is the latter that is 
enacted in Schlegel’s parabasis within “Über die Unverständlichkeit,” a brief encounter 
with which will, I hope, make abundantly obvious why I use the term suspicious. I pick 
up after Schlegel’s brief return to the subject of Unverständlichkeit in order to link it in 
the case of the Athenaeum with irony, in the wake of having outlined a veritable 
taxonomy of types thereof: 
  Generally speaking, the most fundamental irony of irony probably is that even it becomes  
tiresome if we are always being confronted with it. But what we want this irony to mean in  
the first place is something that happens in more ways than one.  For example, if one speaks  
of irony without using it, as I have just done; if one speaks of irony ironically without in the 
process being aware of having fallen into a far more noticeable irony; if one can’t disentangle 
oneself from irony anymore, as seems to be happening in this essay on incomprehensibility;  
if irony turns into a mannerism and becomes, as it were, ironical about the author; if one has 
promised to be ironical for some useless book without first having checked one’s supply and  
then having to produce it against one’s will, like an actor full of aches and pains; and if irony  
runs wild and can’t be controlled any longer.
241  
 
If irony—never mind just yet the irony of irony, or perhaps we should mind it 
from the beginning—is permanent parabasis, what happens to the reader who happens 
upon a discussion of irony that itself occurs within or constitutes a parabasis? Does she 
fall into an endless mise-en-abîme?  Each of the circumstances Schlegel describes 
requires itself to be read both straightforwardly and also ironically, neither of which can 
be conducted thoroughly or successfully. In his very first example, “if one speaks of 
irony without using it, as I have just done [Wenn man ohne Ironie von der Ironie redet, 
wie es soeben der Fall war],” or to translate even more literally, “When one speaks of 
irony without irony, as it was just now the case,” he has to be read at a minimum in the 
following ways. First, he is, indeed, speaking of irony without employing it: this is a non-
ironic utterance that thematizes but does not perform irony. But this phrase also 
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inaugurates the parabasis that constitutes the entire paragraph. It is here, with the word 
“soeben”—“just now” or “this minute”—that the present sentence announces that it is 
about the present sentence, that it hovers self-consciously above itself and comments on 
itself as it unfolds. As such, in that phrase and those that follow, as de Man points out 
about one way to conceive irony in general (although his essay to which I am currently 
referring seeks to “defuse” or “set into question” this version of irony), the conception of 
the self as dialectical and self-referential makes itself known. But if irony for Schlegel is 
permanent parabasis and this statement about irony occurs in a parabasis, how can it 
possibly be read non-ironically? The reader is put into the same untenable position as that 
imposed by the classic Liar Paradox (“This sentence is false,” or, “I am lying”). Perhaps 
the self-consciousness of permanent parabasis is another type of the other syntax for 
which Irigaray wishes, and in certain ways it is quite as unintelligible as what she 
proposes. But unlike the case of Irigaray, unintelligibility here does not arise from a 
recourse to anything unconscious or subterranean. Rather, in this case, it is an excess of 
self-consciousness that stymies the reader. 
One begins to understand—and perhaps to approach—the level of irritation at 
Schlegel that de Man describes in his contemporaries. What on earth does he mean, or 
hope to accomplish by such slippery rhetorical maneuvers? Wasn’t this essay supposed to 
be about incomprehensibility, not about irony? What is more, it promised to explain it—
to be clear for once—not to perform it, which after all is what got Schlegel in the position 
to claim he had to discuss the topic in the first place. It is a useful moment to pause and 
notice the way that affects come into view as comprehension is scrambled or frustrated. 
Yet even in the midst of provoking such irritation, Schlegel hints that he is not only the 
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purveyor of irony but potentially its victim as well. “Irony,” he says, “is something one 
cannot simply play games with.” (Of course, he is obviously not innocent of playing such 
games.) “It can have incredibly long-lasting effects. I have a suspicion that some of the 
most conscious artists of earlier times are still carrying on ironically, hundreds of years 
after their deaths, with their most faithful followers and admirers.”242  (This is, of course, 
a game, and two hundred years later, I must suspect him of continuing to play it.)  
At long last, in an act of unmitigated audacity, Schlegel returns to 
Unverständlichkeit not in order to apologize for his style à la Kant—after all, Schlegel 
suffers rather from an excess than a want of style—but in order to champion it:  
But is incomprehensibility really something so unmitigatedly contemptible and evil? [Aber  
ist denn die Unverständlichkeit etwas so durchaus Verwerfliches und Schlechtes?] Methinks  
the salvations of families and nations rest upon it.  If I am not wholly deceived, then states and 
systems, the most artificial productions of man, are often so artificial that one simply can’t  
admire the wisdom of their creator enough.  Only an incredibly [unglaublich] minute quantity  
of it suffices: as long as its truth and purity remain inviolate and no blasphemous rationality  
dares approach its sacred confines [heiligen Grenze]. Yes, even man’s most precious possession,  
his own inner happiness, depends in the last analysis, as anybody can easily verify, on some  
such point of strength that must be left in the dark, but that nonetheless shores up and supports  
the whole burden and would crumble the moment one subjected it to rational analysis. Verily,  
it would fare badly with you if, as you demand, the whole world were ever to become wholly 
comprehensible. And isn’t this entire, unending world constructed by the understanding out of 
incomprehensibility and chaos?243 
 
Unverständlichkeit, he claims, is actually the condition of the possibility of the 
production of any meaning whatsoever: woe to those who would seek to banish it. One 
could read this as a type of Saussurean argument, pointing out that one term has meaning 
only because of its difference from its opposite. Without nonsense, there is no sense; 
without that which is incomprehensible, there is no comprehensibility. Therefore, anyone 
who values comprehensibility owes a deep debt to these incomprehensible Schlegels. On 
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243 Ibid., p. 168. This is the only passage in the entire essay in which Schlegel actually thematizes 
Unverständlichkeit as such.  
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a second reading, however, Schlegel’s valorized incomprehensibility seems to align itself 
more readily with Freud’s navel of the dream, or Lacan’s real, or Irigaray’s conception of 
the way the feminine is figured: that category outside of a given system that cannot itself 
be figured or represented but which makes the system possible and ensures its closure 
and coherence.  In the wake of this claim, Schlegel takes another tack, this time sounding 
a distinctly Hegelian note, in order to posit the current persistence of Unverständlichkeit 
as symptomatic of a temporary historical moment which will be transformed as the 
nineteenth century ushers in a new and better reader and the triumph of comprehensibility 
and comprehension after all. I will return to this maneuver shortly, but first I want to 
linger with an aspect of the previous passage that Ronell highlights but at which Schlegel 
only briefly hints.  
Schlegel is clear that the essay is motivated at least in part by a desire to respond 
to the charges of unintelligibility lodged against his own writing and the contents of the 
Athenaeum more generally. Yet in only a few brief lines does he yoke these charges to 
the tendency of the Athenaeum to give offense [Anstoß].244  Ronell, however, zeroes in on 
the notion that unintelligibility provokes such attacks precisely because it does provoke, 
and not only at an intellectual level but in a distinctly visceral fashion. In doing so, she 
makes explicit the deep structural similarity between the critiques of the unintelligibility 
of the Athenaeum writers and of those who have more recently been on the receiving end 
of such accusations, such as poststructuralists, Continental philosophers, and purveyors 
of “French Theory” in general, a class that certainly includes Irigaray and Kristeva. 
Ronell writes, 
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So the associates of Athanäum were subject to attacks. Cries familiar to those of you who  
work with theoretical texts resounded accusingly; it’s too difficult, truly incomprehensible,  
what’s the point, where’s the historical punch to back this up, who cares and what’s the  
point, anyway, it makes no sense, this is unintelligible. Schlegel’s response to the  
indignation raised by his theoretical work consists of saying, in the first place, Let’s discuss 
unintelligibility. What is unintelligibility? Why does it provoke such (pre-)critical rage?  
From another point of view, to what extent do we rely on unintelligibility, and, indeed, to  
what extent does it guarantee and underlie the very conditions of intelligibility? What does it  
mean to say that a text is incomprehensible or too difficult, in excess of meaning, or that it  
does not produce enough codified sense?245 
 
De Man is even more explicit about just how irrationally exasperating people—and 
particularly philosophers—found Schlegel. He writes—of Lucinde in particular, but it 
seems to apply to Schlegel across the board, for this characterization comes in the wake 
of a description of Schlegel’s oeuvre—of his having excited “a totally unpredictable 
amount of irritation....” Indeed, as de Man portrays him, Schlegel was uniquely 
provoking, even to such a figure as G.W.F. Hegel, “who refers to Schlegel and Lucinde 
and loses his cool, which doesn’t happen so easily to Hegel. Whenever this comes up he 
gets very upset and becomes insulting—he says Schlegel is a bad philosopher, he doesn’t 
know or he hasn’t read enough, he should not speak, and so on.”246 Ronell characterizes 
this sort of rhetoric perfectly when she notes that it arises from “(pre-)critical rage” and, 
ventriloquizing such readers, asks over again and again the dismissive question: what’s 
the point anyway? In the face of what seems deliberate incomprehensibility, even 
thinkers who are themselves legendarily difficult writers such as Hegel (and really, who 
has ever studied the Phenomenology without experiencing at least one pre-critical violent 
impulse?) find themselves filled with an intense anger that manifests itself critically, once 
words re-emerge, as simple dismissal. What is the point of writing if it is not to 
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communicate? Surely this cannot be philosophy if it provokes such rage; if it makes 
insufficient sense; if it is too self-conscious, or overly unconscious.  
De Man’s analysis of “Über die Unverständlichkeit” in “The Concept of Irony” 
concludes with his thoughts on Schlegel’s valorization of unintelligibility.  In answer to 
Schlegel’s question as to whether or not Unverständlichkeit is really so totally bad, so 
thoroughly objectionable, given that chaos and incomprehensibility are necessary to 
produce their opposites, de Man suggests that we not be taken in by this rhetoric, or else 
perhaps that we ought to consider the terms of the rhetoric more closely and attend to its 
dangers. “That sounds very nice,” says de Man of Schlegel’s ruminations on chaos,  
but you should remember that the chaos is error, madness, and stupidity, in all its forms.  
Any expectation that one may have that deconstruction might be able to construct is 
suspended by such a passage....Any attempt to construct—that is, to narrate—on no matter 
how advanced a level, is suspended, interrupted, disrupted, by a passage like this.247 
 
For de Man, this is an impasse, a dead end, without productive possibilities for ways in 
which to write or to engage in any sort of constructive project, literary or critical or 
philosophical. Instead of casting chaos, like Schlegel, as a sort of necessary energy out of 
which the comprehensible can arise, he reads it as dangerous foolishness. De Man’s essay 
ends here; he can go no further with Unverständlichkeit. Ronell, on the other hand—
while she never forgets the way in which Schlegel’s discussion and performance of irony 
sets each of his utterances continually in question—is not only willing but finds it 
necessary to engage with Schlegel’s final tactic in the essay, in the wake of his praise of 
Unverständlichkeit. Schlegel writes that “the nineteenth century will indeed make a 
beginning of it and then the little riddle of the incomprehensibility of the Athenaeum will 
also be solved. What a catastrophe! Then there will be readers who will know how to 
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read [Dann wird es Leser geben die lesen können].” Moreover, this transformation in 
readers will be a historical phenomenon, a radical shift in general consciousness and 
comprehension, such that “understanding itself will be understood.”248 I must reiterate 
here my previous qualms about whether or not, or when, or if always, Schlegel is to be 
read ironically in this piece. I rehearse these here particularly insofar as this final move 
makes the essay legible as a dialectical argument in which, at a particular and soon-to-
arrive historical juncture, Unverständlichkeit shall be triumphantly converted into 
Verständlichkeit, which seems to me unlikely to be wholeheartedly endorsed by Schlegel. 
But two reasons prompt me to entertain, at least, the possibility of taking an aspect of this 
final gesture very seriously indeed.  
First, Schlegel seems to sound a genuine note of hope, to adopt a prophetic tone, 
when he speaks about this new reader that is yet to come: the reader that can, at last, 
really read, such that previously incomprehensible Schlegels will at long last be read and 
understood. The second reason I wish to entertain the possibility of suspending the ever-
present worries about irony in reading this passage is due to a remarkable moment in 
Ronell’s interpretation. She is likewise suspicious of the notion that Schlegel was 
actually “projecting a moment when unintelligibility would give way to intelligibility”—
she calls it “an improbable hypothesis”—but insists that we must still understand what 
Schlegel anticipates for the nineteenth century, regardless of its situation within or 
outside of the ironic register.249  And such understanding, for her, also centers upon the 
figure of this reader-to-be. Both before and after she proclaims the improbability that it is 
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correct to take Schlegel at his word about the emergence of intelligibility from 
unintelligibility, Ronell hazards two statements about this reader. In the first instance, she 
conjectures that “perhaps he predicted the emergence of readers, not mere interpreter-
digesters but those who take pleasure in the reading of incomprehensibility and who 
understand understanding as just one form of reading.”250 Second, she appears to take 
him quite seriously indeed when she writes:  
The projection Schlegel sketches calls for a different kind of reading because it is not  
some whimsical fantasy but the outline of a theory of reading itself, for reading is nothing  
other than this proleptic swerve, the promise of a future understanding. Today, the project  
of future understanding remains the fiction that it always will have been, an insight that can  
be neither proven nor verified. Still, this fiction, generated out of the exigencies of an  
inescapable temporality, is understanding’s truth.251  
 
There are two principal moments in Ronell’s commentary on this reader and this project 
of reading that I wish to highlight. The first is an element that she adds to Schlegel’s 
projected reader, which is pleasure, and a pleasure taken precisely in the recognition that 
understanding is not the only goal of reading. He enjoys reading what he cannot 
understand. There is a form of pleasure to take in reading that involves a relationship of 
incomprehension between reader and text. The structure of her sentence suggests that for 
Ronell, the capacity for this form of pleasure may, in fact, constitute the defining 
characteristic of a reader, as distinguished from a “mere interpreter-digester.”  
The second moment arrives with her declaration that Schlegel’s projection into 
the nineteenth century “calls for a different kind of reading” insofar as it constitutes the 
“outline of a theory of reading itself.” To say that it “calls” for a different sort of reading 
could be read as Schlegel’s call for a different kind of reading, i.e. in his prediction of a 
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different kind of reader—the kind who will actually know how to read. But given that 
later in the sentence she deliberately indicates the theory of reading that “Über die 
Unverständlichkeit” contains, I understand this as denoting that we, the readers of 
Schlegel, should read his quasi-messianic nineteenth-century reader differently, as in 
other than always and wholly ironically. Put differently, whether or not we decide to 
resume a stance of suspicion towards a straightforward reading of Schlegel on reading 
here, we should at least consider this “different kind of reading.” Because unlike the 
whimsically unintelligible reflections of irony and the irony of irony embedded in a 
parabasis which itself constitutes irony, there is something utterly fundamental about the 
relationship between reading and a future time, whether it is a future in which one is 
reading or a prediction of a moment in a world-historical future. And how we understand 
that configuration of reader and time will have serious repercussions for the sort of 
understanding that is conceived as possible and necessary.252  
While I do not read Schlegel in this essay as ever suspending irony altogether, 
there is an earnestness that attends his description of the reader-yet-to-come that seems to 
me worth taking seriously. And if we do so, and incorporate Ronell’s contention that this 
is a reader who can joyfully encounter the incomprehensible and consider this to be an 
essential part of reading, a new interpretation of the importance of Unverständlichkeit 
emerges, one that is less glib than Schlegel’s contention (however structurally accurate it 
may be) that it is the condition of possibility of comprehensibility itself. The question that 
Schlegel promised to pose and answer—what is Unverständlichkeit?—is replaced 
(although still largely unaddressed) by another one: what does Unverständlichkeit require 
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or demand? It demands a reader. Unverständlichkeit produces a state of total frustration 
and paralysis in which one can throw one’s book across the room and storm out, or 
perform the literary-critical version thereof. Or else, in the wake of that moment, it can 
produce the consciousness of the necessity of reading otherwise and not necessarily for 
understanding, or at least not entirely. The willingness to be totally stymied, to inhabit a 
moment of cognitive defeat, can either foreclose on reading altogether or else produce a 
state of receptivity to attitudinal as well as methodological shifts.  It may be a question of 
disposition, or perhaps it is a question of will or willingness. Let’s make it so hard, 
Schlegel says, so incomprehensible, that one has to want to understand differently, and 
even to enjoy not understanding.  Compare this to Irigaray: “So why not double the 
misprision [méprise] to the limits of exasperation? Until the ear tunes into another music, 
the voice starts to sing again, the very gaze stops squinting over the signs of auto-
representation and (re)production no longer inevitably amounts to the same and returns to 
the same forms, with minor variations.”253 It is precisely the reader whose arrival 
Schlegel forecasts— “Dann wird es Leser geben die lesen können”—who is necessary to 
endure this exasperation and go beyond it.  
 
 
III. Affect and unintelligibility: “La Mystérique” 
 
A question presents itself. How do we distinguish what I have been calling a 
rigorous unintelligibility, an unintelligibility that demands to be reckoned with, from, 
well, bad writing? Is it a question of deliberateness, an intent to bewilder? Is it about 
                                                
253 Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, p. 143; Speculum de l’autre femme, p. 178. 
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artfulness, a loveliness of style or some sort of “literary” quality? Is unintelligibility a 
matter of degree, when a text that is already hard going crosses some sort of invisible line 
from difficult to unintelligible, or is it another category altogether? Is all unintelligibility 
worth puzzling over? While the two examples I use in this chapter—Schlegel and 
Irigaray—do assert their deliberate commitment to strategic obfuscation, I would 
stipulate nonetheless that rigorous unintelligibility should not be understood primarily as 
a matter of intent. This is not only because I wish to avoid making claims about authorial 
intent, but more significantly because I am primarily concerned with unintelligibility’s 
effects.  As such, the criterion that I will use to distinguish rigorous unintelligibility must 
belong at least in part to the reader. As I argued in Chapter Three, I read rigor as a 
question of force, the way that Irigaray forces a sort of merging with her text and/or the 
object of her reading. And I also consider rigorous unintelligibility to be a gesture that a 
text itself enacts, a presentation of a text that tantalizes with the sense that it requires 
deciphering while simultaneously refusing the logic that reading ought to be solely or 
even primarily for the purpose of deciphering and translating content or meaning. 
But rigorous unintelligibility also requires of the reader a receptivity to its force 
and an acquiescence to that refusal, in order to endure (and not only to endure but to wish 
to endure) a moment of infinite resignation as to the possibility of comprehension and 
still to continue to read. Moreover, this receptivity arises in reaction to a text that is not 
simply performative in a legible way. For with Irigaray, for instance, it is not simply a 
question of moving from a text representing its convictions to performing or staging 
them, a shift akin to J.L. Austin’s distinction between constative and performative 
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statements, from words that say to words that do.254 Irigaray does not perform exclusion, 
perform silence: that would be a mere doubling or reduplication, a translation from 
description to performance. 255  Her gesture is more subtle. Rather than inhabiting it 
herself, Irigaray submits the reader to the position she describes, entraps her, forces her to 
experience the position of exclusion, of being unable to speak. In the wake of reading 
Irigaray, the reader is required to ask of herself how to speak about it. And as any 
reduction of Irigaray’s prose to the order of the same, to the intelligible order, would 
constitute a betrayal, the reader comes to see that Irigaray has in fact enacted a forcible 
crippling of any possible response in terms of more traditional philosophical modes of 
discourse—which, given her adherence to the Lacanian doctrine of the masculine nature 
of signification—is to say it forecloses the possibility of speech itself outside of the 
deliberately bewildering Irigarayan idiom.   
 Yet, crucially, Irigaray never concedes that she has made any sort of exit from the 
domain of philosophy.  Unlike Cixous, for instance, Irigaray does not claim to be writing 
the body; she does not seek to write blood, milk, tears, nor does she instruct her readers to 
do so.256  She insists that she is working within the philosophical realm and, remaining 
there, contorts its language, distorts it almost beyond recognition. For all of the roles 
explicitly coded as female that Irigaray has been said to play stylistically—hysteric, 
mystic, flirt, seductress—it seems to me that we ought to read her also as the missing 
little girl whose absence she remarks in Freud’s theory of female sexual development. 
                                                
254 See J.L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words.  
 
255 I am indebted on this point to a very helpful conversation with my colleague Liane Carlson. 
 
256 See Cixous’ classic essay, “Laugh of the Medusa,” in the Portable Cixous.  
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Freud comments in his much-scrutinized lecture on “Femininity” that in the phallic phase 
of sexual development, “we are now obliged to recognize that the little girl is a little 
man.”257 One of the many tasks of the first section of Speculum—which consists of a 
lengthy reading of “Femininity”—is to demonstrate the ways in which the little girl is 
eclipsed, never comes into being at all qua little girl; how she is turned into this “little 
man”; and how her pleasure (when it is in question) and her successful ascension to the 
status of mature woman depends on rejecting the solitary pleasures of the “masculine” 
clitoris and discovering the “truly feminine vagina” as the locus of her adult sexuality.258 
Freud writes earlier of the “striking resemblance” between the hysteric and the “naughty 
child."259 And as I have noted, many have interpreted Irigaray’s style as deliberately 
hysterical. We know what it is to speak or write hysterically, or to mime or perform it. 
But what would it mean to write as the little girl who is not the little man, or the adult 
version of her?  
 Irigaray never introduces this mis- or dis-placed little girl as a character, as she 
does with other figures that have been passed or covered over, in her view, such as 
Nietzsche’s repressed amante marine, whose specter returns as a revenant to haunt his 
work.  But I would suggest that in her stylistic experimentation, especially as she 
forecloses upon a verbal response to her work and, in so doing, forces an affective 
response, it is precisely this missing little girl whom she ventriloquizes and whose 
situation she performs.  This might seem infantile, or infantilizing, but in light of 
                                                
257 Freud, “Femininity,” New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, SE Volume XXII, p. 117.  
 
258 Ibid.  
 
259 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, SE Volume IV, p. 251.  
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Irigaray’s scathing analysis of Freud’s view of the correct or normative progression from 
child to woman, that might well be considered a significant compliment.260  And when 
Irigaray writes in the deliberately incomprehensible unconscious style of the manifest 
dream-text, of the symptom, insists upon not being “translated” back into the latent, 
traditional analysis stalls and grinds to a halt. One can almost picture a small girl 
stamping her foot, refusing to play by the rules.261 This is a moment between the critical 
and the constructive—for Irigaray is most incisive when she wholly inhabits a text and, in 
my view, less and less effective in the utopian mode of the yet-to-come that increasingly 
dominates her later work. When she insists that we remain with the picture-puzzle, 
turning it around and around—and here too the image of the little girl is apt, for we are in 
the realm of games, of eternal puzzle-play—she forces the reader, finally, to cease to 
search for the underlying thought. Instead, she (our reader) at last begins to play over the 
surface of the signifiers of this other order, which is neither the feminine nor the infantile, 
but is clearly, obstinately other and utterly irreducible to the Other of the same, the 
grammatical, the coherent. And she is affected, troubled, frustrated, moved, and 
ultimately altered. The words, the signifiers, with all their associations, remain, but they 
                                                
260 See Irigaray, “La Tache Aveugle d’Un Vieux Rêve de Symétrie” (“The Blind Spot of an Old Dream of 
Symmetry”) in Speculum de l’Autre Femme.  
 
261 While I in no way wish to conflate Irigaray’s work with that of Avital Ronell, it seems relevant to note 
that some time after this comparison occurred to me, I came across a passage in a 2000 interview with 
Ronell in which she discusses her own work, style, and wordplay, and specifically the visceral level on 
which some of the negative responses to that work occurred, and she also frames it in terms of a little girl: 
“In the early part of my career, I was pushed off podiums and stages; I was interrupted and just largely 
reviled in the most Ivy Leagued places, the big leagues. Somehow, I provoked violent responses.  And this 
response is just a dimension of my work that probably should not be left out of the picture.  These critics 
and colleagues may want to learn to read their own symptoms, may want to consider why it is that a little 
girl’s work can provoke such reactionary responses.” (emphasis mine) See Part III of “Confessions of an 
Anacoluthon: Avital Ronell on Writing, Technology, Pedagogy, Politics,” in jac: A Journal of Composition 
Theory 20.2 (2000). 
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remain as indecipherable, their mute presence a palpable rebuke to every attempt at 
faithful re-presentation. 
 
 I will turn now to what I consider to be an intensely performative and 
experimental piece by Irigaray, “La Mystérique,” in order to examine precisely how she 
effects the shift to the affective response.  There are any number of other essays and 
excerpts that might have done just as well. And indeed, in certain respects “La 
Mystérique” is a slight anomaly from the sort of work that Irigaray often does insofar as it 
does not focus on reading, inhabiting, and re-writing the work of a single author. “La 
Mystérique” is also one of Irigaray’s pieces that occurs in the register of both critical and 
constructive. To speak broadly and in terms of overarching theses and projects for a 
moment, I understand Irigaray’s critical project as the close reading and inhabiting of 
crucial philosophical and psychoanalytic texts in order to disclose the ways in which they 
have coded and written out the feminine. I understand her constructive project as working 
toward the elaboration of new possibilities for a distinctively female imaginary (including 
new forms of female language and subjectivity), toward a genuine thinking of sexual 
difference (the possibility of the two rather than the one), and toward a relationship 
between this two that preserves the irreducibility of each as well as the space between 
them. While this critical moment is present from the beginning in Irigaray’s two earliest 
philosophical texts262 (Speculum and Ce Sexe), the constructive project emerges much 
                                                
262 I am using “philosophical” here without any polemical overtones: I intend simply to distinguish 
Speculum (Irigaray’s second dissertation, in philosophy) and her subsequent work from her earlier career in 
linguistic research, although of course this research shares certain emphases and concerns with those 
expressed throughout her corpus. See Parler N’est Jamais Neutre (translated as To Speak is Never Neutral), 
which collects some of these linguistic essays in a volume published in 1985, long after Speculum and 
others.   
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more fully in later texts such as Ethique de la différence sexuelle (An Ethics of Sexual 
Difference), Sexes et Parentés (Sexes and Genealogies) and Être deux (To Be Two).  
“La Mystérique” is an early exception to this trend. Like its title, always 
preserved in the French so as to maintain the untranslatable constellation of hysteria, 
mystery, mysticism, and femininity, it encapsulates crucial aspects of both Irigaray’s 
critical and constructive projects within the brief space of a dense and cryptic essay.   
I could have chosen a piece whose affective burden is primarily the reduction to silence, 
as I have argued is the case when she takes on major figures in the history of Western 
thought and wholly inhabits their texts such that to ‘re-translate’ her interpretation would 
constitute a betrayal. While I contend that this effect remains operative and absolutely 
crucial in the case of “La Mystérique,” I am also interested in understanding the affective 
labor of experimental philosophical thinking and writing as potentially constitutive of 
constructive possibilities for philosophy. As such, it is crucial to work with texts that 
communicate a variety of affects, not only negative or paralyzing ones.263 
 I will give two readings of “La Mystérique,” the first more traditional, seeking to 
decipher and translate, the second an affective reading that resists that impulse as much as 
possible. The first will require context, summary, background, references, and so forth. 
The second will take seriously Irigaray’s statement that the style of “the feminine” 
“cannot be upheld as a thesis, cannot be the object of a position.”264 It would be tidier to 
confine myself in both readings to a single passage. This is an option I examined and 
                                                
263 This would be to heed Kristeva’s warning about Duras, in a sense. I will, however, discuss “La 
Mysterique” insofar as its unintelligibility creates the possibility for the transmission of affect and 
concomitant change in the reader, and as such I will primarily attend to the effect/affect of frustration and 
silence.  
 
264 Irigaray, This Sex, p. 79; Ce Sexe, p. 76. 
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eventually rejected for several reasons.  The first is that “La Mystérique” simply does not 
contain anything that one could construe as a representative passage or line with which to 
begin a sort of explication de texte that would allow me to account for the whole. The 
affective response is an effect of the entirety of the piece. Second, “La Mystérique” is 
oblique, to be sure, but it also tells a story. It has a character, a narrative arc, even a 
journey. The affects it generates, the responses it provokes, fluctuate throughout. I will 
cite sentences and passages, of course, but they will be drawn from throughout the text. 
Furthermore, I realized that if I were to select such a passage and isolate words and 
phrases about which I would then make an affective claim in addition to claims about 
their other functions, I would risk being perceived as doing something along the lines of 
taking Barthes’ reading of “Sarrasine” in S/Z as my guide and simply adding an Affective 
Voice or code, AFF. I am not claiming that affect is a formal property of language that 
can be isolated, tagged, and catalogued. I am claiming that texts have visceral effects on 
readers, that they work on readers in distinctive ways to transmit affect, and that these 
effects are integral to the ways in which they should be understood.  
 Charles Hirschkind writes, in a very different yet related context, “While 
particular percepts might recruit some parts of the sensorium more than other parts—as 
when one has been trained to attend to a very limited range of sensory experience, such 
as in modern academic reading—to at least some extent, the organ of reception remains 
the body in its entirety.”265 One way to distinguish my two readings is along the lines of 
                                                
265 Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics, p. 78. 
Hirschkind’s fascinating book includes one of the best examples I have encountered of the use of affect 
theory, as he argues for the way in which cassette-sermon audition “intervenes precisely at the level of 
what Massumi calls the affective.”  (p. 82) Further, he insists that the conditions for receptivity to such 
audition (by way of which the listener might be not only persuaded “to give his or her assent to a 
proposition but also to enact the ethical attitudes and sensibilities given expression in the sermon speech”) 
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openness or awareness to the body as the organ of reading reception. In the first, I will 
play the modern trained academic reader as (quite accurately, in my view) characterized 
by Hirschkind, dampening visceral response and forging ahead in the desire to make clear 
and distinct a text that both resists and rewards such translation. In the second, I will 
examine what occurs when a text foils the expectation that it can be read without recourse 
to the entire sensorium, when the trained academic reader must expand the set of analytic 
possibilities to include visceral responses, intuitions, bodily intensities, and associations. 
It is worth pausing here for a moment to return to some of the antecedents whom I 
discussed in Chapter One, particularly the reader-response theorists and Roland Barthes, 
especially as forces of habit and language tend to work towards conceptions of readers 
and texts as wholly discrete entities. Barthes reminds us that texts are relentlessly plural, 
a “galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of signifieds,” and that readers produce them in a 
“labor of language.” (I recall here his perennially useful admonition about the dangers 
that await those who fail to reread, who are doomed to “read the same story 
everywhere.”)266  And the reader-response theorists prompt the constant recognition of 
the necessity of expanding the parameters of the field of study in reading, that the text-
reader complex is a dyadic one. Finally, Irigaray herself, who is always concerned with 
the space between,267 reminds us that this dyad always includes the space of that opening 
and admonishes us as to the constant necessity of both thinking and preserving it.  
                                                
take place at the level of the entire body, in what he calls the “Quranically tuned body.” (see pp. 82, 12, 76, 
81, and Chapter Three in general, “The Ethics of Listening.”)  
 
266 Roland Barthes, S/Z (translation), pp. 5. 11, 16; S/Z, pp. 11, 16, 20.  
 
267 Irigaray is primarily concerned with the space between two (sexually) different subjects, but I believe 
that this point can be usefully extended to the space between reader and text. A particularly good example 
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IV. First reading 
The first reading requires contextualizing: background, perhaps a summary of the 
argument or arguments, a description of the overarching arc of the narrative, a list of 
important references, implicit arguments made explicit, and so forth. This will not, of 
course, be exhaustive, and there are far more sophisticated, nuanced, and lengthy 
readings of “La Mystérique” to be found in the literature on Irigaray.268 I am less 
interested in illustrating the contrast between this and an affective reading than I am 
simply to outline some of the essay’s terms and its central concerns in order to 
demonstrate, first, that such propositional meanings can indeed profitably be wrested 
from it and second, in order to be able to examine the relationship of an affective reading 
to the concerns of the essay that emerge from the former type of analysis.  
In “La Mystérique,” Irigaray explores “that other scene, off-stage,” in which 
medieval Christian mystics sought and found a rapturous union with God, and expressed 
this oneness in a ecstatic and ‘hysterical’ tongue that deliberately blurs and confuses the 
very idea of any (theo-)logic of the distinction between self and Other, between woman 
and God. “This is the only place in the history of the West in which woman speaks and 
acts so publicly,” writes Irigaray. “What is more,” she continues,  
it is for/by woman that man dares to enter the place, to descend into it, condescend to it,  
even if he gets burned in the attempt.  It is in order to speak woman [parler femme], write 
to women, act as preacher and confessor to women, that man usually has gone to such  
excesses. That he has accepted the need to take the detour through metaphors that can  
scarcely be called figures.  That he has given up his knowledge in order to attend to  
women’s madnesses....To the point where he can no longer find himself as “subject”  
                                                
of this can be found in To Be Two in her discussion of what she terms “horizontal transcendence,” or in her 
example of the two angels in “Belief Itself.” 
 
268  In particular, see the excellent discussion in Chapter Three of Tamsin Lorraine’s Irigaray and Deleuze: 
Experiments in Visceral Philosophy, especially pp. 70-75, and Part Three of Amy Hollywood’s, Sensible 
Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual Difference, and the Demands of History, particularly Chapter Six: “From Lack 
to Fluidity: Luce Irigaray, La Mystérique.”  
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anymore and goes where he had no wish to follow [Jusqu’à ne plus s’y retrouver comme  
« sujet », et se laisse mener là où il ne voulait surtout pas aller]: to his loss in that  
a-typical, a-topical mysteria.  Where it will already have been noted – to the amazement  
of all – that the poorest in science and the most ignorant were the most eloquent, the richest  
in revelations.  Historically, that is, women. Or at least the “female [le « féminin »].”269 
 
Although the medieval mystical tradition was not exclusively confined to women, but 
included men such as Bernard of Clairvaux and Meister Eckhart, for Irigaray, the 
experience and articulation of the unio mystica constitutes a place from which to speak in 
which the feminine is privileged. In  “La Mystérique,” Irigaray traces the path of the 
(female) soul (named here only as elle) on her ecstatic journey to a fully embodied 
experience of jouissance in union with the presence of God. In so doing, she evokes and 
evolves an experience of subjectivity and subsequent articulation of that subjectivity that 
wholly departs from any notion of a sovereign, autonomous subject.  
Contrary to the subject as “self-as-same [soi (comme) mémé]” that Irigaray so 
vehemently rejects, the (male) subject whose confrontation with (sexual) difference 
serves only to shore up and confirm his own reflection, his fullness in contrast to her lack, 
the elle of “La Mystérique” is never precisely one, singular, nor is she ever distinctly 
two.270  Rather, subsumed in the unio mystica, she is caught up in  “an abyss that 
swallows up all persons, all names, even proper names.”271 Yet unlike the threatened 
subject as self-same, who requires the other in order to keep his own boundaries intact, 
despite (or perhaps because of) the soul’s rapturous and eminently risky giving of herself, 
opening herself to loss of self, she is precisely never lost in this opening, but rather 
                                                
269 Irigaray. “La Mystérique,” Speculum of the Other Woman, pp. 191-2; Speculum de l’autre femme, p. 
238-9. 
 
270 Ibid., p. 200; p. 250.   
 
271 Ibid., p. 194; p. 242.  
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becomes ever more present to herself in her pleasurable merging with the divine.  As 
Irigaray glosses the thirteenth century mystic Angela of Foligno, who famously used 
overtly erotic language in describing her visions of Jesus Christ: “But if the Word was 
made flesh in this way, and to this extent, it can only have been to make me (become) 
God in my jouissance.”272 This jouissance is utterly foreign to the priest, to the confessor, 
those putative guardians of theo-logy, of the truths of God. But these truths, for Irigaray, 
centuries worth of plodding systematizations of theological arguments, are the “obvious 
‘truths’ that actually hide what she is seeking.”273 And yet the soul’s experience of God 
does not lie outside the theological tradition altogether, for the possibility of the soul’s 
jouissance in the unio mystica relies on that peculiarly Christian notion of the Word made 
flesh, the embodiment and subsequent crucifixion of Jesus Christ, “that most female of 
men, the Son.”274  It is with the physical, suffering body of the crucified Christ that the 
soul desires to be joined; it was a vision of this suffering body that inspired Angela of 
Foligno to cry out, “I have made your cross my bed.”275 The rapture of the soul of “La 
Mystérique” is no ineffable or abstract joy, but a unambiguously physical experience of 
desire, pain, and pleasure. 
Unusually for Irigaray, “La Mysterique” does attempt to demonstrate a historical 
point: that alongside the orthodox theological tradition of the Church lies a more 
subterranean feminine tradition, an alternate place from which religious women were able 
                                                
272 Ibid., p. 200; p. 250. One of the epigraphs to “La Mystérique” is from Angela of Foligno, “Le Verbe 
s’est fait chair afin de me faire Dieu.” (“The Word was made flesh in order to make me God.”) 
 
273 Ibid., p. 193; p. 240.  
 
274 Ibid, p. 199; p. 249.  
 
275 Angela of Foligno, “Memorial,” Angela of Foligno: Complete Works, p. 205. 
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to speak and become as women.276 As Margaret Whitford comments, “What Irigaray is 
above all concerned to work out is the conditions of women’s subjectivity – how women 
can assume the ‘I’ of discourse in their own right and not as a derivative male ‘I.’”277  
Despite its detailed attention to ideas about divinity, rapture, and mystical experience, the 
real stakes of “La Mystérique,” in my view, are the possibilities of female subjectivity 
and speech, the latter what Irigaray calls parler-femme.278  As Amy Hollywood astutely 
notes in her readings of Irigaray’s work on mysticism, the actual mystical texts and their 
authors in their specificity tend to recede. Unlike the essays and books in which Irigaray 
inhabits the texts of philosophers and psychoanalysts with an exquisite attentiveness to 
their own words, here she is concerned with a sort of quasi-generic version of the female 
medieval Christian mystic that borrows, at a minimum, from Angela of Foligno (directly 
cited) and the beguine Marguerite Porete (whose presence I will hazard by way of both 
the title and structure of her Mirror of Simple Souls).279 It is the figure of “the mystic” 
whose soul seeks union with the divine that is Irigaray’s subject, and more specifically 
the structure of her subjectivity and her relationship to language.  
                                                
276 For an excellent discussion of the relationship of “mystics” (la mystique, not le mysticisme) to language, 
see Michel de Certeau’s The Mystic Fable, especially Chapter Four, “Manners of Speaking.” 
 
277 Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine, p. 42.  
 
278 Although she is often associated with the notion of écriture feminine, Irigaray prefers the expression 
parler-femme. Margaret Whitford, whose Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine is perhaps the 
definitive English-language book-length study of Irigaray qua philosopher, remarks: “As far as I know, she 
does not use the term écriture feminine at all; it is a label which has been attached to her by others.” 
(Whitford, p. 38) See Whitford’s chapter “Language and Subjectivity” for a discussion of parler-femme, 
which she argues should be conceived in the time yet to come in which a female imaginary has come into 
being. She translates it as “speaking (as) a woman” (in contrast to speaking ‘like’ a woman) and notes that 
in so doing she has attempted to preserve the sense of par les femmes, “by women.” (See Whitford, p. 49) 
 
279 See Marguerite Porete, Mirror of Simple Souls, especially on her characterization of the soul and its 
journey, its characterization in terms of courtly love, and its eventual annihilation.  
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V. Second reading 
There is a whole host of distinct markers within the text of “La Mysterique” that 
indicate how it is to be read, and specifically the ways in which it resists translation. The 
“soul’s” position in terms of her access to/merging with the divine is a privileged one, 
even if it is not (yet?) a privileged site from which to speak. (“Words begin to fail her. 
She senses something remains to be said that resists all speech [Pressentant un rester à 
dire qui résiste à toutes paroles], that can at best be stammered out.”)280  But her inability 
to speak here is predicated on her ability to sense that there is indeed something that 
remains to be said but that resists articulation, and, a fortiori, resists translation. When the 
“soul’s” merging with/becoming God is complete (itself a misleading term in this text 
that resists all such ideas), Irigaray writes, “And what she discovers in this divine 
passion, she neither can nor will translate. At last, she has been authorized to remain 
silent....” Irigaray then abruptly switches from third to first person (a common maneuver 
throughout the essay, and one that I can no longer imagine without remembering  
Proust’s Albertine). She thus grammatically enacts the blurring of boundaries between 
the first and third person positions that occurs throughout the soul’s journey, as she or I 
becomes it/myself, as in, “Maintenant je le/me connais et en le/me connaissant je 
l’/m’aime, et en l’/m’ aiment je le/me desire.” (“Now I know it/myself and by knowing, I 
love it/myself and by loving, I desire it/myself.”)  As such, “Any instrument, any hint, 
even, of theory, pulls me away from myself.”281  
                                                
280 Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, p. 193; Speculum de l’autre femme, p. 241.  
 
281 Ibid., p. 200; pp. 249-50. 
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These textual markers—neither can nor will translate, the rejection of any hint of 
theory that would disrupt her (new) being—function as embedded reading instructions, 
quite in the same way that Derrida’s apostrophizing of the bad reader functioned to herald 
the temptation of bad reading and to warn against it in what was to come. They are 
instructions that Irigaray outlines even more forcefully when she occasionally (frustrated, 
perhaps, with being misread) allows herself to step somewhat “outside” of her style, like 
Schlegel declaring his intention to be clear at least once, and answer questions, as in 
“Pouvoir du discours” when she writes of the style of “le féminin” that it “cannot be 
upheld as a thesis, cannot be the object of a position.”282 And these—especially the last—
are instructions I intend to heed. But if we abide by Irigaray’s reading instructions, what, 
exactly, do we do? I submit that we take her precisely at her word, or literally—à la 
lettre, as Lacan would have it. And that means not to re-translate her. She declares her 
intent to drive us out of our minds with frustration, with exasperation, to the point of 
seeing double, so why not allow ourselves to be so driven? To be acted upon, to be totally 
bewildered and dislocated, maybe mistaken, perhaps even completely wrong, to be 
displaced or dethroned from the position of reader as position of mastery. To begin—
perhaps—even to enjoy this tenuous position of incomprehension? To allow what arrives 
to arrive?  
The first effect that unintelligibility produces is that of frustration, or 
exasperation, and the concomitant sensation of being halted, brought up short. It is an 
experience that militates against the production of language. It manifests as being stopped 
in the action of reading and in the action of speaking about that which one is reading or 
                                                
282 Irigaray, This Sex, pp. 78-89; Ce Sexe, p. 76.  
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has read. I call this an affect as well as an effect for several reasons. First, to invoke the 
language of intensities that many affect theorists employ, it is viscerally experienced as 
such: it is a physical sensation, a temporary paralysis. Furthermore, insofar as it is an 
experience of muteness or being reduced to silence, it bears an intimate relationship both 
to language and to that which escapes it. In the moment of being afflicted or struck by 
such an affective intensity, it is difficult, if not impossible, to say what it is that is 
affecting one. Only afterward can it be named, described, and discussed. For as I noted 
previously in discussing Teresa Brennan’s work on the transmission of affect, the 
argument that affects make their way between people and objects in no way stakes a 
claim to the identity of the thoughts and feelings that result from such transmission.  The 
experience of being stymied as a reader might make one person angry, another bitter, 
another exhilarated, another resolve to work harder, another resolve never to read 
anything by this author again, another racked with guilt and self-doubt, and so forth. If 
we read Irigaray to the letter, one could make the case that ultimately the most rigorous 
reading of her work—rigor, here, indicating not force but rather fidelity, attentiveness, 
and care—consists only in reading her, inhabiting a mute paralysis that refuses to engage 
in the act of translating her work into another set of signifiers in order to comment upon 
it.   
Of course, there is only so far one can go if the telos of one’s work is the 
disruption of the conversation, and I am far from suggesting that the task of philosophy is 
to shut down the production of discourse. But it is well to note that the act of making 
discourse halt, for a very specific reason and as an ethical stance, can itself be a 
profoundly constructive and even transformative moment. And the ability to forcibly 
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enact the experience of a certain subject position in one’s reader, however momentarily, 
is a profoundly difficult task.  Irigaray’s specific brand of unintelligibility is, I think, 
quite distinctive in its moral dimension. It is a response to the conviction that Lacan was 
unfortunately correct when he declared that woman cannot speak, and that his assertion 
that either women or men can easily inhabit the masculine or feminine subject positions 
that he outlines in Encore is all too glib. Until the conditions in and through which 
women can be speaking subjects qua women are realized, all that Irigaray can do is point 
to the ways in which the feminine upholds discourse, and write it as an unintelligible but 
distinctly “disruptive excess.” All this is evident from her own declarations in “Pouvoir 
du discours.” What remains unstated but is, I think, crucial, is the way that the disruption 
resonates not only within Irigaray’s texts but within the rest of the reader’s sensorium, a 
disruptive intensity that intervenes at the level of the production of speech and 
temporarily prohibits it.  It is one thing to contemplate the present impossibility of 
speaking as a woman. It is quite another to endure a sensation, however temporary, of an 
enforced muteness, to inhabit for a strangled moment—willingly or not—the subject 
position against which Irigaray writes.    
Affect reveals itself in a less than subordinate role, as an integral component of 
the effects of writing, in this moment in which all speech and intellectual response seems 
maybe impossible, definitely dubious, and even potentially morally wrong. This is why I 
cited Charles Hirschkind earlier on the ways in which academic readers have been trained 
to ignore almost all other forms of reception in the process of reading. It requires a 
profound disruption and even suspension of the possibility of engaging in the protocols of 
this type of reading in order to bring affective response into view. Lacan, who was 
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himself so distrustful of affect, knew this, as Amy Hollywood points out in Sensible 
Ecstasy. Hollywood is highly attentive to the ways in which Lacan’s work provokes a 
response. Reading him primarily in Encore, his twentieth seminar, she calls this response 
“affect” and asserts—citing as evidence his statement in Encore, “That formulation is 
carefully designed to have an effect, like all those I proffer”—that “Lacan here makes 
clear that the ultimate goal of psychoanalysis is not scientific knowledge but the eruption 
of affect in and through language.”283 Lacan, I think it is safe to say, always sought and 
generally succeeded in producing effects. But affect is not actively on his agenda until 
Encore, where he is interested in the possibility of a non-phallic jouissance, a jouissance 
of the beyond, that of the feminine and/or the mystical.284 He writes in Encore, 
“Llanguage [Lalangue] affects us first of all by everything it brings with it by way of 
effects that are affects.”285 The formulation lalangue indicates Lacan’s attention to that in 
language which supports its articulable aspects but is not in itself susceptible to 
articulation, but is nonetheless the cause of effects and affects, two terms that run 
together here both for Lacan and, as a result, for Hollywood. But simply attending to 
Lacan’s interest in affect/effect here tends to obliterate his early position regarding affect 
(which category, I would comment, even when it does arise in the context of Encore, is 
not subject to theorization; it is enough for Lacan to comment that he is interested in 
producing effects/affects).   
                                                
283 Amy Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy, p. 162.   
 
284 With the notable exception of Seminar X, on anxiety (angoisse), which for Lacan has a special status 
among affects.  
 
285 Jacques Lacan, “The rat in the maze,” Encore, p. 139; “Le rat dans le labyrinthe,” p. 127.  
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Lacan denies affect the peculiarly truthful status that Freud grants it, and 
particularly the idea that one could “work on affects directly,” as Bruce Fink puts it, in 
contradistinction to many (still) prevailing therapeutic notions. In his first seminar, Lacan 
insisted that the “affective is not like a special density which would [somehow] escape an 
intellectual accounting. It is not to be found in a mythical region beyond symbol 
production which supposedly precedes discursive formation.”286  Another way to put it is 
this: whether in the analytic situation or as he conducted his seminars, Lacan is always 
primarily interested to intervene at the level of the symbolic, not in the pre-discursive, for 
he denies the existence of anything pre-discursive that is separable from language.  This 
is (one of the reasons) why he is so concerned with the signifier and its irreducibility to 
the signified. Signifiers produce effects, to be sure. This could reasonably be called a 
Lacanian doctrine, especially when one considers his analytic techniques such as 
intermittent and oracular speech, his desire to “hit the real,” his attentiveness to the 
specificity of patients’ utterances, the short session, and so forth.287 And I would suggest 
that most of these techniques are also in evidence to varying degrees in his seminars.  But 
his insistence that transformation, in analysis, must take place within the symbolic 
order—as a corrective to the notion that one can or should work to alter the imaginary—
suggests to me that while it might be quite accurate to claim that the goal of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is to produce effects, that should not be so neatly elided with affects, and 
it should be amended to include the notion that such effects should always result in the 
production of more words.  To be sure, Encore represents a new turn for Lacan insofar as 
                                                
286 Cited in Bruce Fink, Lacan to the Letter: Reading Écrits Closely, p. 51.  
 
287 For a fantastic and highly readable account of the clinical practices of Lacanian psychoanalysis, see 
Bruce Fink (translator of the most recent, complete English edition of Écrits and practicing Lacanian 
analyst), A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis, especially Part One.  
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he expressly situates himself on the side of the bewildering “mystical jaculations” of 
those who have perceived that there must be a jouissance of the beyond: he instructs his 
readers to drop a footnote in order to “’Add to that list [of mystics/mystical writings] 
Jacques Lacan’s Écrits,’” he says, “because it’s of the same order.”288 Amy Hollywood 
takes him at his meaning, here, as she contends that he aligns himself with mystic 
discourse, but not at his word. In a footnote, off-stage, he can be situated on the side of 
the feminine. But one should not forget that he is also the rest of the text, above the bar.  
I am particularly interested in Hollywood’s argument insofar as she understands 
his effects to be communicative of affect and specifically of jouissance.289 To be sure, in 
Encore, Lacan is very, for lack of a better word, bodily. The intimate relationship 
between the signifier and the bodily is articulated repeatedly, including the notion that the 
signifier returns us to the body, and that its effects are felt. Language, he repeats again 
and again, is not just about communication.  But if I could put it in Lacanian terms, what 
I would want to say is that Irigaray’s and Lacan’s interventions aim to effect change 
within different registers: Lacan’s within the symbolic, Irigaray’s within the imaginary.  
What all of this gets at, the seemingly minor differences between Lacan’s and Irigaray’s 
affects and effects, is that it is no coincidence that talking about affective transmission 
from texts leads me to Lacan, Kristeva, Irigaray, all practicing analysts as well as 
psychoanalytic theorists, who are all interested in the ability of analysis (please hear that 
word in every possible register) to effect transformation, whether in the register of the 
symbolic or the imaginary or both. It makes a kind of immediate sense in the context of 
                                                
288 Lacan, “God and Woman’s Jouissance,” Encore, p. 76; “Dieu et la Jouissance de la Femme,” Encore, p. 
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289 Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy, p. 163.  
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their work that it may not in the logic of other sorts of texts, which is not to say that those 
cannot convey affective intensities.  For analysis in their texts, in their practices, 
presupposes a belief in such transformation, the condition of the possibility of which is 
contingent on the understanding that something has to occur, something has to arrive, in 
order to make what is presently inarticulable into something that is subject to 
symbolization in one way or another, whether in words or images. This is part of what 
Freud understood when he realized that it was utterly insufficient for him to simply 
inform his patients of their diagnosis and expect them to get better.  Or, put in terms of 
Lacanian analytic practice, when you “hit the real,” something unspeakable can be 
spoken. In Kristeva’s terms, psychoanalysis is about connecting the semiotic and the 
symbolic, restoring language to the speaking subject. And this is essentially what I am 
talking about here, the recognition that the production of new speech—in philosophy as 
well as in analysis—stands and falls with the willingness to be affected by something that 
cannot, at least for a long, uncomfortable, impossibly fragile moment (it could be seconds 
or it could be years) be articulated. A reading is affective, in other words, insofar as it 
contains the possibility for transformation.  
I think Lacan understands this clearly, although I am dubious of the claim that 
Encore creates jouissance in its readers, especially the non-phallic jouissance that is its 
subject. This has certainly not been the case for the vast majority of feminist 
commentators on Encore I have encountered. And I would also distinguish Lacan’s 
effects from Irigaray’s in “La Mystérique” because the inability to symbolize is fraught 
for her in a way that it is not for Lacan, despite the fact that she largely adopts (and 
perhaps even radicalizes) his doctrine on this point. While Lacan’s own unintelligibility 
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is most definitely rigorous and certainly not totally dissimilar from Irigaray’s, especially 
in their mutual delight in wordplay and polysemy, it has different aims and a markedly 
different tenor.290 I want to take seriously Hollywood’s astute comment regarding “La 
Mystérique,” which could never map onto Encore: “Irigaray reduces mystical language to 
pure affect—a barely articulated song that conveys emotion with little if any signifying 
power.”291  For as Hollywood notes, the elle/soul of the essay has a peculiar relationship 
to words.  
She cannot specify exactly what she wants. Words begin to fail her. She senses something  
remains to be said that resists all speech, that can at best be stammered out.  All the words  
are weak, worn out, unfit to translate anything. For it is no longer a matter of longing for  
some determinable attribute, some mode of essence, some face of presence. What is expected is  
neither a this nor a that, not a here any more than a there. No being, no places are designated.  
So the best plan is to abstain from all discourse, to keep quiet, or else utter only a sound so 
inarticulate that it barely forms a song.292 
 
Irigaray here gives the reader a gift. She relieves her of the necessity, or the 
responsibility, to decipher. There is a distinct freedom here, in which it is not only 
legitimate but necessary to fail to understand, just as the soul fails to speak. The reader 
can simply turn the text around, like a picture-puzzle, playing over the words. As I have 
argued, Irigaray in “La Mystérique” and elsewhere submits the reader to the position of 
the feminine within discourse, which is the problem that she tackles here and throughout 
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291 Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy, p. 197, emphasis mine.  
 
292 Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, emphasis in original, p. 193; Speculum de l’autre femme, p. 
241.  
 183 
her work. But with that forceful silencing comes the concomitant possibility—let us 
rather say the invitation—to try on an alternative subjectivity qua reader, a position that 
is maybe a little abject or maybe even quite a lot, that is fundamentally deferential and 
viscerally as well as cognitively aware of the almost laughable implausibility and, what is 
more, the undesirability of the position of the reader as decoder. And if Irigaray is read 
well, the forbidding of translation will occur at the level of cognition as well. For while I 
am interested in the phenomenon of the textual transmission of affect in itself, I am also 
concerned in this context with what that transmission subsequently makes possible for the 
reader, which will not be articulated entirely or even primarily in terms of affective 
sensation. For affect to mean in a philosophical text will require translation, for it is well 
to heed Kristeva’s warning, learned from her reading of Duras, that the experience of 
being silenced as a reader must only be a moment.  
“La Mystérique” itself gives its reader more than a hint as to what possibilities can 
proceed from that moment. For in addition to its emphasis on language, it is also an 
examination of possible routes towards figuring alternate forms of female subjectivity.  
As I have emphasized before, Irigaray does not believe that such forms can be fully 
articulated or inhabited at present. And I would add that I do not see her as elevating the 
mystic to the status of some sort of ideal femininity. Nonetheless, she sees productive 
possibilities in the radically intersubjective mystical soul of ““La Mystérique,” “outside 
of all self-as-same”: 
“She is transformed into Him in her love: this is the secret of their exchange. In her and/or  
outside her, as, in her jouissance, she loses all sense of corporeal boundary [car en sa  
jouissance ses entrailles s’ouvrent et s’épanchent indéfiniment].... 
 Thus “God” will prove to have been her best lover since he separates her from  
herself only by that space of her jouissance where she finds Him/herself.... 
 And if someone were to object that, with the Good thus within her, she no longer 
needs to receive it, she would reply in her ateleological way that, for her, the one doesn’t  
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rule out the other.”293 
 
Moreover, the soul as it opens is figured in terms of desire as openness; her relationship 
to the other is capacious, unbounded; she discovers not only a broad expanse of 
emptiness within her—“the ‘I’ is empty still, even more empty, opening wide in rapture 
of soul”—but at the same time it is an emptiness that is filled with herself/Him. The 
image of her openness is literally visceral. The translation has it that she loses her “sense 
of corporeal boundary”; in the French, her entrails open up and pour out of her. But every 
time she loses herself, she finds herself, although a radically reconfigured self. She is not 
simply subsumed into him, but He also into her, and yet this transformative jouissance is 
only possible because her radical openness and emptying-out never comes at the cost of 
being severed from (touching) herself.  
The work of affect as silencing, I have argued, creates an openness in the reader 
who is willing to endure it. It is an openness that compels a surrender to the possibility of 
new subjectivities, and radical openness is one of the great themes of the piece itself. 
Subjectivity here is always already split, of course, but not in a sense that is at all tragic, 
that would reveal a mourning at some primordial, however inaccessible unity. Irigaray’s 
text compels, however, a joyful surrender to the possibility of this intersubjectivity, for 
such loss of boundaries is celebrated rather than mourned. Ecstasy and silence, here, are 
not mutually exclusive. The effect cannot be duplicated in simple declarative sentences 
with full stops.  
 
 
 
                                                
293 Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, pp. 200-202; Speculum de l’autre femme, pp. 250-252.  
 185 
VI. Conclusion  
I have juxtaposed affect and unintelligibility not in order to elide the difference 
between these two categories, for I believe they are distinct, but rather to make the 
affective dimension of reading appear. Unintelligibility makes this possible in a 
distinctive way, when it frustrates habits and preconceptions and brings response 
ineluctably into view.  This must be understood as a legitimate and distinctly 
philosophical strategy, in order for philosophy—as well as psychoanalysis, as well as 
literature—to speak affect and allow it to be heard.  But there exists already a 
commonsense understanding that affect is the proper purview both of literature and 
psychoanalysis. It is in philosophy that affect and its associates, feeling and desire, 
remain suspect, and where, as such, they must plead their case. And as Irigaray famously 
wrote, it is precisely the texts, figures, tropes, and metaphors of philosophy that we must 
“challenge and disrupt,” insofar as it is philosophy that “constitutes the discourse on 
discourse.”294  
It would be wrong to characterize this disruption that Irigaray both mandates and 
enacts as an operation entirely of subversion or correction.  It is also an act of love, if not 
always of reverence. Moreover, it is also a philosophical project that unfolds within the 
well-established tradition of immanent critique. Why it matters that Irigaray (or Kristeva, 
for that matter) be read as a philosopher is a slightly different question than what is at 
issue here, although I regard it as self-evident that she should. As Margaret Whitford 
writes, obviously tired of defending this eminently defensible position: “she is engaged in 
that most philosophical of enterprises: philosophy examining its own claims and its own 
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presuppositions.”295 What I am more concerned here to maintain is why affect should be 
not only understood but also deliberately deployed as a distinctly philosophical strategy. 
For affect forces us, as I have demonstrated in the case of Kristeva and Duras as well as 
Schlegel and Irigaray, into fundamentally different relationships with/toward a text and 
its “contents,” so to speak. This new relationship permits the foregrounding of the words 
of the texts and their relationships to each other as an aesthetic object that the reader can 
turn around and around, suspending “translation,” with often surprising consequences. In 
the absence of the need to decipher and immediately to decide, certain questions can be 
temporarily suspended or bracketed, and others can emerge. In the case of Irigaray, for 
instance, the single issue that so preoccupied at least the first wave of scholarship on her 
work and that continues to require comment by all subsequent interpreters is the question 
of whether or not she is an essentialist. But in spite of the fact that the majority of 
Irigaray scholars have roundly negatived this proposition, this (mis-)understanding 
persists. Surely it must mean something that casual students of Irigaray, as well as the 
initial scholarly reception, locate something essentialist in Irigaray.296 But if we attend 
primarily, for a moment, to the affective dimension of her work, and allow the setting of 
signifiers of femininity in a commentary on Plato or Nietzsche or Lacan to work on us 
without scrambling immediately to assign propositional meaning to it, the conflict drops 
out. The laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle are temporarily suspended. What 
matters affectively are the effects of the insertion of tropes and figures of feminine 
morphology into their discourses, the effects of these juxtapositions. And these effects 
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296 For a survey of these debates as well as a nuanced dissection of the arguments regarding Irigaray’s 
essentialism, see Naomi Schor, “Previous Engagements: The Receptions of Irigaray” and “This 
Essentialism Which Is Not One: Coming to Grips with Irigaray,” in Engaging with Irigaray.  
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can force us into different ways of being and knowing; of relating and behaving; of 
seeing and of reading. Put differently and transposed into eminently familiar categories: 
ontology and epistemology, ethics and aesthetics. 
 If philosophy learns not only to speak affect, as Kristeva and Irigaray do, but to 
understand it as a legitimate philosophical strategy, there results a far more capacious 
conception of what constitutes rigorous philosophy. And this conception will always 
include the question of style, as once the bonds of ready intelligibility are slipped, the 
necessity of attending to presentation becomes inescapable. What is more, it also 
contributes a new vision of rigor, which would not simply consist in systematicity or 
thoroughness, although neither would it prohibit or disdain these. If rigor ceases simply 
to indicate these criteria, it need not become a placeholder word, emptied out, an 
insubstantial way to say that someone is good at what they do without indicating anything 
more precisely about it. Rather than becoming devalued, it simply becomes less rigid and 
more capacious. There is room within the concept of rigor to expand to include 
philosophical effects and affects, the quality of forcing a reader to bind with the text, to 
compel at least a temporary acquiescence to its protocols. Affect compels surrender, 
compels response, attentiveness, and receptivity. This quality of inevitability, of 
unavoidability, has always been a marker of philosophical rigor, identifying that—
whether thought or claim or method—with which subsequent philosophy must contend.  
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